MEMORIES OF NATIONS AND STATES: INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN POST-SOVIET EURASIA

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The national identities of post-Soviet societies profoundly influenced the politics and economics of Eurasia during the 1990s. These identities varied along two distinct but related dimensions: their content and contestation. Nationalist movements throughout post-Soviet Eurasia invoked their nations in support of specific purposes, which frequently cast Russia as the nation’s most important “other” and the state from which autonomy and security must be sought. Nationalists therefore offered specific proposals for the content of their societies’ collective identities. But not everyone in these societies shared the priorities of their nationalist movements. Indeed, the international relations among post-Soviet states often revolved around one central question: did post-Soviet societies and politicians agree with their nationalists or not? The former Communists played a decisive role in contesting the content of national identity. One of the defining differences among post-Soviet states during the 1990s was the political and ideological relationship in each one between the formerly Communist élites and the nationalists—whether the former Communists marginalized the nationalists, arrested them, coopted them, bargained with them, or even tried to become like them. These different relationships revealed different degrees and kinds of societal consensus about national identity after Soviet rule.

Post-Soviet societies sorted themselves into roughly three groups.¹ One included the former republics on the Baltic littoral: Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. In the three new Baltic states the nationalist movements’ authority and fundamental goals were relatively uncontested during the 1990s; their demands for political-economic reorientation toward Europe, their interpretation of dependence on Russia as a security threat, and their portrayal of Russia as the nation’s defining “other” influenced their governments’ policies. Even Communist successor parties in the three states adopted the rhetoric and goals of the nationalists.² In a second group of countries—including Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova—the nationalists and former Communists remained deadlocked, their respective bases of support divided largely along regional lines. Regional contestation of national identity in these four states prevented their governments from decisively choosing a political-economic orientation toward either West or East. Finally, a third group of states—
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—thoroughly marginalized the nationalist movements within them. The nationalists’ ideas and policy proposals in these six societies were unpopular among both the political élites, dominated by former Communists, and the mass public.

These national identities—and the social and political debates they embodied—affected a wide range of policies during the 1990s, including those dealing with language, citizenship, economic and political reform, security, and foreign affairs. National identities were among the social facts of post-Soviet Eurasia. That is, identities can be treated as independent variables amenable to systematic analysis for the purposes of creating falsifiable causal arguments.¹

In this paper I treat the national identities of post-Soviet societies as dependent variables. I offer a preliminary answer to the question of the historical origins of the variation among these societies’ identities. By focusing on one country from each of the three patterns—Lithuania, Ukraine, and Belarus—I explore the alternative arguments that have been proposed for their social and political divergence. All of the alternatives are informed by history: something about the past has influenced the present. Many of the differences among post-Soviet national identities pre-dated the fall of the Soviet Union and reflected a variety of historical, institutional, and cultural experiences. The difficult analytical issue is sorting out what exactly about the past is most relevant for contemporary politics. The most compelling arguments include: prior experience with statehood; the timing of the republics’ incorporation into the USSR; the mechanism of their incorporation; and the spread of literacy. None of these, I argue, can account fully for the differences among even Lithuania, Ukraine, and Belarus, much less all 14 non-Russian post-Soviet societies. Statehood, the timing and mechanism of incorporation, and literacy interacted in complex ways in the territories that eventually became these three states. They interacted through the institutional history of the Soviet Union, but also through the institutional histories of two other empires whose borders met in the region: the Habsburg and the Romanov. The most compelling argument for the differences among Lithuania, Ukraine, and Belarus is in some ways also the most straightforward: they diverged because of the institutional contexts within which nationalist movements arose in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In particular, those territories that experienced either independent statehood or Habsburg rule produced influential nationalist movements, and those same territories remained strongholds of nationalist sentiment during and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ultimately, the way these variables mattered was through their influence on the development and institutionalization of constructed, social memory in the former Soviet Union—the memories of states within Lithuanian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian nations.

In this article I first offer a narrative of the historical development of Lithuanian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian nationalist movements and national identities. Second, I suggest the ways in which alternative arguments relate to the institutional history of the three states. Finally, I present a potentially unsatisfying, but useful, conclusion:
no single variable can account fully for the variety of post-Soviet identities, though some are clearly more general than others. This means that it is worthwhile to explore several institutional histories in order to understand post-Soviet national identities: in addition to the history of national-federalism in the USSR, the management of ethnic heterogeneity by the Habsburg and Romanov authorities decisively influenced the development of national identities on the borderlands between them.

**History, Institutions, and Identity in Lithuania, Ukraine, and Belarus**

**Lithuania**

Lithuanians—or, more precisely, the people who have lived on the territory of the state we now call Lithuania—have not always shared the particular content of their national identity that they now share. Lithuanians have not always defined their identity primarily in opposition to Russia; they have not always sought an independent state; and they were not always committed to their Europeanness. These are characteristics primarily of late twentieth-century Lithuanian nationalism. The content of Lithuanian national identity is a historical outcome, and a relatively recent one at that.

**The Rise and Fall of the Interwar Lithuanian State**

The territory of contemporary Lithuania was once part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. After the partitions of the Commonwealth, 1772–1795, most of what is now Lithuania became a western province of the Russian Empire. This was well before nationhood had become widely institutionalized in the world, and certainly before a modern Lithuanian national consciousness had emerged.

The first stirrings of nationalist activity in the Lithuanian territory came in the 1880s. At the turn of the century, however, a coherently Lithuanian national consciousness was limited to the intelligentsia and, increasingly, a Lithuanian diaspora outside of Russia. At this time, Lithuanians were not “more nationalist” than the populations of other western provinces of the empire, such as Ukrainians or Belarusians. As historian Ronald Grigor Suny argues, Lithuanians were similar to Belarusians in the empire, with their “peasant composition and low level of national consciousness.” Indeed, the Lithuanian cultural élite was thoroughly Polonized, and people who considered themselves Lithuanians—with the ethno-national connotation the designation carries today—were noticeably absent from urban areas in the province.

The goals of emergent Lithuanian nationalists were modest: rather than statehood, in 1905 the Great Lithuanian Assembly in Vilnius demanded an autonomous and democratic Lithuanian province still within the tsarist empire. Lithuanians’ pre-1914 nationalism could not therefore have caused their independent statehood. Suny
concludes, “As in many other regions of the western borderlands, the creation of an independent Lithuania was not the result of a broad-based and coherent nationalist movement that realized long-held aspirations to nationhood.” Rather, the establishment of an independent Lithuanian state resulted from German eastern diplomacy, the weakness of the Russian state, and British policies in the Baltic region. Alfred Erich Senn, a scholar of Lithuanian political history, concludes that “the decisive factor in the establishment of the Lithuanian national state was the existence of a titanic power struggle in Eastern Europe in 1918–20.”

