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INTRODUCTION

The past 25 years have seen dramatic shifts in the psychological study of negotiation. The study of negotiation was an active field within the domain of social psychology in the 1960s and 1970s, but the cognitive revolution in the late 1970s left little room for interpersonal processes, leaving the study of negotiation to decline. By the early 1980s, negotiations blossomed anew as perhaps the fastest growing area of teaching and research in schools of management. Much of this growth was based on psychological research, specifically a behavioral decision-making perspective. The 1980s and 1990s have witnessed an explosion of research on the negotiator as decision maker. But the late 1990s brought many calls to reintroduce the social aspects of the negotiation process—with an explicit criticism of the behavioral decision paradigm of negotiation as overly restrictive.

In this paper, we review these developments and also explore an emergent body of work integrating cognitive and social aspects of negotiation. This new work examines the negotiation as it is perceived and constructed by the negotiators themselves.

We organize this paper around two sections. In the first section, we provide a selective history of the development of the psychological study of negotiation. This history briefly explores the demise of the early social psychology of negotiations, overviews the behavioral decision perspective of negotiation, and explores recent efforts to create a new social psychology of negotiations. In the second section, we explore emerging trends that broaden the study of negotiation and connect negotiations to a broader spectrum of psychological literatures. Specifically, this section focuses on research that, rather than assuming negotiators respond to an objectively specified game structure, explores how negotiators psychologically understand the negotiation game they are playing.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF NEGOTIATION

The Early Social Psychology of Negotiations

Negotiation was the subject of hundreds of empirical papers by social psychologists in the 1960s and 1970s (Rubin & Brown 1975). During this time, the study of negotiations in social psychology primarily focused on two subdomains: individual differences of negotiators and situational characteristics. In the sections
that follow, we discuss the general conclusions arising out of these areas of research. As the field of social psychology moved toward research on social cognition, negotiation, like many interpersonal topics, drifted from the forefront of social psychology.

**Individual differences** Rubin & Brown (1975) documented the extensive literature on individual differences in negotiation, including both demographic characteristics and personality variables. Despite hundreds of investigations, these factors typically do not explain much variance in negotiator behavior (Thompson 1998), just as they fail to account for much variance in other behaviors (Ross & Nisbett 1991). When individual differences do influence negotiated outcomes, slight changes in situational features swamp these effects (Ross & Nisbett 1991, Thompson 1998). Although true believers in individual differences still exist (Barry & Friedman 1998), many authors have reached the conclusion that simple individual differences offer limited potential for predicting negotiation outcomes (Lewicki et al 1993, Pruitt & Carnevale 1993). Furthermore, individual differences are of limited use because they are not under the negotiator’s control (Bazerman & Carroll 1987). Finally, ample evidence shows that even experts are poor at making clinical assessments about another person’s personality in order to accurately formulate an opposing strategy (Morris et al 1999, 1995).

**Structural variables** Social psychological research on negotiation in the 1960s and 1970s also explored a series of situational/structural variables. These are the variables that define the context of the negotiation. Examples of situational variables include the presence of constituencies (Druckman 1967), parties’ incentives and payoffs (Axelrod & May 1968), power (Marwell et al 1969), deadlines (Pruitt & Drews 1969), the number of people on each side (Marwell & Schmitt 1972), and the presence of third parties (Pruitt & Johnson 1972). Although research on situational variables has contributed to our understanding of negotiation, the objective features of a negotiation are often beyond the control of an individual negotiator. Recent research has turned its attention to how negotiators perceive and construct the negotiation problem, which is more (although certainly not fully) under the control of the negotiator. Unfortunately, the older social psychological study of negotiation did not explore the creation or construal of the negotiation structure but tended to offer data on the impact of objective alternative structures. As a result, the effects were typically consistent with naive intuition.

Overall, the dominant social psychological approaches suffered from critical shortcomings and were of limited use for enhancing the effectiveness of negotiation scholarship or practice. As we will argue, the problem was not inherent in the psychological perspective; the problem was with the specific analytic lens chosen, which relied on description without clear standards of rationality or optimality against which behavior could be evaluated.
The Behavioral Decision Perspective on Negotiations

The cognitive revolution in psychology strongly influenced research in negotiation. The research moved in the direction of behavioral decision research (BDR) in the 1980s and 1990s. Greater interaction between descriptive and prescriptive researchers facilitated research on this decision perspective (Bazerman & Neale 1992). Prescriptive research on negotiations prior to 1982 focused primarily on game theory, the mathematical analysis of fully rational negotiators. Raiffa’s (1982) focus on providing the best advice to a focal negotiator was a key turning point in negotiation research. First, from a prescriptive perspective, Raiffa explicitly acknowledged the importance of developing accurate descriptions of opponents rather than assuming the opponent negotiator to be fully rational. Second, the notion of using negotiation analysis to give advice implicitly acknowledged that negotiators themselves do not intuitively follow purely rational strategies. Most important, from the perspective of psychology, Raiffa initiated the groundwork for dialog between prescriptive and descriptive researchers, creating a prescriptive need to descriptively understand how negotiators actually make decisions. Following Raiffa’s structure, Bazerman and Neale (1992) outlined a psychological understanding of negotiation designed to use description to prescribe strategies that would help the focal negotiator increase the likelihood that the parties would grow a larger pie, while simultaneously giving the focal negotiator the needed understanding to maximize how much of the pie they obtained, subject to concerns for fairness and the ongoing relationship.

The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a large number of studies that address the questions Raiffa’s work left unexamined (Bazerman 1998, Neale & Bazerman 1991, Thompson 1990, 1998). This line of work uses the field of BDR as a core for ideas about how negotiators actually make decisions. The field of BDR delineates the systematic ways in which decision makers deviate from optimality or rationality (Dawes 1998, Kahneman & Tversky 1973, 1979). Individuals are presumed to attempt to act rationally but to be bounded in their ability to achieve rationality (Simon 1957). This field has allowed researchers to predict, a priori, how people will make decisions that are inconsistent, inefficient, and based on normatively irrelevant information. To document the biases that lead negotiators to deviate from optimally rational behavior is not to deny the amazing feats of which the human mind is capable (Pinker 1997). We navigate complex social worlds with amazing dexterity and solve enormously complex problems with breathtaking ease, but we are not perfect. Human cognition suffers from a variety of predictable mistakes, and it is precisely these mistakes that give us insight into the functioning of the mind (Kahneman & Tversky 1982).

The core argument of much of BDR is that people rely on simplifying strategies, or cognitive heuristics (Bazerman 1998). Although these heuristics are typically useful shortcuts, they also lead to predictable mistakes (Tversky & Kahneman 1974). It is the systematic and predictable nature of these biases, and what they reveal about the human mind, that makes them so intriguing to researchers.
Specifically, research on two-party negotiations suggests that negotiators tend to (a) be more concessionary to a positively framed specification of the negotiation than to a negatively framed specification (Bazerman et al. 1985, Bottom & Studt 1993, De Dreu & McCusker 1997, Lim & Carnevale 1995, Olekalns 1997); (b) be inappropriately affected by anchors in negotiation (Kahneman 1992, Kristensen & Garling 1997, Northcraft & Neale 1987, Ritov 1996, Thompson 1995, Whyte & Sebenius 1997); (c) be inappropriately affected by readily available information (Neale 1984, Pinkley et al. 1995); (d) be overconfident and overly optimistic about the likelihood of attaining outcomes that favor themselves (Bazerman et al. 1999, Bazerman & Neale 1982, Kramer et al. 1993, Lim 1997); (e) falsely assume that the negotiation pie is fixed and miss opportunities for mutually beneficial trade-offs between the parties (Bazerman et al. 1985, Fukuno & Ohbuchi 1997, Thompson & DeHarpport 1994, Thompson & Hastie 1980); (f) falsely assume that their preferences on issues are incompatible with those of their opponent (Thompson & Hrebec 1996); (g) escalate conflict even when a rational analysis would dictate a change in strategy (Bazerman 1998, Bazerman & Neale 1983, Bizman & Hoffman 1993, Diekmann et al. 1999, 1996, Keltner & Robinson 1993); (h) ignore the perspective of other parties (Bazerman & Carroll 1987, Carroll et al. 1988, Samuelson & Bazerman 1985, Valley et al. 1998); and (i) reactively devalue any concession made by the opponent (Curhan et al. 1998, Ross & Stilinger 1991).

