

1 Income Inequality and Social Preferences for Redistribution and
2 Compensation Differentials

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4 **Abstract**

5 Countries with greater inequality typically exhibit less support for redistribution and greater
6 acceptance of inequality (e.g., US versus Western Europe). If individual nations evolve along this
7 pattern, a vicious cycle could form with reduced social concern amplifying primal increases in
8 inequality. Exploring movements around these long-term levels, however, this study finds mixed
9 evidence regarding the vicious cycle hypothesis. Larger compensation differentials are accepted
10 as inequality grows. Weighing against this, growth in inequality is met with greater support for
11 government-led redistribution. Inequality shocks can be reinforced in the labor market but do not
12 result in weaker political preferences for redistribution.

13 *Keywords:* Inequality, Social Preferences, Social Norms, Redistribution, Welfare, Class Warfare.

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1. Introduction

The substantial increase in wage and income inequality over the last three decades is a central focus of recent economic research and policy discussion. Much of the earlier literature focuses on accounting for why inequality is increasing. One line of work considers changes in the relative supply and demand for skilled workers due to shifts in educational attainment, the introduction of labor-saving production and computing technologies, and capital deepening. Others researchers consider structural changes of the labor market itself, like the decline of institutions and policies that have historically compressed the wage structure (e.g., unions, minimum wages) and the proliferation of "superstar" labor markets where top performers earn disproportionate sums to those just behind them. The potential erosion of social preferences regarding compensation inequality and redistribution is also widely discussed. For the United States, particular emphasis is placed on the explosion in executive pay and deepening within-establishment inequality.¹

The empirical literature mostly considers these potential determinants in isolation. Yet, an important theme of recent macroeconomic models is that the interactions among the factors bear significant responsibility. Moreover, a greater potential for the entrenchment or amplification of inequality exists in this general-equilibrium setting.² Taking skill-biased technical change as an example, its individual effect on inequality to raise the skilled-unskilled wage differential will be checked in the long-run as firms substitute towards cheaper factors of production or as labor supplies and education investments endogenously adjust. If the bias is sufficient, however, the technical change and its concomitant increase in inequality may also prompt lasting changes in the structure of the labor market (e.g., deunionization, increased segregation of skilled workers) that entrench or magnify its solitary effect. Of course,

¹Gordon and Dew-Becker (2008) and Heathcote et al. (2010) provide recent surveys of various inequality determinants. The appendix provides extended references on these different channels.

²Examples include Acemoglu et al. (2001), Alesina and Angeletos (2005), Benabou (2003), Guvenen et al. (2011), and Hassler et. al. (2003).

38 interactions can alternatively dampen inequality shocks. Understanding these dynamics is
39 important for identifying how economies respond to primal inequality shocks.

40 This potential for amplification is particularly strong for social preferences regarding
41 income equalization and social support. First, if changes in inequality directly influence
42 ideology, then social preferences are a propagation channel for any shock to the income dis-
43 tribution, regardless of the source. Second, of all the factors discussed, social attitudes are
44 the least governed (if at all) by market-like mechanisms that can retard excessive changes.
45 Third, social preferences can affect many forms of institutions and policies—from firm em-
46 ployment structures to redistribution policies—resulting in higher amplification.

47 Given these conditions, the formation of a "vicious cycle" is possible—where an increase
48 in disparity weakens concern for wage equality or redistribution and thus propagates and am-
49 plifies the original shock. Under this scenario, growth in inequality creates larger differences
50 across groups in society. These greater gaps then directly reduce support among the wealthy
51 for redistribution, as the wealthy feel less likely to become themselves poor or feel that the
52 poor are less like them. Increased social stratification in society may also amplify the shock
53 if preferences for redistribution decline as groups spend less time in direct contact with each
54 other. Indirect channels may further exist, as the rich increasingly segment themselves into
55 workplaces and schools that entrench these differences across groups. Thus, under a vicious
56 cycle, the initial weakened concern produces even greater future compensation differentials,
57 a further shrinking of the welfare state, and so on, which kicks the process off again.