During Lithuania’s interwar statehood political élites succeeded in their project of consolidating a coherent Lithuanian national identity. Lithuanian nationalists took full advantage of the political opportunity given to them by the collapse of Germany and Russia, and Lithuanian nationalism became a broad-based cultural phenomenon. Between 1920 and 1940, Lithuanians found themselves, for the first time in modern history, with the authority and space to “standardize their language, to establish an educational system and a literary culture based on that language, and to form institutions that strengthened Lithuanian national consciousness.” Twenty years of the government’s self-conscious efforts to turn the population of the Lithuanian territory into Lithuanians were consequential. During these years, the authority of a specific Lithuanian nationalist vision was relatively uncontested.

The power vacuum in eastern Europe that created political space for Lithuania’s interwar state was eventually filled, however, by the expansion of German and Soviet power. Soviet troops occupied Lithuania in June 1940, and the state was formally incorporated into the Soviet Union as a constituent republic two months later. Although the German army occupied Lithuania for most of the war, the Soviets returned in July 1944 and remained, despite the guerilla war between anti-Soviet resistance and Soviet security forces that continued as late as 1952.

The Rise of Sajudis and the Fall of Soviet Lithuania

An opportunity for change emerged with perestroika. A number of Lithuanian intellectuals in the Academy of Sciences created the Lietuvos Persitvarkymo Sajudis, or Lithuanian Movement for Restructuring (Perestroika), which, at first, merely sought to promote political change and independence from the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPL). The Movement, or Sajudis, as it came to be known, held its founding congress in October 1988, where it proclaimed its support of perestroika and proposed greater Lithuanian autonomy within the Soviet federation and more economic self-management. In November Sajudis elected Vytautas Landsbergis, a music professor, as its president and adopted increasingly radical goals regarding Lithuania’s place in the Soviet Union. Sajudis was transformed from a movement for perestroika into a nationalist front demanding independent statehood in the space of little more than a year.

The CPL’s reaction to Sajudis during its rise to prominence varied over time.
Originally, the CPL sought to contain Sajudis influence, but eventually embraced Sajudis’s support of a new model of Soviet federalism put forward by Estonian nationalists. The Party lacked Sajudis’s resolve, at least early on. Under pressure from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the CPL backed down from the Estonian federal model.

However, Algirdas Brazauskas, a young party leader, pushed the Party to change more quickly with the times. Brazauskas’s popularity and political savvy led to his appointment on 20 October 1988 as First Secretary of the CPL, the Party’s highest post. Brazauskas was clearly in touch with Lithuanian sentiment regarding the opportunity for change presented by perestroika. Two days after his appointment, Brazauskas addressed the founding congress of Sajudis, his first major public audience as First Secretary. Attempting to connect with Lithuania’s increasingly influential nationalists, he told Sajudis, “on matters of principle, we think alike.” A second speech he gave to the congress revealed his commitment to change, as he spoke of the “revival of Lithuanian national consciousness.”

When First Secretary Brazauskas called the twentieth congress of the CPL in December 1989, he proposed a dramatic break with the past. At the congress, the CPL announced its independence from the CPSU. Lithuania’s Communists thus sent a clear message to the Lithuanian public and to Moscow, where Soviet authorities condemned the move. Afterwards, the CPL cooperated more intensively with Sajudis during the drive toward independence. Indeed, the membership of Sajudis and the Communist Party of Lithuania increasingly overlapped: approximately half of the Initiative Group that founded Sajudis were Party members. And when the Party elected its new Central Committee in 1989, over half of its members were of self-described “Sajudis orientation.” Later, in 1990, the CPL recast itself as a social democratic party, “in the West European tradition,” and renamed itself the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (Lietuvos Demokratine Darbo Partija, or LDDP).

Events moved quickly during 1990. Gorbachev visited Lithuania in January to campaign against secession from the Union. However, in the February 1990 elections to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, independence-minded Sajudis candidates won more than 70% of the seats. A month later, in March, the Supreme Soviet voted 124–0 to declare independence from the Soviet Union. Landsbergis of Sajudis was elected Chairman of the Soviet, a parliamentary post that also made him the newly declared state’s first president.

The Politics of Nationalism in Post-Soviet Lithuania

Although other nationalist political parties emerged after independence, Sajudis was the most prominent and influential proponent of a vision for the future of the nation and set of purposes for the state. In 1993, Sajudis, which had been only a movement rather than an official party, reorganized itself as a political party called Homeland
Union, which remained the dominant nationalist party throughout the decade.

Homeland Union’s leaders, and most of Lithuania’s other nationalists, organized its policy proposals around three main ideas. First, they argued that Lithuania’s interwar state was lost to Soviet influence, which they associated with Russia, and that after the Cold War Lithuania’s newly regained statehood was threatened most by Russia. A strong state was therefore to be an important defense of the sovereignty of the Lithuanian nation. Second, Lithuania’s nationalists argued that economic dependence on Russia was the state’s primary security threat. Third, they argued that the state should therefore “reorient” its politics and economy from East to West. That is, Lithuania should cultivate close economic relationships with “European” states and reduce its economic dependence on Russia. And while the Lithuanian government should become part of the EU, NATO, and other Western institutions, it should reject under all circumstances multilateral, institutionalized economic and political relationships with post-Soviet states as a group, especially the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Sajudis, and later Homeland Union, essentially put forward specific proposals for the content of Lithuanian national identity. These ideas and policy proposals became popular between 1988 and 1991, when Lithuania was on its way to independent statehood. Almost all Lithuanians accepted the arguments of these nationalists. There were no influential organized groups that contested them. Lithuanians largely agreed on what it meant to be Lithuanian, what the government should do in its relations with other governments, and what were the purposes of the state. As Soviet authority collapsed, the popularity of these ideas was reflected in the popularity of Sajudis itself, which swept the 1989 elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies and 1990 elections to the parliament.