Behavioral decision theory perspective largely reframed psychological research on negotiation in the 1980s and early 1990s. This behavioral research departed from previous psychological research on negotiation, as it emphasized how actual decisions were different from what would be predicted by normative models. Clearly, a goal to provide useful information that could lead to the debiasing of negotiators guided this research. As we move forward, our goal is to outline a future for negotiation research that keeps this strength, yet allows for a broader understanding of the psychological task of negotiation.

The Rebirth of the Social Psychology of Negotiation

The behavioral decision perspective had a significant influence on the scholarship and practice of negotiation. However, many authors criticized this perspective for ignoring too many factors that were obviously important in negotiation (Greenhalgh & Chapman 1995). Recent research adds social psychological variables consistent with a BDR perspective. In this research, the social factors argued to be missing from earlier research on decision making have become specific topics of study. However, this new social psychology of negotiations accepts some of the features of the BDR perspective, including the backdrop of rationality (Murnighan 1994, Thompson 1998). This section highlights four sets of questions, building off of the review by Bazerman et al. (2000).

Social relationships in negotiation

The importance of relationships in negotiation has been noted throughout the field’s history (e.g. Follett 1940, Rubin &
Brown 1975, Walton & McKersie 1965). However, this topic has reemerged strongly in the 1990s (for reviews see Greenhalgh & Chapman 1998, Valley et al 1995). The study of relationships and negotiation can be trichotomized into three basic levels: the individual, the dyad, and the network.

The first level includes studies of how judgment and preferences of individual negotiators are influenced by social context (for review see Clark & Chrisman 1994). An example of this work is a study by Loewenstein et al (1989), which found that disputants’ reported preferences for monetary payoffs were greatly influenced by payoffs to and relationships with their hypothetical counterparts.

The second level examines how social relationships within dyads can influence negotiation processes and outcomes (for review see Valley et al 1995). Bazerman et al (1998a) demonstrated that certain behaviors that appear irrational from the individual perspective may be rational from the perspective of the dyad. For example, given the opportunity to communicate freely, negotiators often appear irrational in their individual decision making yet reach dyadic outcomes that outperform game theoretic models (Valley et al 1998).

Finally, the third level is concerned with the influence of relationships on the broader network of actors (Baker 1984, 1990; Shah & Jehn 1993; Sondak & Bazerman 1989; Valley 1992). As an example of this third category, Tenbrunsel et al (1996) examined the implications of relationships on the selection of a negotiation partner. Essentially, they argued that people “satisfice” (March & Simon 1958) by matching with other people they already know rather than seeking out new partners (Tenbrunsel et al 1996), at the cost of finding better-fitting matches.

Egocentrism in negotiation Negotiators’ fairness judgments are not purely objective. Rather, parties tend to overweight the views that favor themselves—resulting in a motivational bias (Babcock & Loewenstein 1997, Diekmann et al 1997, Walster et al 1978) in addition to the cognitively based biases reviewed earlier. This motivational bias is called egocentrism. Thompson & Loewenstein (1992) found negotiators to be egocentric, and the more egocentric the parties were, the more difficulty they had coming to agreement. This pattern has been replicated both in studies that used financial incentives for performance and across negotiation contexts (Babcock et al 1995, Camerer & Loewenstein 1993, Loewenstein et al 1993). Furthermore, Thompson & Loewenstein (1992) found that the provision of more (neutral) information increases egocentrism. Those participants who received this additional neutral information tended to make more extreme estimates of a fair outcome. Participants also showed self-serving recall bias, remembering better those facts that favored themselves.

A large amount of research has gone into explaining this egocentric pattern of behavior. We are most persuaded by the view of Messick & Sentis (1983) that preferences are basic and immediate, but fairness judgments must be determined through reflection, a process that is vulnerable to bias. As ambiguity creates uncertainty around what a fair outcome would be, negotiators tend to interpret fairness
in ways that favor themselves (Babcock & Olson 1992, Camerer & Loewenstein 1993, De Dreu 1996, Diekmann 1997, Diekmann et al 1997, Messick & Sentis 1979). Experimental manipulations that reduce potential ambiguity also reduce egocentrism. For example, when players occupy symmetric roles, egocentrism is weaker than when their roles are asymmetric (Wade-Benzoni et al 1996). Communication between the players that allows them to form a shared understanding of the situation also reduces egocentrism (Thompson & Loewenstein 1992, Wade-Benzoni et al 1996).

**Motivated illusions in negotiation** Most people view themselves, the world, and the future in a considerably more positive light than reality can sustain (Taylor 1989, Taylor & Brown 1988). People tend to perceive themselves as being better than others on desirable attributes (Gabriel et al 1994, Messick et al 1985, Svenson 1981) and have unrealistically positive self-evaluations (Brown 1986). In the negotiations domain, Kramer et al (1993) found that in a negotiation class taken by candidates for masters in business administration, 68% of the students predicted that their bargaining outcomes would fall in the upper 25% percent of the class.

In part, negotiators’ optimism may be traceable to overestimation of their ability to control uncontrollable events (Crocker 1982, Kramer 1994, Miller & Ross 1975). Negotiators in a prisoner’s dilemma act as if their decision will control the simultaneous decision of the other party, even when that is logically impossible (Morris et al 1998, Shafir & Tversky 1992). This research argues that one reason parties cooperate in one-shot prisoner dilemma games is the illusion that their own cooperation will create cooperation in the other party. Other evidence points to the social costs of positive illusions. Unsuccessful negotiators tend to denigrate their more successful counterparts by attributing their success to uncooperative and unethical bargaining tactics (Kramer 1994). Positive illusions, especially when accompanied by egocentrism and vilification of opponents, are likely to increase the costs of conflict by inhibiting integrative gains and by delaying agreement (De Dreu et al 1995b).

**Emotion and negotiation** Although the laboratory-based cognitive approach that dominated negotiation research in the 1980s and 1990s has ignored most emotion-relevant variables, some research has explored the important role of emotion in negotiation. This research finds that positive moods tend to increase negotiators’ tendencies to select a cooperative strategy (Forgas 1998) and enhance their ability to find integrative gains (Carnevale & Isen 1986). Angry negotiators are less accurate in judging the interests of opponent negotiators and achieve lower joint gains (Allred et al 1997). Anger makes negotiators more self-centered in their preferences (Loewenstein et al 1989) and increases the likelihood that they will reject profitable offers in ultimatum games (Pillutla & Murnighan 1996).