58 Support for the vicious-cycle hypothesis can be taken from the cross-sectional distribu-
59 tions of countries (particularly long-term OECD members) and regions of the United States.
60 Nations with greater income inequality typically demonstrate less support for redistribution
61 and greater acceptance of wage inequality than their more-equal counterparts. While the
62 evolution of countries or regions along this pattern would be consistent with hypotheses of
63 reduced social concern, this response is not guaranteed as many primal factors determining

64 these long-term ideology positions (e.g., beliefs regarding social mobility) may be stable.³
65 In contrast to the vicious-cycle hypothesis, changes in social preferences may counteract
66 inequality increases. In the face of higher inequality, individuals may believe that greater
67 redistribution and sharing of resources is warranted for the current generation and to ensure
68 equal opportunities for future generations.⁴

69 Ultimately, this question is an empirical matter as powerful factors are operating in
70 potentially conflicting directions and have unknown relative strength. The empirical response
71 of social preferences to changes in inequality has not been quantified. This empirical analysis
72 is of critical importance for immediate policy discussions. It would also provide a better
73 foundation for developing macroeconomic models of inequality in society, the discernment
74 of optimal policies that balance trade-offs between insurance and agent incentives, and the
75 appropriate depiction of fixed versus state-dependent preferences.

76 This paper investigates this question by focusing on short-term movements in inequality
77 and social attitudes around the long-term level of each country or U.S. region. A fixed-effect
78 estimation strategy removes permanent differences in inequality and redistribution philoso-
79 phies, as well as common time trends. The contribution of this study is to characterize
80 how the resulting longitudinal responses resemble and differ from the cross-sectional pat-
81 tern. How responses differ by income class and neighborhood racial heterogeneity is also
82 considered. A first set of international results are drawn from a panel of countries repeatedly
83 surveyed by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the World Value Sur-
84 vey (WVS). Complementary results and extensions are developed through regional variation

³The determinants of this cross-sectional pattern have been a frequent and lively political-economy topic since at least de Tocqueville. Alesina et al. (2001) and Hornstein et al. (2005) offer broad studies of why the United States has both higher inequality and a smaller welfare state than Western Europe, including appropriate references.

⁴Political-economy models differ in their predictions of how responses to inequality changes vary by income class. Piketty (1995) constructs a Rawlsian model where increases in the inequality of opportunity, holding fixed beliefs regarding the incentive costs of effort, promote greater support for redistribution independent of current income. On the other hand, redistribution preferences diverge with rising inequality in the median-voter model (e.g., Meltzer and Richards 1981) as gaps to the median income widen.

85 in the United States captured by the General Social Survey (GSS). To establish causal-
86 ity, an instrument-variable specification that exploits exogenous changes in the real federal
87 minimum-wage rate interacted with predetermined regional characteristics is also employed.
88 This step is a very important contribution of the study given the substantial degree to which
89 inequality, policies, and preferences jointly influence each other. The U.S. regional analysis
90 also allows us to consider the implementation of policy outcomes connected to social pref-
91 erences (e.g., state tax code progressivity, welfare expenditures), contrast multiple forms of
92 inequality (e.g., wage, consumption), and consider how gaps can emerge between preferences
93 and policies through features like voter participation.

94 The results of this study show that the potential mechanisms of the vicious-cycle hy-
95 pothesis conflict with other, thereby weakening its overall strength. On one hand, larger
96 compensation differentials are accepted as inequality grows. This growth in wage differen-
97 tials is of a smaller magnitude than the actual increase in inequality, but it is nonetheless
98 positive and substantial in size. On the other hand, growth in inequality is met with greater
99 concern over inequality, greater support for government-led redistribution to the poor, and
100 greater support for more-progressive taxation. This is particularly true for inequality in the
101 bottom half of the income distribution. While greater class conflict is perceived along in-
102 come dimensions, the increases in support for redistribution among wealthy individuals are
103 as strong as those of poorer individuals.