The coherence and consensus of Lithuanian national identity were even more clearly illustrated when Sajudis lost parliamentary and presidential elections to former Communists several years later. In October 1992, a little over a year after the Soviet authorities recognized Lithuanian independence, Lithuania was the first country in eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union to return its former Communists to power in an election. Lithuanians gave the LDDP a parliamentary majority in 1992 and elected the former First Secretary Brazauskas in the 1993 presidential election. For five decisive years in the middle of the decade, Lithuania was ruled by essentially the same party that had controlled the republic during the Soviet era, and many of its leaders were the same people, the old nomenklatura. To many outside observers, particularly in the West, the return of the LDDP and Brazauskas was a shocking return to the Communist past, and the repetition of the “Lithuanian syndrome” in several other post-socialist states led to great concern about these societies’ commitments to change.

Why did Lithuanians trust their former Communists to return to power? Lithuania’s former Communists were unlike many former Communists throughout the region, Lithuanians seemed to believe. Of course, it helped that Brazauskas had
cooperated with *Sajudis*, and had broken with the CPSU even before formal independence had arrived. Most Lithuanians trusted the commitment of the LDDP and Brazauskas to an independent Lithuanian state. After Brazauskas was elected President, he explained that Lithuanians knew they could trust the former Communists, because “in the former Communist Party maybe three percent were communists and the rest were just members.” In other words, everyone knew that they never really meant it.

Indeed, Lithuania’s former Communists had become nationalists, in the sense that they used the symbol of the nation in the same ways that *Sajudis* and Homeland Union did, and to legitimate the same foreign policy goals. Lithuanians elected a nationalist, pro-European LDDP in 1992, which had foreign policy goals that were essentially identical to those of the original nationalists. Thus, Lithuania’s former Communists proclaimed the nationalists’ main goals as their own as well. As an LDDP leader explained, in Lithuania “the Communists are more nationalist than the nationalists,” because they are better at achieving the same goals.

In sum, Lithuanians, especially the Lithuanian political élites elected during the 1990s, agreed on the meaning of their national identity and on the fundamental purposes of their statehood, purposes derived from their shared historical memory of the interwar Lithuanian state and their shared interpretation of the Soviet Union as an empire that had denied them their sovereignty. In the late 1980s *Sajudis* emerged as a nationalist movement that proposed pro-European and anti-Soviet content for their society’s identity, and they were successful. Most significantly, Lithuania’s former Communists, the other major political force in the country, agreed, and adopted the foreign policy goals and national symbolism of *Sajudis*. The prevailing construction of Lithuanian national identity was both clear and consensual.

**Ukraine**

Russian leaders have perpetuated the idea of a Ukraine intimately integrated with Russia since 1654, when the Treaty of Pereiaslav institutionalized the tsar’s authority over Ukrainian territory. However, Pereiaslav incorporated only parts of what is now eastern Ukraine into the tsarist empire. Central Ukraine was incorporated almost 150 years later in 1793–1795, after the last partition of Poland. Then, in the middle of the twentieth century, the Soviet Union annexed western Ukraine, which includes Galicia and Volhynia (1939), Bukovina (1940), and Carpatho Rus/Ruthenia (1945). Galicia, Bukovina, and Carpatho Rus/Ruthenia had never been part of a Russian or Soviet state prior to their incorporation into the Ukrainian SSR. Thus, Ukraine, as it exists after 1991, does not even have a singular history, much less a single type of historical relationship to Russian authority and identity.

The most distinctive feature of Ukrainian history is its regional diversity, which ultimately influenced the content and contestation of Ukrainian national identity in powerful ways. In particular, this diversity of historical experience within the
Ukrainian state and society produced diverse interpretations of Ukrainian national identity after 1991. The regional contestation of Ukrainian national identity is a result of the shifting boundaries and changing institutional contexts within which Ukrainian nationalists, as well as Habsburg, Romanov, and Soviet bureaucrats, have sought their cultural, economic, and political goals.

Nationalists and the Idea of Ukraine under the Romanovs and the Habsburgs

Although the western regions of post-Soviet Ukraine eventually became the country’s stronghold of nationalist sentiment, nationalists first attempted to construct a Ukrainian identity distinct from Russia’s in central and eastern Ukraine, under Romanov rule, in the 1820s and 1830s. However, these first Ukrainian nationalists elicited a severe reaction from the tsarist authorities. The Polish Insurrection of 1863 had brought nationality issues in the western borderlands of the empire to the attention of the tsarist regime. As a measure to deal with the problem the empire banned the Ukrainian language in 1876. The development of a distinctively Ukrainian identity, independent, as the nationalists proposed, of a broader Russian identity, was a serious threat to the identity project that motivated Moscow. The regime of the Russian Empire considered both Ukrainians and Belarusians to be part of a Russian identity that included them all—Great Russians, Little Russians (Ukrainians), and White Russians (Belarusians). Thus, although Ukrainian nationalists might have first succeeded in mobilizing popular support for a nationalist movement in eastern Ukraine, Russian authorities effectively hindered the development of Ukrainian national consciousness by Russifying the language, eliminating distinctively Ukrainian institutions, and, giving Ukrainian élites favored positions in the empire’s administration to win their loyalty.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian speakers living under Habsburg rule in the west also began to propose specific content for a Ukrainian national identity that included east and central Ukrainians and was defined by its differences from that of both Poles and Russians, and thus against the Polonophile and Russophile identities embraced by many élites in their society. This attempt, and the rising national consciousness associated with it, began later than it had in the east. Only in the late nineteenth century did the Ukrainian-speaking population in these eastern territories of the Habsburg empire begin to refer to themselves as “Ukrainians.” This identity project, the fashioning of Ukrainian national identity within Austrian territory but for a population that lived outside Austrian territory as well, required considerable intellectual flexibility on the part of nationally conscious Ukrainians who had never shared a province, much less a state, with Ukrainians who lived in the Russian Empire.

During this Ukrainian nationalist revival, the most influential region of what would become western Ukraine was Galicia, then part of the Habsburg empire. According to historian Orest Subtelny, in Galicia, “nationally conscious Ukrainian intellectuals took advantage of the relative freedom allowed by the Habsburgs” to engage in the
cultural politics of nation making. Not only was the Habsburg regime more liberal than the Romanovs to the east, it also tolerated, and occasionally encouraged, the rise of Ukrainian nationalism in Galicia as a counterweight to Polish influence in the region. As Suny concludes, Austrian Galicia thus became the “center for literary expression and popular nationalism,” while Ukrainians in Russia developed “neither a coherent mass-based national movement nor even a widely shared sense of a Ukrainian nation.” Some of eastern Ukraine’s persecuted nationalists fled to Austrian Galicia, strengthening both the nationalist movement and their sense of solidarity across the boundary between the two empires.