In these experiments, fairly mild manipulations created moderately strong effects. Nevertheless, the nature of emotion manipulations that are ethically pos-
sible in the lab may be sufficiently “cold” (Janis 1982) that they are qualitatively different from the “hot” emotions that lead people to find the role of emotion in negotiation so compelling. The hotter emotions create strong internal conflicts in people, and tell us emotions are important in negotiation. These are more likely to create a divide between what people think they should do (cognitive) and what they want to do (emotional) (Bazerman et al 1998b), leading to self-destructive choices (O’Connor et al 1998). Nevertheless, some authors see a functional role for emotions (Keltner & Kring 1999), and some have pointed to the potential strategic use of emotion (Barry 1999, Thompson et al 1999).

In sum, the behavioral decision perspective has been enriched by renewed attention to social factors. More important, because this recent research relies on a backdrop of rational optimality for assessing decisions, it can be useful in offering advice to actual negotiators. It gives the negotiator useful hints about the likely behavior of opponents and suggests ways in which the individual’s own decisions may be biased.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFINITION OF THE NEGOTIATION GAME

We believe that the research just reviewed provides an excellent base for the future development of the psychological study of negotiation. The rationality backdrop to this research is key. This creates the opportunity for a useful dialogue with economic perspectives. It is also crucial in creating a psychological field that is capable of providing advice to negotiators. Yet, as the contemporary social psychological critiques suggest, the behavioral decision perspective became narrow in order to develop these strengths. Although the recent exploration of social factors has broadened the field, we see even further broadening by thinking about how to help negotiators become more rational in order to better obtain what they value in the negotiation process.

An important emerging feature of research on negotiation is the study of how players define and create the negotiation game—both psychologically and structurally. Interdependence theory explored the ways in which social actors transform the given matrix of outcomes into an effective matrix by their own personal interpretations, relationship-specific motives, and social norms (Kelley & Thibaut 1978, Rusbult & Van Lange 1996). More recently, Brandenburger & Nalebuff (1996) changed the focus of game theory by arguing that how competitors define the game may be more important than the moves they make within the game. In the present section, we explore this perspective through the lens of psychology, suggesting that how parties understand the game is a critical determinant of how they play the game. To give rational advice, we need to understand the actual preferences and mental models of negotiators, rather than simply inferring that they accept the utility structure that an experimentalist provides. Understanding
how negotiators differentially define the game may be key to better understanding why parties do not reach agreements when we think they should.

At first appearance, this focus on the definition of the game would seem to be a throwback to the structural research of the 1960s and 1970s earlier criticized. However, the new focus is on how negotiators define and create the game, rather than on how structural features of the game predict negotiators’ behavior. We argue that negotiators’ mental models (Gentner & Stevens 1983) are central to understanding how the negotiation game is defined. We then examine how other critical factors determine the definition. Specifically, we explore how concerns of ethics, fairness, and values define the rules of the game; how the selection of a communication medium impacts the play of the game; how cross-cultural issues in perception and behavior affect the game; and how negotiators organize and simplify their understandings of the game when more than two actors are involved.

Mental Models in Negotiation

Much of the work on negotiation assumes that the structure of a negotiation is exogenous to the parties and that the cognition and affect of the parties is exogenous to the structure. But work on mental models of negotiation suggests that the parties’ perceptions of the negotiation structure are critical and endogenous to the negotiation and that, similarly, the cognition and affect of the parties are critical and endogenous to the negotiation.

The concept of mental models is related to some other psychological constructs. Although we recognize the substantial overlap, both within the literature and within our definitions, we see the construct of mental models differing from frames, scripts, and schemata in its expansiveness and its reliance on both social and cognitive processes (Gentner & Stevens 1983; L Thompson, D Gentner & J Loewenstein, unpublished data). This paper defines a mental model as a cognitive representation of the expected negotiation, a representation that encompasses understanding of the self, negotiator relationships, attributions about the other, and perceptions and knowledge of the bargaining structure and process. Mental models can be studied as individually held cognitive concepts or as shared definitions that develop interactively. We use this distinction between individually and mutually shared models to organize the literature. Although the authors were not studying mental models per se in much of the research discussed below, we extrapolate from their findings to explore the role of mental models in negotiations.

Individually held mental models  In an integrative task, Thompson & Hastie (1990) directly measured individual negotiators’ perceptions of the negotiation structure. They asked their respondents whether the structure of the situation allowed for integrative trade-offs and found that the majority assumed their interests were strictly opposed to those of the other party. This assumption was held
across all the various issues, even those for which the two parties had identical, compatible interests (see Thompson & Hrebec 1996). Thompson & Hastie (1990) provided evidence that individuals who modified their initial perceptions, or mental model, did so immediately at the onset of the interaction; otherwise the fixed-pie assumption tended to persist throughout the negotiation. They showed that fixed-pie biases result in a largely predictable outcome that fails to capture gains from integration.

In a creative examination of how the individually held definition of the situation affects processes and outcomes of negotiations, Larrick & Blount (1997) addressed the question of why cooperation levels differ between ultimatum games and two-person social dilemmas that are identical in their objective structures. Larrick & Blount (1997) found that when the interaction is framed as a social dilemma, the second party accepts substantially lower payoffs than when the interaction is framed as an ultimatum game. Through a series of studies, they show that the critical difference is whether the second party is given the role of “claimer” or “acceptor or rejector.” Apparently, when the subjects perceive themselves to be claimers, they do not perceive their roles as including the right to reject the first party’s proposal. Rejection is not included as an appropriate behavior in the rules prescribed by their mental model.

Investigators (see Ross & Ward 1995) crossed individual reputations (cooperative/competitive) with the definition, or more precisely the name, of the game (“community game”/“Wall Street game”). All participants played the same seven-round prisoner’s dilemma game. The effects of the construal manipulation were dramatic. The manipulation affected play throughout the seven rounds, with nearly twice as much cooperation in the community game as in the Wall Street game. In contrast, individual dispositions showed virtually no effect, despite the fact that three steps were taken to maximize their impact: (a) The dispositional predictions were based on evaluations by people who knew the subjects well; (b) only those judged to be extreme cooperators or competitors were used as subjects; and (c) all dyads were composed of subjects with the same extreme disposition. Simply changing the name of the game changed the mental models the parties brought to the situation, and with it their definitions of what was acceptable or appropriate behavior.

Loewenstein et al (1999) address the question of creating an appropriate mental model for a new situation, based on analogical reasoning. Past research has shown that when trying to understand a situation, people often attend to information that has surface, rather than structural, similarity to the situation in which they are engaged (Gentner & Markman 1997, Gentner et al 1993). Explicitly comparing examples, rather than experiencing examples sequentially, allows negotiators to adjust their models of the current negotiation to incorporate past learning (L Thompson, D Gentner & J Loewenstein, unpublished data). Loewenstein et al (1999) showed that this learning affects subsequent negotiation behavior. Parties taught to draw analogies between cases were almost three times more likely to apply useful frames from other negotiations than were parties exposed to the cases
sequentially. Others (L Thompson, D Gentner & J Loewenstein, unpublished data) argue for the use of analogies in teaching people to apply more useful mental models across negotiations.