104 These patterns suggest that short-run inequality shocks can be reinforced in the labor
105 market, and that changes in compensation differentials due to changing factors of production
106 and economic conditions are only modestly retarded by social preferences. By contrast, in-
107 equality growth does not result in weaker political preferences for redistribution, suggesting
108 that the policy channel alone is unlikely to prompt a vicious cycle that amplifies primal in-
109 equality changes. Indeed, for the U.S. regional analysis, the translation of preference changes
110 into local policy outcomes is also evident with respect to dimensions like state taxation pro-

gressivity and minimum wage mandates. These empirical patterns provide insights for how to most accurately model economic dynamics. Preferences in labor markets and competition for scarce skills influence inequality in a different format and degree than what occurs in policy markets and their choices regarding basic social well-being. The former appears substantially more state dependent in its nature and easily adjusts, while the latter is more fixed within societies (but can vary across societies) and retards changes.

Before proceeding to the analysis, it is important to distinguish preferences regarding inequality from other factors that influence perceptions of distributive justice. Political economists have long considered how beliefs regarding the determinants of success affect attitudes towards redistribution. Individuals and societies who believe hard work and effort are more important for outcomes than luck or ancestry often choose systems characterized by higher inequality and lower redistribution.⁵ Past mobility experiences and future expectations of social position are also significant for attitudes towards income equalization.⁶ If the forces driving higher inequality also alter these underlying beliefs, then social preferences for equality may weaken. The analysis presented below controls for changes in these social-mobility beliefs to isolate the effect of inequality, and additional research needs to evaluate whether other amplification mechanisms operate through these channels.

2. Preferences in International Surveys

2.1. *ISSP and WVS Data Structure*

The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) conducts annual surveys in member countries (38 nations in 1999) on rotating topics ranging from religion to environmental

⁵Alesina and Angeletos (2005) demonstrate how differences in these beliefs can create multiple equilibria among otherwise similar economies, as rational agents select taxation and redistribution policies (and their associated distortions) that fulfill their original expectations. Benabou and Tirole (2006) develop a related general-equilibrium model where different beliefs regarding how just the world is create two distinct redistribution states. Guvenen et al. (2011) consider the general equilibrium of human capital investments and redistribution policies.

⁶For example, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005); Benabou and Ok (2001); Fong (2001, 2006); Piketty (1995).

132 protection. This study primarily considers questions that were included in the 1987, 1992,
133 and 1999 Social Inequality module. Responses to three complementary questions proxy social
134 preferences for government-led income redistribution—the first considering the responsibility
135 of the government in the transfer of income (Government Responsibility), the second focusing
136 on the progressive nature of taxation (Progressive Taxation), and the last focusing on the
137 acceptability of current income differences (Inequality Acceptance). Higher responses on
138 a five-point scale indicate greater support for government intervention, greater support for
139 more progressive taxation, and greater concern over income differences.

140 Respondents are also asked their opinions on the appropriate salaries for a variety of
141 occupations. Instructions request preferences be pre-tax and regardless of perceptions of
142 current pay scales. From these responses, a Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Worker Wage Ratio
143 is developed as the log ratio of the wages ascribed for a "doctor in general practice" and an
144 "unskilled worker in a factory." A higher ratio indicates a wider wage distribution (i.e., a log
145 ratio of zero would indicate unskilled workers and doctors should earn the same amount),
146 while a lower ratio indicates less support for compensation differentials. Perceptions of
147 respondents regarding the actual earnings of these occupations are also examined below.

148 Finally, two questions regarding conflicts between social groups are considered. The first,
149 focusing on conflicts between the poor and the rich (Poor-Rich Conflict), is used to validate
150 respondents' awareness of inequality, while a second question regarding conflict between
151 young and old people is considered as a falsification exercise (Young-Old Conflict). A higher
152 score on a four-point scale indicates a greater perception of conflict.