The Russian Revolution in 1917 and the end of the First World War initiated chaotic years on the territories of the collapsed Habsburg and Romanov empires and the several nascent Ukrainian states that emerged. The Ukrainian Central Rada declared an independent state based in Kyiv in January 1918, but this Ukrainian People’s Republic lasted less than a year. After several more violent years of ebbing and flowing independence and war, Soviet authorities subjugated the territories that had been part of the Romanov empire and incorporated them into the Ukrainian SSR, also based in Kyiv. West Ukrainian nationalists based in L’viv, in Galicia, declared independence for the short-lived West Ukrainian National Republic in November 1918, only to lose independence to Poland in 1919. A few small provinces populated predominantly by Ukrainian speakers were annexed to neighboring states—Bukovina to Romania, Carpatho Rus/Ruthenia to Czechoslovakia.

Essentially, however, Ukrainian territories were divided between interwar Poland, which included most of western Ukraine, and the Soviet Union, which controlled central and eastern Ukraine, still ruled from Russia after several centuries. Historically separate before the war, western and eastern Ukraine also remained apart between the World Wars, and their cultural and political experiences under the Poles and Soviets continued to diverge.

**Uniting Ukraine under the Soviets**

Many Ukrainian nationalists, in both the eastern and western regions, had sought to unify all Ukrainians into a single state for a century or more. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin achieved the goal for them in 1945, when Soviet authorities incorporated western Ukraine into the Ukrainian SSR. As historian Roman Szporluk notes, the Soviet annexation of western Ukraine “may have been one of Stalin’s most fateful decisions during the years from 1939 to 1945.”

This was because western Ukraine had not by the Second World War become any less nationalist. Indeed, in reaction to the interwar Polish state’s attempts to Polonize its eastern borderlands, west Ukrainians had in general become even more committed to their Ukrainian identity and to projects, like autonomy and independent statehood, with which they increasingly connected their nation.

Thus, after its incorporation into the Soviet Union, western Ukraine profoundly
influenced how the content of national identity was constructed and debated in the Ukrainian SSR.\textsuperscript{32} Moreover, Soviet authorities, wary of powerful nationalist sentiment in western Ukraine, treated the new region carefully after 1945, allowing the local press to continue to publish in Ukrainian and in general seeking primarily to influence the meaning of Ukrainian national identity, rather than Russifying the language and population, as they did in western Belarus after the war.\textsuperscript{33} Western Ukraine, once the Piedmont of Ukrainian nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, again influenced the trajectory of Ukrainian nationalism in the late 1980s, when perestroika and glasnost opened up the Soviet political and economic system to nationalist contention.

\textit{Perestroika and Rukh}

After Mikhail Gorbachev initiated the Soviet Union’s perestroika and glasnost, several existing and new Ukrainian organizations began to mobilize support for goals linked to the survival of the Ukrainian nation—in other words, to connect the symbol of the Ukrainian nation to specific projects. This was the re-emergence of Ukrainian nationalism in the late Soviet era. However, Ukraine’s Communist Party opposed the rising tide of nationalist sentiment, and its First Secretary, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, remained among the most conservative in the union republics.

1989 was a turning point. The most important event was the creation of the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring, or \textit{Rukh}, in early 1989. In September 1989, Shcherbytsky was removed from his post as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Also in September 1989, \textit{Rukh} held its founding congress in Kyiv, by which time it had almost 300,000 members. Initially, \textit{Rukh} was careful to operate within the framework of Gorbachev’s perestroika, supporting democratization, cultural and linguistic renewal, and economic autonomy, but not political independence.

As Subtelny reports, popular support for \textit{Rukh} was “unevenly distributed. To an overwhelming extent it was based in western Ukraine and among the Kyiv intelligentsia. In eastern and southern Ukraine, where the Party maintained an iron grip, support for \textit{Rukh} was minimal.”\textsuperscript{34} Thus, western Ukraine became a vanguard for the Ukrainian nationalist movement during the late 1980s, as it had been earlier in the century.\textsuperscript{35}

\textit{The Politics of Nationalism in Post-Soviet Ukraine}

The single most important proposal for the content of Ukrainian national identity was that of \textit{Rukh}.\textsuperscript{36} Ukrainian nationalists, including \textit{Rukh}, argued that Ukraine had a long history of statehood.\textsuperscript{37} Ukrainian nationalists traced the political lineage of contemporary Ukraine to the medieval state of Kievan Rus, which in Russian and much Western historiography has long been considered the origin of the modern Russian
state. This put Ukrainian nationalists in direct competition with Russia for ownership of these historical memories, a fact that also, as Paul D’Anieri shows, led to political conflict between the two states. In Ukrainian nationalist ideology, Russia was more directly implicated in Ukrainian nationalists’ debates about the causes of brief and failed states between 1917 and 1921. These brief and tenuous moments of statehood also became part of many Ukrainians’ historical memory.

Ukrainian nationalists also proposed to connect the idea of their nation to other specific purposes. They argued that economic dependence on Russia was a threat to state security and sought reorientation. And nationalists contended that Europe was fundamental to the content of Ukrainian national identity. The nationalists’ external agenda, Andrew Wilson shows, was “clear and can be neatly summarized as anti-Russian and pro-European.”

The nationalists’ proposals for the content of Ukrainian national identity were accepted by some Ukrainians, rejected by others. Ukrainian society’s contestation of its collective identity followed regional lines, primarily the historical differences that separated western from eastern Ukraine. Nationalist political parties and their identity and policy proposals enjoyed wide support in western regions, especially Galicia, and urban and central regions, including Kyiv.

East and south Ukrainians largely rejected the nationalist parties in favor of the Communist and Socialist Parties, which disagreed with the nationalists’ emphasis on a Ukrainian identity defined in opposition to Russia and in concord with “Europe.” In general, the Communist, Socialist, and Peasant parties were anti-reform and pro-CIS. East and south Ukrainians tended to embrace multiple identities that overlapped with three others: a pan-Slavic identity, a residual Soviet identity, and their regional identity within Ukraine, none of which was defined in opposition to Russia. In fact, each allowed for the possibility that Ukrainians and Russians are more similar than different, that they are not one another’s “others.” Any characterization of east Ukrainians as “pro-Russian” is therefore misleading. More accurately, most east and south Ukrainians were not anti-Russian. East and south Ukrainians did not long to rejoin Russia in a new state or empire. They simply had a different idea of what it means to be Ukrainian. As Dominique Arel points out, east and south Ukrainians were “less likely to worry about what a close integration with Russia would do to their identity, since they already identify at least as much with Russian culture as with Ukrainian culture.” The pro-CIS stance popular in the eastern and southern regions was primarily based on an economic argument, for living better and avoiding economic pain by cooperating more with the East.