The research just discussed focuses on mental models of the situation. Mental models can also focus on the other parties in the negotiation. There is a long research tradition in attribution and interpersonal perception (Gilbert 1994). In addition, researchers have explored the role of these attributions in conflict resolution (e.g. Betancourt & Blair 1992; Bradbury & Fincham 1990; De Dreu et al 1994, 1995a; Forgas 1994; Friedland 1990; Johnson & Rule 1986; Kette 1986; Lord & Smith 1983). For example, researchers have explored the problem of naïve realism in mental models of social conflict and the resulting false polarization effect (Keltner & Robinson 1996, Robinson & Keltner 1996, Robinson et al 1995). In one study, participants who identified themselves as either pro-life or pro-choice responded to a variety of questions relevant to their attitudes about abortion, both for themselves and in the way that they believed the average pro-life or pro-choice person would respond. Participants overestimated the degree of ideological difference between themselves and their opponents and saw their ideological opponents as more extreme than they actually were (Robinson & Keltner 1997).

In addition to defining the situation and the other parties or resources in a negotiation, mental models can also be seen in the way people perceive themselves in the negotiation. Montgomery (1998) developed a formal model of strategic play in which players are constrained to follow the meta-rules consistent with their role in a given interaction. Thus, in games with exactly the same economic structure, “a business person” and “a friend” will act differently, in ways that reflect their different roles. A central tenet of role theory is that individuals do not hold immutable roles, rather their roles change with the situation. The “business person” and the “friend” could be the same person in different situations. These models can improve on standard game-theoretic models of bargaining in accounting for empirical findings. Describing what we would call the search for an appropriate mental model, Montgomery (1998) asserted that people in social situations are struggling with “a constantly recurring problem of pattern recognition.”

Shared mental models The research just discussed posits mental models as individually held. Within a given negotiation, one party could hold one model, whereas the other holds an orthogonal or even contradictory model. The research discussed in this section suggests that these asymmetries are unlikely to continue through the negotiation—that negotiators quickly create shared understandings of the situation, the parties, and the rules of acceptable behavior (Messick 1999).

Most of the research on shared mental models holds as a basic assumption that these models are dynamic. The phenomenon of one party’s beliefs changing the reality for both parties is well documented in the literature on the self-fulfilling prophecy (e.g. Rosenthal 1974), expectancy confirmation (e.g. Darley & Fazio
1980), and behavioral confirmation (Snyder 1992). In short, this literature provides substantial evidence that interpersonal beliefs actively guide social interaction, creating a social world that fits the expectations of the actors. Actors engaged in social interaction behave as if their beliefs about the others are true, and their targets, in turn, tend to act in ways that verify these beliefs. The demonstrations of this effect “are sufficiently numerous that the existence of the phenomenon need not be questioned” (Jones 1986:43). In negotiations, too, the parties, through their belief systems, create the interaction and its outcomes. Negotiators can and do, as Brandenburger & Nalebuff (1996) advocate, “change the game.”

Conflict research in communication and anthropology takes as a given that a negotiation script is shared and dynamic (Felstiner et al 1980, Mather & Yngvesson 1981, Merry & Silbey 1984, Putnam & Holmer 1992, Putnam & Poole 1987, Todd 1978). In communications research, the interaction itself, as it evolves in the negotiation, defines the meanings for the involved parties. In anthropological research, the dispute is a series of interpretive acts that define the parties’ understanding of and acceptable behavior for the next stage of the dispute.

Pruitt & Carnevale (1993) proposed that negotiations entail collective scripts with “interlocking roles.” A working relationship is one of the collective scripts where the interaction flows along a predictable, contingent path, with reciprocity as an important subroutine. When and how negotiators evoke the working relationship script depends on the strength of the relationship. As is true with individually held mental models, norms and rules are likely to accompany this script—specifically, the norms of responsiveness, reciprocity, and truth telling.

Negotiation research is only beginning to adopt the notion that mental models can be developed mutually in interaction. In one of the few studies directly addressing this issue, Pinkley & Northcraft (1994) measured three dimensions of disputant frames before and after a multi-issue negotiation: relationship versus task, cooperate versus win, and emotional versus intellectual (Pinkley 1990). They found that the parties’ frames mutually influence each other, converging during the interaction. In turn, these frames affect individual and joint monetary outcomes, as well as satisfaction with the outcomes.

Exploring the same issue at a more cognitive level, De Dreu et al (1995a) found that a negotiator’s behavior is influenced by the other party’s gain-loss frame. The focal negotiator sends messages that communicate the held frame (e.g. profits and benefits versus expenses or costs). In return, the responding negotiator sends messages adopting this frame. This mutual influence holds primarily when the adopting party has a gain rather than a loss frame (De Dreu et al 1992). Thus, if one party in a negotiation holds a loss frame, the bulk of the communication during the negotiation process will reflect this frame, regardless of the other party’s frame at the onset of the negotiation.

Valley and Keros (unpublished data) explicitly traced the process of the interaction with a two-party, distributive negotiation. The investigators found that a very short segment of initial interaction solidifies the mental models of the nego-
tiators (Thompson & Hastie 1990), resulting in either a trusting or a competitive
script that carries through the negotiation. When the parties do not come to a
common model of the interaction, the negotiation is much more likely to result
in impasse or widely disparate payoffs than when a single model is shared, regard-
less of whether the shared model defines the interaction as trusting or competitive.

Wegner et al (1991) proposed that shared mental models within close rela-
tionships need not rely on interaction but result from shared memory systems.
Friends are likely to classify, describe, and evaluate information about others and
themselves in similar ways (Deutsch & Mackesy 1985). Extending this work into
negotiations, a growing body of work (Barsness & Tenbrunsel 1998, Halpern
1997; KL Valley & AT Keros, unpublished data) provides evidence of a shared
model of appropriate bargaining behavior between friends. It was found (KL
Valley & AT Keros, unpublished data) that many of the touted positive effects of
friendship and rich communication media in bargaining are mediated through a
shared script.

Taken as a whole, a growing body of research provides evidence that the
process and outcome of negotiations cannot be fully understood without a clearer
understanding of negotiators’ mental models. To come to this clearer understand-
ing, psychological researchers need to devise ways of investigating the presence
and role of these models (Rouse & Morris 1986). We need to pay increased
attention to how process and outcome are interrelated if we are to obtain more
accurate descriptions of negotiations and more useful prescriptions.

Ethics and Sacredness in Negotiation

Ethical standards in negotiation are inextricably tied to the definition of the game.
Understanding what sort of game is being played conveys information about rules,
boundaries, and which strategies are permissible. There have been some attempts
to evaluate the perceived permissibility of the most frequently used bargaining
tactics (Lewicki & Stark 1996, Robinson et al 1997). These attempts are consist-
ent with the desire to articulate a general formulation of ethical guidelines,
against which any tactic or behavior can be evaluated (e.g. Applbaum 1996).
Although ethics, interpreted superficially, impose clear limits on allowable nego-
tiation strategies, much of the evidence on their use in actual negotiations high-
lights their ambiguity and flexibility.

According to Lewicki & Litterer, “lying and deceit are an integral part of
effective negotiation” (1985:324). Certainly it is the case that deception is used
in negotiation (Schweitzer 1997) and can be an effective strategy for increasing
one’s own outcomes (O’Connor & Carnevale 1997). The 1990s saw an active
debate on the ethics of deception in negotiation. Some have argued that deception
in negotiation is to be expected and is morally acceptable (Strudler 1995, Wokutch
& Carson 1993). Others, however, have maintained that the world would be better
off without deception and that it is always morally regrettable (Dees & Cramton 1991, 1995).