153 As a complement to the ISSP, responses to a question included in the 1990, 1995, and
154 2000 rounds of the World Value Survey (WVS) are studied. For this question (WVS Income
155 Equalization) respondents are asked to rate their views regarding income equalization, with
156 a higher score on a ten-point scale expressing greater concern. Table 1 details the countries
157 included, sample sizes, and average responses to these questions for both surveys.

158 These surveys are paired with national income inequality estimates using log Gini series
 159 constructed from the United Nations Development Programme’s World Income Inequality
 160 Database (WIID), the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000),
 161 Atkinson and Brandolini (2001), and various national statistics agencies. With a few excep-
 162 tions, these Gini estimates are estimated with national samples of disposable (after-transfers)
 163 household income and lagged one year. The U.S.-based analysis later considers alternatives
 164 like wage and consumption inequality that are not possible with international data.⁷

165 2.2. Empirical Estimation Strategy

166 Figure 1 illustrates the main findings of the study. Panel 1A plots the average response
 167 by country to the Government Responsibility question in the 1992 ISSP survey against the
 168 country’s log inequality level. The trend line indicates that greater inequality is associated
 169 with weaker support for redistribution. Panel 1B plots the average proposed wage ratio for a
 170 doctor vs. unskilled worker. Respondents in countries with greater inequality propose a wider
 171 wage distribution, too. These cross-sectional patterns have been frequently documented,
 172 and both patterns could be taken as evidence that a vicious cycle could emerge with growth
 173 inequality prompting changes in preferences that further amplify the original increase.

174 The patterns evident in the cross-sections, however, do not necessarily dictate the move-
 175 ment of countries over time. Panels 1C and 1D consider changes in preferences and inequal-
 176 ity from 1992 to the 1999 ISSP survey. In Panel 1C, increased inequality is associated with
 177 greater redistribution support, in contrast to Panel 1A. Societies experiencing increases in
 178 inequality become more concerned about income differences and assign an increasing re-
 179 sponsibility to the government for transferring income. Thus, within-country shifts in policy
 180 preferences for redistribution do not mirror cross-country patterns, perhaps because other

⁷The unpublished appendix provides additional information about the datasets employed, the sample construction steps performed, and the empirical estimations undertaken. This information is provided for both the international and U.S. preference estimations. The appendix also documents many additional references and literature notes that were removed from the final paper due to space constraints. This appendix is available at <http://www.people.hbs.edu/wkerr/>.

181 factors that affect redistribution preferences are not being influenced (e.g., belief about de-
 182 terminants of success). Yet, Panel 1D does show that respondents propose a wider wage
 183 distribution after increases in inequality. The within-country and across-country patterns
 184 are much more similar with respect to preferences regarding appropriate wage dispersion.

185 While important for framing the analysis, the visual correlations fail to control adequately
 186 for factors influencing both inequality and social attitudes for redistribution. First, common
 187 shifts in attitudes over time (e.g., a greater worldwide concern for inequality not necessarily
 188 linked to changes in the inequalities of individual countries) can affect the results. A robust
 189 analysis should also control for changes between surveys in national income and demogra-
 190 phy (e.g., an aging population). Finally, and most importantly, social-mobility experiences
 191 and beliefs regarding the sources of success are primary determinants of attitudes toward
 192 redistribution. It is important to account for changes in these experiences and perceptions
 193 to isolate the role of increasing inequality.