For much of the decade the Communist and Socialist Parties dominated in the eastern regions, as well as parts of central Ukraine, while Rukh and other nationalist parties did well in the west. Thus, the Ukrainian political spectrum was polarized with regard to the most fundamental foreign economic policy choice the government had to make. A centrist position was not well institutionalized in party competition, and the societal and political debates were dominated by two opposing and irre-
concilable arguments about what the Ukrainian state and economy was for after 1991. And although it was clear that political-economic integration in the EU and CIS were necessarily competing principles, the Ukrainian government was unable to choose. Thus, according to Ilya Prizel, Ukrainian national identity was contested regionally, “leading to different ‘national’ agendas advocated by different regions.” Ukrainians agreed that their state was permanent, but there was “little agreement as the purpose of that statehood.”

**Belarus**

The ambiguity and contestation of Belarusian national identity in the 1990s resulted from the policies of Russian and Soviet governments over the past several centuries. Post-Soviet Belarus is composed of territories that were integral parts of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Both tsarist and Soviet leaders sought to mold the identity of Belarusian populations to serve their political needs, first by emphasizing the unity among Eastern Slavs, especially Great Russians, White Russians, and Little Russians. Then Soviet leaders sought to mold a non-national, Soviet identity for its citizens. Both of these identity projects succeeded more fully in Belarus than in any other region of the tsarist and Soviet states.

**The Incorporation into Tsarist Russia**

The territories of contemporary Belarus were part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and, later, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth until the three partitions of 1772–1795. After the last partition in 1795, the Belarusian territories and population were incorporated into the Russian Empire. During the nineteenth century the tsarist authorities imposed policies of cultural and linguistic Russification.

Small groups of Belarusian nationalists emerged during the late nineteenth century, but their influence was as minimal as their goal, which was not a Belarusian state, but merely to reintegrate Poland and Lithuania into a new Commonwealth. The Belarusian national movement remained weak until the end of tsarist rule. The Russian Empire’s linguistic and cultural policies were successful in Belarus, as they had been in eastern Ukraine. The populations of Belarus and eastern Ukraine did not necessarily consider themselves to be “Russian,” but rather part of a broader Slavic identity. At the time of the Russian Revolution in 1917, there were no territories currently part of the Belarusian state that lay outside the Romanovs’ empire.

After the Russian Revolution a number of states appeared on the map during the ebb of Moscow’s authority, and these included the Belarusian Democratic Republic (BDR) in 1918. The BDR’s independent existence ended in 1919. According to the historian Nicholas Vakar, who was sympathetic to Belarusian nationalist historiography, “It has been said that nationhood came to the Belorussians as an almost unsolicited gift of the Russian Revolution. It was, in fact, received from the hands of
the Austro-German occupation army authorities and depended on their good will.” Then, when war between Poland and the Soviet Union ended in 1920–1921, Belarusian territories were divided between the two states by the Treaty of Riga. Western Belarus became part of interwar Poland.

**Uniting Belarus under the Soviets**

The Soviet leader Joseph Stalin formally incorporated western Belarus into the Belorussian SSR in 1939, but did not solidify Soviet rule over the territories until after the German occupation of Belarus ended in 1944. However, the inclusion of western Belarus in the SSR did not significantly affect the development of Belarusian national identity. Western Belarus did not, like western Ukraine, transform the republic into which it was incorporated after the Second World War. In particular, western Belarus did not become the location of a Belarusian cultural or national revival during the 1980s. Belarus’s Brest and Hrodno provinces were no Galicia, the stronghold of Ukrainian nationalism in the western regions of Ukraine.

In contrast to the situation in western Ukraine, the Soviet authorities banned the use of Belarusian in the local press of western Belarus and engaged in extensive cultural and linguistic Russification of the region. Although it was undoubtedly true that the Belarusian national movement was weak before 1944, it is also true that west Belarusians and, at that time, most Belarusians in the BSSR spoke primarily Belarusian, not Russian. The Soviet authorities changed all that, and their different treatment of western Ukraine and western Belarus reflected their divergent assessments of the national resistance in the two regions. Whether Soviet authorities were right or not about which of the two was more nationalist, the choice they made based on those assessments was consequential. By the 1980s most Belarusians spoke Russian as their primary language. Although nationalist ideas were marginally more popular in western Belarus than in other regions of the country during the 1990s, western Belarus never became a regional stronghold for the nationalist movement.

**Perestroika and the Belarusian Popular Front**

Just as in the Lithuanian and Ukrainian SSRs, during perestroika a Belarusian nationalist movement began to take shape. Indeed, an articulate nationalist movement emerged in Belarus even before similar movements mobilized in Ukraine and other parts of the Soviet Union. Belarusian nationalists began to demonstrate over issues of language and culture in 1987. Then, in 1988, Belarusian archeologists discovered mass graves linked to Stalinist purges of Belarusian citizens in the Kurapaty forest near Minsk. The discovery galvanized the small opposition movement, and one of the archeologists, Zenon Pazniak, helped to mold the movement into a national front. The Belarusian Popular Front (BPF; Belaruský Narodny Front), also known as Rebirth (Adradžhenie), was founded in 1988 in the politically charged context of the
Kurapaty excavation.

Under serious pressure from the Communist Party of Belarus, the BPF was forced to hold its founding congress outside of Belarus and with the help of nationalists from neighboring states. The BPF thus held its first congress in June 1989 in Vilnius, Lithuania. The contrast between the BPF’s experience and that of Lithuania’s Sajudis is remarkable. The First Secretary of Lithuania’s Communist Party, Algirdas Brazauskas, had addressed the founding congress of Sajudis to express his sympathy to the nationalists’ goals. Meanwhile, Belarus’s Communist Party opposed the emergent nationalist movement at every stage of its development.

The Politics of Nationalism in Post-Soviet Belarus

Nowhere in the former Soviet Union was there a larger gap between the beliefs of a society’s nationalist movement and the beliefs of society as whole about the political meaning of a collective identity than in Belarus. Belarusian nationalists offered a set of proposals for the content of national identity, but Belarusian political élites, and most Belarusians in general, rejected them.54

Russian scholars Dmitri Furman and Oleg Bukhovets offer a compelling summary of the differences in popular support for nationalists in Lithuania, Ukraine, and Belarus: “Whereas the people’s fronts in the Baltic region really were movements of the peoples as a whole, and while Rukh in Ukraine has, together with its intellectual social base in Kyiv, a powerful regional base in western Ukraine as well, the BPF in fact has a base only among the mass of Minsk intelligentsia and that of other large cities.”55 Thus, the local nationalist movement’s ideas were ascendant in Lithuania, contested regionally in Ukraine, and marginalized in Belarus.