Interests, motivations, and incentives influence the interpretation of ethical standards. Kronzon & Darley (1999) show that individuals’ perceptions of how ethics apply in a specific situation depend fundamentally on which rules favor themselves. They had participants in their experiment observe an ethically questionable act of deception in a videotaped negotiation. Partisans who allied with the victim perceived the act as more reprehensible than did either partisans allied with the perpetrator or neutral observers. Deception in negotiation increases as the incentives for performance increase (Tenbrunsel 1998). Furthermore, deception is more likely to occur when people have individualistic motivations than when they have cooperative motivations (O’Connor & Carnevale 1997). Despite the influence that situational factors exert on negotiators’ perceptions both of the ethical permissibility of various strategies and on actual behavior, research suggests that people underestimate differences in construal and thus are overconfident in their predictions of both their own and others’ behavior (Griffin et al 1990).

People are motivated to think of themselves as ethical, and rate themselves as more ethical than the average person (Tenbrunsel 1998). When people do engage in ethically questionable behavior, they often justify it as self-defense (see Shapiro 1991). Consistent with this notion, negotiators’ expectations that their opponents will deceive them are influenced by their own tendency to deceive. Tenbrunsel (1998) varied the amount of money participants could win for negotiating successfully. Participants who could win $100 expected significantly more deception from their opponents and were significantly more likely to deceive than those who could only win $1. However, participants’ expectations of their opponents’ deception were not influenced by whether the opponent could win $1 or $100.

Players can harmonize their mental models and gain insight into the rules of the game they are playing by communicating with others. However, ethical disagreements may be more difficult to resolve if their goal is not accuracy but moral correctness based on some internal, subjective standard, especially when that internal standard is egocentrically biased (Kronzon & Darley 1999, Wade-Benzoni et al 1996). Tenbrunsel (1999) suggested that construal differences across parties may actually lead to greater expectations of unethical behavior than uniformly high incentives to behave unethically. Disagreements about ethics are likely to be an enduring fixture of real negotiations, on which parties may not be motivated to seek agreement. Yet the existence of multiple conflicting models of fairness need not make conflicts insoluble. Messick (1995) pointed out that different decision rules can be implemented simultaneously.

Sometimes, negotiation itself can be seen as immoral. When issues are tied to sacred values, compromise or trade becomes exceedingly difficult. For example, most people resist setting a price on human life or creating markets for human body parts. Not only will people resist trades or compromises on sacred issues, but even the consideration of such trades may be seen as reprehensible (Tetlock et al 1996). Tetlock et al (1996) explored how people respond to “taboo trade-
offs’ that pit sacred values against each other. Taboo trade-offs lie outside the permissible bounds of the game and tend to elicit responses of moral outrage, avoidance, or outright denial (Tetlock et al 1996). Fiske & Tetlock (1997) recently specified a model of misdirected matches of transaction frames. They argued that people code relationships as based on (a) community, (b) authority, (c) equality, or (d) market mechanisms. Perceptions of deviant, unethical, or taboo behavior are most likely to occur when parties hold differing models.

Although Tetlock et al (1996) explicitly avoided endorsing any particular way of responding to taboo trade-offs, Thompson & Gonzalez (1997) took a stronger stand. They pointed out that the daily decisions of life force us to make trades between values we hold dear, even if we do not routinely understand our choices in these terms. Thompson & Gonzalez (1997) suggested that in many negotiations where one side claims an issue is sacred, the issue is not, in fact, sacred but pseudosacred. Issues are pseudosacred when negotiators would consider trading that issue, given adequate compensation. In desperate times, people have sold their kidneys and even their children.

Tough bargaining strategies aside, insincere claims of sacredness may lock parties into suboptimal negotiation outcomes. Integrative negotiation depends fundamentally on parties’ ability to trade issues against each other (Froman & Cohen 1970, Walton & McKersie 1965). Claims of sacredness that rule out certain trades or compromises restrict the game. An unwillingness to consider trades because of sacred values may constrain the set of permissible agreements in ways that reduce the value of negotiated outcomes for all parties by turning negotiations into win-lose battles in highly restricted domains (Thompson & Gonzalez 1997).

Concerns about ethics and sacredness pose as general rules of allowable and appropriate conduct in negotiation. Ethical guidelines define the rules and permissible negotiation strategies. Negotiators tend to make decisions of ethical appropriateness in an egocentric fashion and to favor those rules that favor themselves. However, negotiators can also hurt themselves by claiming certain issues to be sacred when in fact they are not, thereby placing constraints on the game and on their ability to find integrative trade-offs.

Choosing a Medium of Communication

One way in which negotiators can influence the mental model held by other parties is by their choice of communications media. As we enter the new millennium, we see an expanding universe of technologically mediated communication channels, such as telephone, fax, express mail, videophone, and electronic mail. Whereas in the 1960s when little was known about the influence of communication media on negotiation (Smith 1969), today researchers generally agree that medium of communication affects social conflict in a number of important ways (Carnevale & Probst 1997, Roth 1995, Valley et al 1998). The technology we use to negotiate affects our definition of the negotiation game and the behavior deemed appropriate for the interaction (KL Valley & AT Keros, unpublished data).
Therefore, from the perspective of an individual negotiator, the choice of communication medium can be critical to the process and outcome of a negotiation. In this section, we review research findings that bear on the question of whether or not a negotiator should seek face-to-face communication.

The case for face-to-face communication in bargaining Most researchers studying the impact of communication media conceptualize the various forms of media along a continuum of “social presence” (Fulk et al 1990, Rutter & Robinson 1981). That is, face-to-face communication has the richest level of social presence, followed by audio/visual, audio, and finally written or computer-mediated communication. Accordingly, in a study by Drolet & Morris (1999), face-to-face communication enabled participants to develop greater rapport and cooperation than audio-only communication. Thus, unless a close relationship already exists or rapport can be generated by some alternative means (see Moore et al 1999), rapport is more likely to be developed and consequently more likely to improve negotiated outcomes in face-to-face interaction. This research suggests that in negotiations where rapport is more likely (e.g. face-to-face, between closely related parties, where cooperation is primed), we can expect to see a more shared, dynamic evolution of the mental model.

Truth telling is higher in face-to-face negotiations than in other media. In a two-person negotiation exercise involving asymmetric information, Valley et al (1998) found that participants negotiating face-to-face achieve higher joint benefit, due to higher levels of truth telling than those negotiating by telephone or in writing. In the game used by Valley et al (1998), the seller held the informational advantage. Buyers’ trust was higher in verbal interaction than in written interaction, regardless of whether the verbal communication took place face-to-face or over the telephone, yet trustworthiness among the sellers was higher only in face-to-face interaction. In other words, deceit may be less common in the context of face-to-face interaction, increasing the likelihood of mutually beneficial agreements, whereas suspicion of deceit and actual deceit may be higher in the context of written interaction, increasing the likelihood of impasse. In telephone interaction, the players do not seem to share the same mental model: The buyer appears to be operating under a model assuming trustworthiness, whereas the seller is operating under a model allowing deception. The result is likely to be a bad deal for the trusting buyer.

A significant proportion of a message’s meaning comes from facial and vocal cues rather than the actual words themselves (DePaulo & Friedman 1998). Therefore, it is no surprise that removal of such cues can reduce a message’s clarity. Evidence for this assertion is found in the results of studies that utilize dilemma games (Sally 1995). Without the presence of clear communication, participants are less likely to coordinate their moves to achieve mutual cooperation. Accordingly, in a study by Wichman (1970), 87% of participants playing 78 trial prisoner’s dilemma games cooperated when they could see and hear one another,
when they could only hear one another, 48% when they could only see one another, and 41% when they could neither hear nor see one another.