To characterize how inequality changes influence social preferences, the study estimates
 a series of regressions with individual responses to the surveys as dependent variables. For
 simplicity, only least-squares specifications are discussed; ordered-logit specifications that
 allow for non-linearities in responses yield similar results. The primary estimation equation
 takes the following form (person i , country c , year t):

$$RESP_{i,c,t} = \phi_c + \eta_t + \beta \ln(GINI_{c,t-1}) + \lambda N_{c,t-1} + \gamma X_{i,c,t} + \epsilon_{i,c,t}, \quad (1)$$

194 where ϕ_c and η_t are vectors of country and year fixed effects, respectively. The cross-sectional
 195 effects ϕ_c control for the long-run positions of each country in terms of preferences and
 196 inequality levels, while the year effects η_t control for systematic changes between surveys in
 197 inequality growth and survey responses. These panel variables focus identification on relative
 198 changes in inequality and survey responses across countries in the sample. Regressions are
 199 weighted to form nationally representative samples and to have each country-survey carry

200 the same significance. The results are robust to different weighting strategies. Standard
201 errors are clustered by country.

202 The β coefficient is the focus. Survey responses are ordered so that a positive β coef-
203 ficient reflects a more-concerned position: greater concern for inequality, more support for
204 government intervention, and so on. The exception is the Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Worker
205 Wage Ratio, where a positive β coefficient reflects a wider proposed wage differential.

206 The $N_{c,t-1}$ vector of covariates includes controls for macroeconomic conditions in each
207 country contemporaneous with the inequality measure. A log GDP per capita covariate
208 controls for national wealth at the time of the survey; two other covariates control for the
209 share of economic activity in the country-year coming from industry/manufacturing and from
210 services. These factors can influence preferences for redistribution independent of inequality,
211 and incorporating these macroeconomic controls better isolates inequality's role. Finally, the
212 $X_{i,c,t}$ vector of individual-level covariates includes personal demographics and responses to
213 social-mobility questions as controls. These controls are discussed further below.

214 2.3. *International Preferences Results*

215 Table 2 presents the international results, with each row representing a separate set of
216 regressions for the dependent variable indicated. To conserve space, only the observation
217 counts for the Government Responsibility regressions are listed. Observation counts for the
218 other ISSP estimations in Panels B-F are similar, with slight differences due to respondents
219 not answering all questions. The first column reports regressions that include only country
220 and year fixed effects and macroeconomic covariates. Variables are transformed to have a
221 zero mean and unit standard deviation to aid in interpretation. Thus, the 0.161 coefficient on
222 the Gini estimate in the first regression for Government Responsibility indicates that a one
223 standard-deviation growth in inequality is partially correlated with a growth of about 16%
224 of one standard deviation in survey responses towards greater government-led redistribution.

225 This positive elasticity confirms the visual patterns in Panel 1C of Figure 1, and support
226 for a more-progressive tax structure is also evident in Panel B. Panel G also finds a similar
227 call for greater income equalization in the WVS sample. These partial correlations are
228 statistically significant and of moderate economic magnitudes. Taking the United States
229 as a specific example, the implied increase in redistribution preferences from a standard-
230 deviation inequality growth would close the gap to the average responses of other Anglo-
231 Saxon countries (e.g., Canada, Australia, and Great Britain), but would fall short of the
232 levels of continental Europe and especially transition economies. The short-run responses
233 thus reflect modest movements around the long-term levels of the countries. Nevertheless,
234 their positive direction suggests an inequality shock alone is insufficient to start a cycle of
235 deteriorating support for redistribution policies.⁸

236 Potential omitted variable biases are a clear concern for these first two outcomes. It
237 is possible that the inequality metric is simply correlated with unmodeled factors that are
238 truly responsible for the higher support for government-led redistribution. The next three
239 rows, however, provide reassurance that concern over inequality truly underlies the sup-
240 port for stronger government intervention. The increase in inequality is associated with
241 greater concern for income differences in Panel C and greater awareness of social conflict
242 between poor and rich in Panel D. As a comparison, Panel E finds inequality changes are
243 not correlated with changes in awareness of social conflict between young and old people.
244 These outcomes are consistent with inequality growth raising concerns about disparities and
245 prompting greater support for government redistribution.