The BPF was essentially the only nationalist political party in Belarus, the only group that consistently linked the symbol of the nation to the political and economic projects it proposed. Therefore, the BPF was the central cultural location for the production of nationalist ideology. The BPF, like nationalists throughout the post-Soviet region, concentrated on the history and purposes of the Belarusian state, the threat of economic dependence on Russia, and the necessity of reorienting the polity and economy away from Russia and toward the Europe and the West. For the BPF, Russia was the nation and the state against which Belarusian identity should be defined. “Europe,” especially Central Europe, was a broad cultural identity with which Belarusians had a historical affinity.

Although Belarus lacks a modern tradition of independent statehood, Belarusian nationalists sought to attach political importance to the Belarusian state (the Belarusian Democratic Republic) that appeared briefly between 1918 and 1919. Despite the precariousness and brevity of the Belarusian Democratic Republic, for nationalists it was a moment of statehood, true independence from Russia, that Russia snatched from Belarusians’ grasp. According to Vakar, “It cannot be denied that the ten-month period of symbolic independence has left an indelible impression
on the Belorussian mind. A fact, historically accidental and trivial, has grown into a historic legend." Moreover, Belarusian nationalists claimed an even longer tradition of statehood: the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

Therefore, like Lithuanian nationalists, Belarusian nationalists claimed that their state was “restored,” not new. And Russia, linked to Soviet authority in Moscow, was the “empire” from which Belarusian statehood was regained. Belarusian nationalists thus adopted the “anti-imperial master frame” of Soviet and post-Soviet nationalist movements throughout the region. Thus, the BPF’s first platform called for the “complete economic independence” of Belarus, as well as the “integration of the republic’s economy into the European and world economic system.” The policies that the Belarusian government pursued instead, policies of economic integration with Russia and with other CIS states, vexed the nationalists. The central accusation made by the nationalists was that the Belarusian government, under both Kebich and Lukashenko, has been selling out the Belarusian national interest.

Finally, Belarusian nationalists believed that the state’s rightful and historical place is in Europe, not the “East,” represented by Russia. According to this interpretation of history, Belarus was historically a part of cultural Europe until Russia wrested it from the influence of the West. The nationalists’ foreign policy goals reflected that interpretation. The BPF wanted Belarus to join the EU and NATO and to integrate fully into the institutions of the West.

Although Belarusian nationalists emerged during the late 1980s to articulate a coherent vision of a new state free from external domination, according to political scientist Mark Beissinger, they “ultimately failed in their attempts to mobilize the [Belarusian] population around the anti-imperial master frame” of the region’s ascendant nationalist ideologies during the 1980s and 1990s. In Beissinger’s metaphor, Belarusian nationalism barked, but it did not bite.

This was because the ideas of Belarusian nationalists were unpopular among most Belarusians, and particularly among Belarusian political élites. In the parliamentary elections of 1990 the BPF won less than 8% of the total number of seats, and of those half were in urban Minsk. Most important about this is that the BPF essentially was alone in its foreign policy preferences for breaking with Russia and turning the country Westward. So the 8% of the seats that the BPF held was the total number of members of parliament who opposed integration with Russia.

The political divide of 1990s Belarus separated those who saw the Belarusian population as a community of shared and distinct identity, on the one hand, and as a part of a larger community of Slavs, on the other. Thus, the central axis of contention in Belarusian politics during the 1990s was the interpretation of the state’s political-economic relationship to Russia. Belarus’s nationalists favored autonomy, the former Communists ever closer ties.

In sum, the nationalists proposed a specific vision for the Belarusian nation, and Belarusian political élites contested it, offering instead a more ambiguous interpretation of the Belarusian nation that did not contradict the closest of economic and
political ties with Russia. It was not that Belarus as an entire country or society lacked a national identity, or that Belarusians believed themselves to be Russian. More accurately, most Belarusians, like east Ukrainians, had mixed identities, combinations of multi-ethnic and multilingual identities that did not preclude a significant overlap between Belarusian and Russian identities.

**Alternative Arguments**

*Soviet Federalism*

As the histories of these three societies and territories indicate, there is more to the story of Soviet and post-Soviet nationhood than the sophisticated institutionalist accounts of scholars such as Rogers Brubaker and Yuri Slezkine suggest. Keith Darden has recently argued this point quite forcefully by analyzing the institutionalist argument that the Soviet Union was more an “incubator” than a “prison-house” of nations. “The institutionalist account is incomplete in its inability to specify the mechanisms that generated and maintain national identity among the masses and,” Darden continues, “in its failure to recognize or explain the persistence of pre-Soviet national myths that the Soviet regime did not institutionalize or support.”

Clearly the Soviet federal system profoundly influenced the ways in which the state ultimately collapsed, because Soviet authorities institutionalized the national identities of its constituent societies in the form of national federalism, whereby the union consisted of 15 republics given administrative functions, demarcated territory, and a titular nationality. This institutionalization of national identities, at the same time that the Soviet regime repressed alternative organizational possibilities, ensured that the end of Soviet rule would create disintegrative pressures organized at the republic level. Thus, in addition to the fact that empires tend to fall apart amid nationalist demands for sovereignty, the Soviet Union’s demise was even more likely than that of other empires patterned along ostensibly national lines. But the striking variety of Soviet nationalist movements and post-Soviet national identities suggests that other important variables influenced their development as well.

*Prior Statehood*

One variable that has been invoked to explain this variety is the existence of prior statehood. The three Baltic republics enjoyed a period of approximately two decades of sovereignty during the interwar years. As a result, their politics are, the argument goes, rather different. Because these three produced the most powerful and influential nationalist movements in the region, as well as the most coherently shared national identities among the 15 societies, there must be something to this claim.

Although an independent Lithuanian state did exist during the years between the two World Wars, its existence, by itself, did not determine Lithuania’s path to
independence from the Soviet Union. Several kinds of arguments have been offered in relation to this interwar state. Some observers, including Lithuanians themselves, have suggested that because many states never recognized the Soviet Union’s annexation of Lithuania in 1940, the new Lithuanian state is not new at all, but rather “restored,” and that there was something inherent to the country’s institutions or territory that required independence in 1991. However, it is not the claim to a distinct legal status of the post-Soviet Lithuanian state that led Lithuanians to share their interpretation of their collective identity or to demand independence. Domestic social norms, not international legal norms, formed the basis of Lithuanians’ nationalism.