The case against face-to-face communication in bargaining The aforemen-
tioned advantages of conducting negotiations face-to-face notwithstanding, under
certain conditions, conducting negotiations via telephone or other audio-only
channels might be preferable. In a study by Lewis & Fry (1977), individualisti-
cally oriented negotiators used fewer pressure tactics, were less likely to impasse,
and obtained higher joint profit when they negotiated with a barrier that prevented
them from seeing each other. Participants with a more cooperative problem solv-
ing orientation were not significantly affected by the presence of the barrier. Other
studies have found similar tension-enhancing effects of face-to-face communi-
cation when negotiators possess high levels of accountability (Carnevale et al
1981) or when low-Machiavellian negotiators are matched with high-

Carnevale et al concluded that, under certain conditions, “...the other party’s
gaze may be interpreted as an effort to dominate. ... [B]argainers will make
pressure statements only if they can accompany them with efforts to stare the
other down” (1981:113). Lewis & Fry (1977) noted that the negative conse-
quences that sometimes accompany face-to-face interaction are consistent with
Zajonc’s (1965) theory that the visible presence of others has arousal-inducing
properties. Arousal leads to dominant behavioral responses, and dominant behav-
ioral responses to conflict typically involve either attack or retreat (Selye 1976).
Therefore, under conditions of high arousal, audio-only communication may
facilitate more sophisticated, adaptive negotiating strategies.

Although written communication may share some of these mitigating effects
on arousal, e-mail communication in particular—especially in the context of high
arousal—could make things worse rather than better. When a communication
medium like e-mail lacks social context cues, people tend to become more forth-
right in their communication, even to the point of weakening inhibitions on
socially undesirable behavior, either because of reduced evaluation anxiety or
because of reduced attention to social norms (Kiesler & Sproull 1992). Moreover,
a feeling of anonymity that tends to accompany e-mail communications may
exacerbate such disinhibition (Griffith & Northcraft 1994, Thompson 1998, Zim-
bardo 1969). Dubrovsky et al (1991) found that, among 24 four-person decision-
making groups interacting via computer, there were 102 instances of rude or
impulsive behavior, whereas another 24 groups that interacted face-to-face pro-
duced only 12 such remarks. Among computer aficionados, this uninhibited or
antisocial behavior is referred to as flaming (Sproull & Kiesler 1991). Perhaps as
a result of this uninhibited behavior, e-mail negotiations suffer from higher rates
of breakdown (Croson 1999). Therefore, audio-only communication may be the
best choice of media when it comes to negotiating under conditions of high
arousal.
One potential benefit of e-mail interaction is its tendency to cut across social hierarchies. In three experiments comparing the effects of face-to-face and computer-mediated communication, Siegel et al (1986) found that the amount of participation is more equally distributed among group members interacting via computer than among group members interacting face-to-face. Whereas face-to-face discussions often involve status differentials that determine talk time (Bales et al 1951), computer-mediated discussions have fewer social status cues (Sproull & Kiesler 1991). Although some interpret this lack of social regulation in computer-mediated communication as disorganized (i.e. lacking in efficiency) (Williams 1977), many see it as egalitarian.

In summary, a negotiator often can influence the negotiation game and its outcome through his or her choice of a communication medium. Research indicates that this decision should depend in large part on the circumstances of the negotiation. Conducting negotiations face-to-face appears to be more likely to foster development of rapport, less likely to involve deceit, and less likely to involve misunderstanding. However, when rapport already exists and/or tension (i.e. arousal) is high, audio-only communication may reduce the likelihood of pressure tactics that might otherwise result in domination or hostility. Moreover, in other cases, where conflicts involve low levels of arousal and meeting by phone or in person is overly costly or prohibited, computer-mediated negotiations may allow for certain benefits, such as more evenly distributed participation. Because the choice of medium so clearly changes the negotiation game, prescriptive advice should take these contingencies into consideration.

Cross-Cultural Issues in Negotiation

In their review of research on negotiation and mediation, Carnevale & Pruitt (1992) predicted that cultural differences in negotiation would increase in importance as a result of growing interrelationships among nations. Indeed, over the past decade, we have seen an expansion of research on culture and negotiation (Weiss 1996). In this section, we review two types of literature. The first type includes research on cross-cultural differences in negotiation behavior as well as how these affect and are affected by the parties’ conceptions of negotiation. The second type deals with negotiating across cultural boundaries and prescriptive techniques for doing so successfully. Put differently, we review both differences in the negotiation game between cultures and how negotiators might change their game (or even change their mental models) to facilitate negotiation across cultures.

The nature of the negotiation game within cultures Over the past decade, dozens of studies have examined how the meaning and practice of negotiation varies across cultures (for reviews see Cohen 1997, Leung 1998, Markus & Lin 1998). Although a growing number of studies have examined organizational cul-
ture (e.g. Chatman et al 1998, Mannix et al 1995), for the purposes of this paper, we focus on national cultures.

Of the multiple dimensions of cultural variability recognized by cultural psychologists, the most relevant to the culture and negotiation literature have been collectivism-individualism, power distance, communication context, and conception of time (Brett et al 1998, Cohen 1997, Leung 1998). The first two dimensions emerged from a much-cited survey of international values conducted by Hofstede (1980, 1983). The last two dimensions emerged from the work of Hall (1976).

Although individualism-collectivism may in fact represent a number of cultural factors rather than a single trait (Triandis 1995), it is perhaps the most important (Triandis 1990) as well as the most frequently cited cultural dimension in studies of negotiation (Leung 1998). Members of individualist cultures are said to have loose ties among individuals and to value independence, uniqueness, and individual goals, whereas members of collectivist countries are said to have tight ties among individuals and to value interdependence, doing one’s duty, and the goals of the collective (Hofstede 1983, Markus & Kitayama 1991, Triandis 1990).

Many researchers have explored how the individualism-collectivism dimension applies to conflict management. Generally speaking, the individualist negotiator (e.g. United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands) is more concerned with preserving individual rights and attributes, whereas the collectivist negotiator (e.g. Colombia, Pakistan, Taiwan) is more concerned with preserving relationships (Markus & Lin 1998). A number of cross-cultural studies of negotiation-related behavior and cognition have provided data consistent with the generalization that members of individualist cultures are more likely to handle conflicts directly through competition and problem solving, whereas members of collectivist cultures are more likely to handle conflict in indirect ways that attempt to preserve the relationship (Leung 1998, Starr & Yngvesson 1975). For example, Americans (individualists) were more likely than Japanese (collectivists) to hold egocentric notions of fairness and to defect in asymmetric social dilemmas (i.e. placing individual goals ahead of group goals) (KA Wade-Benzoni, T Okumura, JM Brett, DA Moore, AE Tenbrunsel et al, unpublished data). In a conflict scenario study (E Weldon, KA Jehn, L Doucet, X Chen & W Zhong-Ming, unpublished data), Chinese (collectivists) more frequently addressed the conflict with the express interest of maintaining relationships, whereas Americans simply wanted to address the incident itself. Members of collectivist cultures were more likely than members of individualist cultures to use deception, typically as a means of saving face, avoiding confrontation or preserving harmony (HC Triandis, P Carnevale, M Gelfand, C Robert, A Wasti, et al, unpublished data).