Also, it is possible that Lithuania’s interwar statehood was important because it meant that Lithuanians “remembered” their independence, unlike other post-Soviet societies that had never known independence in the twentieth century. There is some truth to this sentiment, but it should be incorporated into a general understanding of how national identities imply specific interpretations of history that become meaningful politically. Few Lithuanians alive during the late 1980s experienced the interwar statehood, and those who led the nationalist movement were, in general, not old enough to have remembered statehood. It was not personal memories of Lithuanians that made the interwar state politically meaningful after 1988. Rather, it was a constructed, historical memory, shared among many Lithuanians, its symbols given meaning by an older to a younger generation.

Similarly, it is common to hear that Belarusians had no modern tradition of statehood upon which to draw, and that therefore they sought reunification with Russia after the Soviet collapse. But Ukraine also had no modern tradition of statehood, and its government, adopting goals defined by west Ukrainian nationalists, did resist Russian hegemony and seek economic autonomy. In addition, Belarusian nationalists, like all nationalists, claim a tradition of statehood for themselves. This suggests that it was not the histories of Belarusian and Ukrainian territories that were influential in their post-Soviet policy-making. Rather, it was the histories of the identities of the populations of those territories, and the political and institutional contexts within which those identities developed, that eventually influenced Belarusians’ interpretation of the economic choices they faced after 1991. And, of course, Belarusian and Ukrainian nationalists claimed traditions of statehood as a means to rally their societies to sacrifice for independence. The difference was not in the claiming or even in the existence of prior statehood, but in the resonance of such a claim among members of society.

Therefore, the interwar state did matter a great deal for Lithuania’s nationalist politics of perestroika, but in two specific and less generally acknowledged ways. First, the interwar state was important because it had provided the political space within which Lithuanian national identity, promoted by an independent government, first became widely shared among the population. Second, the symbol and mythology of a Lithuanian state lost to Soviet influence became important to politics during and after the collapse of Soviet political institutions.
Timing of Incorporation into the Soviet Union

A related argument is that there are differences between those territories incorporated into the Soviet Union after the First World War and those incorporated after the Second World War. Roman Szporluk made this argument most carefully in a 1991 essay. Ernest Gellner made a similar, if somewhat less sophisticated historical argument:

In the Soviet Union, generally speaking there is a difference between the so-called seventy-year-old and the forty-year-old areas of Soviet power: there is a perceptible difference between the areas that were incorporated in it only at the end of the Second World War. The difference between seventy and forty years seems to affect the nature of social memory profoundly: the forty year-ers have a sharp sense of what the other world is like, and the seventy year-ers have largely lost it. They know no other.

However, the historical divergence of western Belarus and western Ukraine undermines the power of this interpretation based only on Soviet history at two twentieth-century moments. Belarus shares a potentially important similarity with Ukraine: contemporary Belarus contains territories that were incorporated into the USSR only after the Second World War. The territories known collectively as western Belarus were, like western Ukraine and the three Baltic republics, incorporated into the Soviet polity relatively late. Like western Ukraine, western Belarus was part of interwar Poland. However, unlike western Ukraine, western Belarus did not become a regional stronghold of national sentiment; it did not become Belarus’s Piedmont, its place of national revival.

Despite their both having been part of interwar Poland, then, western Belarus and western Ukraine had had very different historical and cultural experiences. Western Ukraine had been part of the Habsburg empire prior to incorporation into Poland, and it was under the Habsburgs that Ukrainian national activists enjoyed a relatively liberal political space in which to pursue their nation-making project. Western Belarus, in contrast, was part of a state dominated by Russia prior to and after the interwar years, and therefore it had not been separate from Russian political authority and cultural influence during the nineteenth century, when nationhood was becoming the dominant idiom of world politics. Significantly, western Belarus, unlike western Ukraine, had never produced a nationalist movement. Thus, the difference in historical sequence between the Habsburg–Polish–Soviet authority experienced by western Ukraine and the Romanov–Polish–Soviet context of western Belarus influenced their divergent cultural and political roles in the Soviet and post-Soviet republics of which they were a part. The existence of a modern tradition of statehood was obviously not what distinguished Ukraine from Belarus, nor was the timing of incorporation into the USSR the crucial variable. Rather, it was the identities of the societies that inhabited Belarusian and Ukrainian territories, and the internal and external influences upon the development of those identities. In sum, as the Ukrainian author Viktor Zalizniak suggests, “They do not say it for nothing that Belarus is Ukraine minus Galicia.”
Mechanism of Incorporation

David Laitin has recently argued that it was not the timing of incorporation into the Soviet Union that was most decisive for the development of national identities in these societies as much as it was the mechanism of incorporation. Although Laitin is primarily interested in explaining the integration of Russian-speaking populations into the societies of Soviet successor states, his distinction among types of élite incorporation also accounts for a wide range of variation in the timing and depth of nationalist mobilization before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. According to Laitin, the Soviet authorities exercised three distinct patterns of control on the societies they incorporated into the union: “a most-favored-lord pattern exemplified by Ukraine, a colonial model exemplified by Kazakhstan, and an integralist model exemplified by the Baltic states.”

Laitin’s is a powerful argument, therefore, that builds variation into the institutionalist account of Soviet federalism. The only difficulty for the model is that not all of the territories of all of the republics were incorporated at the same time or even in the same manner. The problem is particularly serious for understanding Ukraine, and its significance lies in the facts that the Ukrainian nationalist movement played such an important role in the emergence of nationalism in the region and that Ukraine is one of the cases Laitin analyzes in greatest detail. As Laitin suggests in a footnote, the western regions of Ukraine “did not experience any sort of most-favored-lord advantage under Soviet rule. It was ruled in ‘integral’ style, very much like the Baltics.”

Laitin addresses this issue of regional variation in Ukraine in Chapter 13 of his book, and it is not crucial for the domestic political outcomes Laitin analyzes. But in terms of the development of Ukrainian national identity and its implications for relations with Russia and the rest of the world, the divergent institutional histories of Galicia and the rest of Ukraine is the defining issue in the politics of Ukrainian nationalism.