In comparison to the collectivism-individualism dimension, three other dimensions—power distance, communication context, and conception of time—have received only minimal attention in cross-cultural studies of negotiation. Power distance refers to the relative prevalence of social or professional hierarchies in a society (Hofstede 1980). High power distance societies reflect inequalities among individuals on the basis of these hierarchies, whereas low power
distance societies reflect more egalitarian values. Communication context is the degree to which communicated messages inherit meaning from the settings in which they are transmitted (Hall 1976). Low communication context cultures use explicit, direct language, whereas high communication context cultures use implicit, indirect language in which words and phrases derive their meanings from contextual clues. Finally, conception of time refers to the way in which people perceive and manage their time. A polychronic conception of time is the notion that time is plentiful and many tasks can be undertaken simultaneously, whereas a monochronic conception of time is the notion that time is scarce and only one task can be handled at a time (Hall 1983).

In a conflict scenario study, Tinsley (1998) found each of the three cultural dimensions described above to account partially for normative models of conflict resolution in Japan, Germany, and the United States. Moreover, in his review of the literature on culture and negotiation, Leung (1998) provided evidence for the following associations. First, members of high-power-distance cultures (e.g. the Philippines, Venezuela, India, France, Belgium) have fewer conflicts with their superiors and are more likely to have superiors intervene in settling their conflicts than do members of low-power-distance cultures (e.g. Denmark, Israel, Austria) (Bond et al 1985, Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey 1988; for review see James 1993). Second, members of low-context cultures (e.g. United States, Germany, Scandinavia, Switzerland) have been found to communicate more directly than members of high-context cultures (e.g. Japan, China, Korea, Vietnam) (Chua & Gudykunst 1987). More recent evidence suggests, however, that the more important differences may be in the goals of the communication and not the amount of direct communication (E Weldon, KA Jehn, L Doucet, X Chen & W Zhong-Ming, unpublished data). Third, negotiators who hold monochronic conceptions of time (e.g. North American, Western Europe) are more likely to process issues sequentially and to negotiate in a highly organized fashion, whereas negotiators with polychronic conceptions of time (e.g. Asia, Africa, South America, Middle East) are more likely to process issues simultaneously while ignoring conversational turn-taking (i.e. speaking simultaneously) and using frequent interruptions (Foster 1992).

Overall, attempts to correlate cultural value dimensions with cross-cultural differences in intracultural negotiations have produced only partial success (Tinsley & Brett 1997; E Weldon, KA Jehn, L Doucet, X Chen & W Zhong-Ming, unpublished data). Tinsley & Brett (1997) argued that value dimensions such as the four just discussed lack predictive power and therefore should not be used to predict negotiation behavior. Instead, they advocate domain-specific, normatively based predictors such as asking study participants to rate the appropriateness of a given conflict-handling behavior, explaining each party’s underlying concerns, or seeking help from a boss (Tinsley & Brett 1997). However, Weldon & Jehn (1995) suggested that the problem of low predictive power could be mitigated through the use of inductive approaches to the generation of conflict scenarios.
and the measurement of conflict behaviors (E Weldon, KA Jehn, L Doucet, X Chen & W Zhong-Ming, unpublished data).

Difficulties predicting behavior based on cultural value dimensions recall the failure of individual-differences research to predict specific behaviors (Ross & Nisbett 1991, Thompson 1998). Perhaps a more fertile avenue for research lies in studying how cultural traits, in conjunction with individual definitions of the game, influence negotiation behavior (Neuberg 1988). Such a relationship is suggested by investigators (DA Briley, MW Morris & I Simonson, unpublished data), who demonstrated how individually held mental models moderate the effect of culture on choice behavior. When individuals were made introspective by having to provide reasons before making choices, their choices varied more on the basis of their culture than when no reasons were required. A similar interaction between culture and individually held mental models may also govern negotiation behavior.

**Negotiation across cultures—changing the game** Cross-cultural differences are substantial, and negotiating across cultures (intercultural negotiations) differs dramatically from negotiating within the same culture (Adler & Graham 1989). Indeed, tales of “cross-cultural conflict—faux pas and ‘blunders’—abound” (Weiss 1994:52). Tinsley et al (1999) described the process of intercultural negotiation as akin to a dance in which one person does a waltz and another a tango. Different cultures may not share some of the most basic assumptions; evidence suggests that there is cultural variation in the tendency to fall victim to the fixed-pie assumption (Starr & Yngvesson 1975) and the fundamental attribution error (Morris & Peng 1994).

According to Tinsley et al (1999), intercultural negotiations present a sort of “dilemma of differences.” On the one hand, differences between cultural scripts present procedural conflict at the bargaining table; on the other hand, differences in preferences present opportunities for logrolling. For example, cultures that differ in their perceptions of risk (see Weber & Hsee 1999) can create value by sharing risks and benefits proportionally but asymmetrically (Bontempo et al 1997). However, the price of realizing such joint gains is high. In a study of intercultural negotiations by Brett & Okumura (1998), Japanese and American participants negotiated a hypothetical mixed-motive conflict with either a same-culture partner or an other-culture partner. As expected, intercultural dyads reached outcomes that were of lower joint value than intracultural dyads. Responses to a postnegotiation questionnaire revealed that intercultural dyads had less-accurate mutual understanding of each other’s priorities (although Japanese negotiators understood more about American priorities than vice versa). Consistent with the power-distance dimension, Americans viewed their walk-away option as a source of power, whereas Japanese had preexisting notions of power based on role assignments (i.e. buyer versus seller). Finally, consistent with the collectivism-individualism dimension, Americans were more focused on self-interest than were Japanese—a factor that, when asymmetrical between negotia-
tors, has been found to lead to premature closure of negotiations (Huber & Neale 1987). The authors speculate that a combination of these factors—insufficient information sharing, power struggle, and asymmetric focus on self-interest—led to lower levels of joint gains among intercultural negotiation dyads.

A growing literature has emerged to address the intercultural negotiation challenge through prescriptive advice to practitioners (e.g. Corne 1992, Morrison et al 1994, Shapiro & von Glinow 1999, Weiss 1994). This advice usually suggests modifying how one plays the game or, even better, modifying how one’s opponent plays the game. The problem is that even if negotiators were to agree on a cultural norm by which to conduct their business, there is no evidence that an individual negotiator could transcend his or her own cultural background (Brett & Okumura 1998). Shapiro & von Glinow (1999) conceded that “stepping out” of one’s culture would be difficult. A more plausible suggestion was offered by Weiss (1994), who instructed intercultural negotiators to jointly follow the culture with which both negotiators are most familiar. Clearly, more research is necessary to determine the feasibility and effectiveness of these strategies.

In sum, cross-cultural differences in the negotiation game can be conceptualized along four basic dimensions—collectivism-individualism, power distance, communication context, and conception of time (Brett et al 1998, Cohen 1997). Most empirical research has focused on the first of these dimensions—collectivism-individualism—and has documented both behavioral and cognitive manifestations related to negotiation. Although the research using cultural value dimensions alone has suffered from predictive shortcomings (Tinsley & Brett 1997), perhaps the use of mental models in conjunction with culture (e.g. DA Briley, MW Morris & I Simonson, unpublished data) will prove more fruitful. The prescriptive literature is growing, but the most common suggestion for negotiation across cultures involves deliberate changes to the negotiation game. Although in theory such changes seem reasonable, research has not, to our knowledge, confirmed its viability for the typical negotiator.

Negotiation With More Than Two Players

Increasing the number of players involved in a negotiation dramatically increases the complexity of the situation in at least five ways: informational, computational, procedural, social, and strategic (Kramer 1991). As new players are added to a conflict, the number of potential dyadic connections between players increases exponentially. Different parties are likely to bring a variety of interests to the table, and simply understanding these interests, let alone finding ways to integrate them, can become an exceedingly complex task. Multiparty negotiations are situations in which a full understanding of the situation, with the variety of potential strategies and outcomes, may simply be impossible. Making the problem tractable often necessitates simplification of the structure or organization of the interaction, and there may be many justifiable ways to accomplish this simplification. Different ways will have different consequences for the outcome of the negotiation.
Developing a manageable understanding of the situation is essentially the problem of how people structure and define the negotiation game when there are more than two players. Empirical research has highlighted some of the ways that they do this.

One procedural tool for managing conflict in the face of that complexity is to implement decision-making rules that control participants’ opportunities to communicate or specify how the group will make a decision (e.g. dictatorship, majority rule, unanimity). However, many procedures designed to reduce conflict or organize the process of multiparty negotiation also serve to reduce the opportunities for negotiators to learn about each others’ interests and to find integrative gains (Bazerman et al 1988). For example, an agenda that leads negotiators to resolve issues one at a time dramatically reduces their ability to improve the quality of the agreement using trade-offs across issues (Mannix et al 1989, Weingart et al 1993). On the other hand, a unanimity decision rule, which requires agreement from all parties, can be cumbersome to implement, but tends to increase the quality of agreements (Thompson et al 1988). Groups without any shared mental model for dealing with the negotiation are likely to seek some such coordination; simply telling a group about a guideline without requiring its use can nevertheless be a large influence on group norms and future group agreements (Mannix & Blount White 1992).

Another way to structure the information-processing complexity of multiparty negotiations is to limit communication to subsets of the group. Even when all parties’ participation is necessary for an agreement, constraining communication to dyadic encounters results in lower levels of cooperation, less-equal outcomes, and a decrease in integrative trade-offs involving more than two parties (Palmer & Thompson 1995). When parties can be excluded from the final agreement, caucusing increases the likelihood of coalition agreements (Kim 1997, Mannix 1993a).

The possibility of shutting some parties out of an agreement is one distinguishing feature of multiparty disputes. Although some multiparty conflicts require the participation of all parties for an agreement, many can be resolved by a coalition. Analysis of coalition games has a long history (Gamson 1961, Luce & Raiffa 1957). Forming coalitions to reduce the number of parties to an agreement is one way to simplify a complex multiparty deal. Research finds that various factors that increase the complexity of multiparty negotiations, such as asymmetry between parties (Mannix 1993b) or uncertainty regarding outcomes (Mannix & Blount White 1992), also increase the occurrence of coalition agreements.

The embeddedness of negotiated outcomes in social relations can also be an important factor in the resolution of multiparty negotiations. Although structural analyses of coalition formation suggest that coalitions will often be unstable (Murnighan & Brass 1991), the social context of interpersonal relationships in which coalitions form may contribute to their stability (Polzer et al 1995). Negotiators tend to form coalitions with those who have been allies in the past, even if better partners exist, based on the congruence of interests (Polzer et al 1998). Further-
more, the spoils from coalition games tend to be allocated more equally (Mannix 1994) and include more parties (Mannix 1991) when the players care about future interactions with their negotiating partners.

Increases in the informational and computational complexity of the negotiation situation extend the length of time it takes to reach agreement (Polzer 1996) and may lead to information overload (Morely 1982), which increases the use of cognitive heuristics. Therefore, we might expect simplifying strategies or cognitive mistakes to be more common in complex multiparty negotiations. For example, we might expect multiparty negotiations to have more trouble achieving integrative gains than dyadic negotiations, and we might expect outcomes to gravitate toward social heuristics or focal points such as equal division (Debusschere & van Avermaet 1984, Messick 1993), rather than more complex allocation rationales. However, given that people interpret fairness in egocentric ways (Diekmann et al 1997), additional complexity is likely to increase dissention about what a fair outcome would be (Thompson & Loewenstein 1992). This dissention may increase the chances of delays, stalemates, and impasses.

There is more optimistic evidence from experiments that compare individual with team negotiation. These experiments, which have only two sides represented in a negotiation but which vary the number of people representing each side, suggest that teams have some distinct advantages. When teams negotiate against individuals, the teams tend to claim a larger portion of the bargaining surplus (Polzer 1996, Thompson et al 1996). At the same time, teams exchange more information (Thompson et al 1996), generate more high-quality ideas for solutions (Polzer 1996), and tend to enhance the integrative value of the resulting agreement (Polzer 1996, Thompson et al 1996). However, teams perceive themselves, and are perceived by their opponents, to be less cooperative and less trustworthy than are individual negotiators (Polzer 1996). In addition, team members tend to be less satisfied with both the negotiation process and the outcome than are individuals (Polzer 1996).

As the number of parties in a negotiation increases, the complexity of the dispute rises quickly. Negotiators may respond to this complexity by simplifying the negotiation game in several ways. They may rely on group norms. They may form coalitions that reduce the number of parties to an agreement. They may implement procedures that establish decision rules. Although there are reasons to assume that increased complexity would increase reliance on cognitive simplifications of the negotiation landscape, evidence suggests that negotiating teams are better than individuals at exchanging information that allows them to find wise agreements.

CONCLUSION

The psychological study of negotiation has witnessed an amazing set of shifts over the past 25 years, often in parallel with more global changes in the field of psychology and the broader society. We view these changes as useful and exciting.
We have seen the birth and death of the study of personality and structural variables that were common in the precognitive era of social psychology (Bazerman et al. 2000). We have seen the development of a behavioral decision perspective in the 1980s and 1990s shift the attention of researchers to the decision processes of the actor, and we have witnessed the criticism that resulted from the narrowness of this perspective. We have seen the reemergence of the role of social psychology in the study of how social context affects negotiator decision making. And, finally, this paper has attempted to integrate recent research that calls for a better understanding of how negotiators define the negotiation game that they are playing.

We see the backdrop of rationality as critical to the impact of the psychological study of negotiation on related fields. We believe that the main reason the behavioral decision perspective dominated negotiation research in the 1980s and 1990s is that this perspective made it explicitly clear what was needed to improve negotiation behaviors—the debiasing of the mind of the negotiator. This perspective has now spilled over into the new social psychology of negotiations that we overviewed in this chapter. And we see this perspective as relevant to creating useful research about how the negotiator defines the game.

As laboratory researchers, we are sympathetic to the constraints of the laboratory methodology. However, it is also important to realize the resulting biases in the definition of the field. Most negotiation experiments are easiest to create when it is in the power of the researcher to specify the game. Unfortunately, this researcher specification may have inhibited the study of how negotiators psychologically define the game. Many of us have been annoyed by the “weird” things that our experimental participants do, particularly when they “ruin” the significance of our effects. However, one important source of error may be in not understanding how our participants redefine the game.

Finally, we offer our review as a call for better integration of the multiple subfields of psychology to understand negotiation. The psychological study of negotiation was once a subfield of social psychology (Rubin & Brown 1975), but this is no longer the case. We now have important contributions from social psychology (Bazerman et al. 2000), cognitive psychology (Loewenstein et al. 1999), behavioral decision research (Thompson 1998), and clinical psychology (Greenhalgh & Chapman 1997, Greenhalgh & Okun 1998). Moreover, early work suggests that physiological factors can increase our understanding of negotiations as well (TC Burnham, unpublished data; ME Schweitzer, unpublished data). We hope that these multiple lenses can create a more unified understanding so that psychology can help the world overcome barriers to effective negotiation behavior.

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