Literacy

In contrast to these arguments, Keith Darden has made the case that another variable—literacy—can account for the variety of post-Soviet national identities. That is, the relevant issue is whether a region of the Soviet Union “secured mass literacy before or after its incorporation into the USSR.” According to Darden’s analysis, because Ukrainian Galicia and the societies of the three Baltic republics achieved mass literacy in the late nineteenth century, rather than the middle of the twentieth century, as was the case for much of the Soviet Union, they created standardized languages and “national canons” to go along with them. Darden effectively solves what was something of a puzzle for other approaches to the politics of Ukraine and Belarus—namely, why Galicia is more nationalist than the rest of western Ukraine and western Belarus despite the fact that these regions were incorporated into the Soviet Union at approximately the same time during the Second World War. They were all forty-year-ers, after all.
But an institutionalist interpretation of the same set of effects would emphasize the place of Galicia in the Habsburg empire: the Austrian authorities cultivated a Ukrainian identity to contest Polish influence in the region and perforce helped to promote the Ukrainian language. The high literacy rate of Galicia was, then, an outcome of the policies of an empire that sought to manage its ethnic heterogeneity. It was a creation of the Habsburgs, rather than the Romanovs and Soviets, and therefore could be incorporated into a broader institutionalist narrative about the development of identities in the region.

A similar problem of collinearity arises with respect to Lithuania, one of the three Baltic republics, which also enjoyed a high literacy rate before its incorporation into the Soviet Union. Both of the following facts describe Lithuania: its literacy rate was high in 1897 (according to the tsarist census) and it experienced a period of 20 years of statehood. Which of them is most responsible for the assertiveness of Lithuanian nationalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s? Darden does not offer data that show Lithuanians to have been more coherently nationalist than, say, Belarusians, in the years before the First World War, and the historical narrative offered here suggests that indeed they were not significantly more so. Perhaps more important is the fact that Lithuanian nationalists neither demanded independent statehood nor somehow ensured their state’s independence as the Soviet Union was being constructed over the next decade. In terms of causal emphasis, I argue that greater importance must be given to the period of statehood—not because statehood itself caused a more coherent nationalism some forty years later, but rather because of how Lithuanian authorities used the political opportunity that was given to them to engage in nation-making, building upon the fact that so many members of interwar Lithuanian society already were literate in one or another of the dialects that the authorities rationalized and standardized in the 1920s and 1930s.

Conclusions

There is no master variable that accounts for the variety of post-Soviet national identities—not Soviet federalism, nor a history of prior statehood, nor the timing of incorporation into the USSR, nor the mechanism of incorporation, nor the spread of literacy. None of these variables can account for the differences among just Lithuania, Ukraine, and Belarus. These variables interacted in complex ways in different regions of these three post-Soviet states, as well as in the rest of the former Soviet Union. An institutionalist history of these three societies and territories that invokes each of the variables can provide a coherent account of how they turned out so differently, but it is necessarily a complex causal account that emphasizes a great deal more contingency than the alternatives. Therefore, to understand post-Soviet nationhood it is necessary to analyze the imperial histories of the Soviets, the Habsburgs, and the Romanovs and the kinds of federal authority (or lack thereof) each promoted within their territories.
For Lithuania, Ukraine, and Belarus, the development of a broad-based nationalist movement depended on two factors: first, the necessary political space for nationalists’ efforts to mobilize and, second, the encouragement, or at least accommodation, of political authorities. In Lithuania, the interwar state provided space, and the interwar government actively engaged in nation making. In western Ukraine, the Habsburg authorities also offered a relatively liberal space for emergent Ukrainian nationalists as well as institutional support in their own efforts to undermine Polish dominance in the region. Finally, in eastern Ukraine and both western and eastern Belarus, the Romanov authorities treated local populations as part of a broader Slavic group and emphatically discouraged attempts to cultivate distinctive Ukrainian and Belarusian national identities. These regional differences pre-dated Soviet federalism and to this day remain important influences on the politics of the three countries. Thus, these contrasting institutional histories have influenced political and social development primarily by affecting the historical memory of the Lithuanian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian nations.

NOTES

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2. Armenia could be included in this group as well, the main difference being the relative lack of anti-Russian content in Armenian national identity.


8. Senn, The Emergence of Modern Lithuania, p. 231, and Chapter 10 more generally.


16. A few Soviet loyalists retained the CPL name for their organization until the party was banned in August 1991.


20. The 1992 constitution created the presidency.


25. Author’s interview, LDDP, Vilnius, August 1998.


36. See *The Popular Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring “Rukh”: Program and Charter*


39. Author’s interview, *Rukh*, Kyiv, July 1998. See also the election platforms of several nationalist parties and coalitions that conflict on many dimensions but share several fundamental interpretations of Russia and international economic relations: *Rukh, New Way for Ukraine* (Kyiv, 1998); Ukrainian National Assembly, *Economic Program of UNA* (Kyiv, 1998); and the coalition of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party, and Ukrainian Republican Party, the National Front, *Ukraine Needs Ukrainian Power!* (Kyiv, 1998).


Przel, National Identity and Foreign Policy, p. 371.


See Vakar, Belorussia, Chapters 9–11.

See Szporluk, “West Ukraine and West Belorussia.”


See Vakar, Belorussia, p. 105, and Chapters 7 and 8 more generally. For a contemporary discussion, see Petr Petrikov, “Byla li BNR gosudarstvom?” (Was the BNR a State?), Sovetskiaa Belorussia, 25 March 1993.

See Wilson, “Myths of National History in Belarus and Ukraine.”


See, for example, Mikhail Shimansky, “Oppozitsiia obviniaet pravitel’stvo v rasprodazhe Belarus” (Opposition Accuses Government of Selling off Belarus), Izvestiia, 14 April 1994.


63. Beissinger, “How Nationalisms Spread,” p. 124. Also see the discussion on pp. 122–123, where he finds, “But even when nationalisms do bark, it is far from certain that they will bite, and even if they do snap a bit, that the bite will find its intended target. Intellectuals who propagate nationalist ideas may indeed be in place; they may even attempt to mobilize populations in pursuit of nationalist aims. But whether their messages resonate within populations is another matter.” See also Beissinger’s excellent survey of the issue, “Nationalisms that Bark and Nationalisms that Bite: Ernest Gellner and the Substantiation of Nations,” in John A. Hall, ed., The State of the Nation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 169–190.


68. See Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and Destruction of Socialism and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

69. Szporluk, “The Soviet West—or Far Eastern Europe?”


72. Laitin, Identity in Formation, Chapter 3.

73. Ibid., p. 59.

74. Ibid., p. 65, footnote 13.