246 Panel F demonstrates, however, that respondents are more likely to propose a wider
247 wage distribution with higher inequality. A one standard-deviation growth in inequality is
248 associated with a 0.25 standard deviation increase in proposed wage differentials. An un-

⁸Levels regressions without country fixed effects also confirm the cross-section correlations evident in Figure 1. Nations with greater inequality have a significantly reduced concern for income differences, weaker support for government intervention, and lower desire for a progressive tax structure. While critical, panel estimations of inequality dynamics are rarely employed (e.g., Alesina et al. 2004).

249 reported disaggregation of changes in the Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Worker Wage Ratio
250 finds the expansion to be primarily occurring between doctors and skilled workers rather
251 than skilled workers and unskilled workers. A similar elasticity is evident for the proposed
252 wage differential between the chairman of a large, national company and an unskilled worker.
253 This growth in proposed wage differentials—based upon what respondents think occupations
254 should earn—indicates at least partial acceptance of inequality shifts due to changes in rel-
255 ative factor scarcities and associated rewards. The coefficient of 0.25 is statistically different
256 from zero, a level where no support for a wider distribution is evident, and from a value of
257 one, a level where a full endorsement of the inequality expansion is evident if the inequality
258 increase is due to growing earnings differentials.

259 The 0.25 coefficient is measured using all changes in inequality, and this approach may
260 understate the elasticity due to earnings inequality itself. By mixing growth in inequality
261 due to labor market differentials with growth in inequality outside of the labor market, the
262 0.25 coefficient may underestimate the extent to which preferences regarding compensation
263 differential expand to accommodate increases in earnings inequality. In addition to propos-
264 ing wages for occupations, the ISSP surveys ask respondents what they think occupations
265 actually earn. Fixed effect regressions of Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Worker Wage Ratio on
266 the perceived wage ratio for doctors and unskilled workers yield elasticities of about 0.6.
267 That is, growth in perceived inequality is again associated with larger proposed distribu-
268 tions, but not as wide as the perceived increase itself. This 0.6 elasticity finding, along with
269 the reported results using national inequality changes, leads to the conclusion that social
270 preferences over wage differentials expand to accommodate substantial portions, but not all,
271 of growth in earnings inequality. These patterns suggest that short-run inequality shocks
272 can be reinforced in the labor market, and that changes in compensation differentials due to
273 changing factors of production are only modestly retarded by social preferences.

274 The second column of Table 2 adds each nation's log GDP per capita to capture move-

275 ments in the overall wealth of the country, as well as Demographic Controls and Economic
276 Mobility Controls. Demographic Controls include sex, marital status, age, education, and in-
277 come dummies. Economic Mobility Controls incorporate respondents' answers to other ISSP
278 questions that reveal beliefs and experiences regarding social mobility. ISSP regressions in-
279 clude two questions asking respondents to rate the importance of being from a wealthy family
280 or of knowing the right people for getting ahead. Respondents believing these important sig-
281 nificantly favor more redistribution. Past mobility experiences use respondents' ratings of
282 the status of their jobs compared to their fathers' jobs; respondents believing their jobs are
283 better than their fathers' are significantly less likely to support redistribution.

284 The magnitudes and significance of the β coefficients on the Gini estimates are robust
285 to including these Demographic and Economic Mobility Controls. Column 3 further shows
286 the results are robust to including Work Controls of dummies for self-employed, supervisor,
287 unemployed, and a union member. Coefficient elasticities are very similar after including
288 these covariates, which are further discussed in the appendix. The coefficients in the WVS
289 regressions continue to suggest a higher elasticity of about 0.35. The higher share of devel-
290 oping countries in the WVS sample likely plays a role in these larger partial correlations.
291 Also, the larger estimates may be the product of offering respondents ten choices rather than
292 five, making it easier to capture shifts in attitude. The specific wording of this question may
293 also contribute, as further discussed in the appendix.

294 Poorer and transitional countries tend to have higher support for redistribution than
295 their OECD counterparts with similar levels of inequality (Austen 1999, Suhrcke 2001).
296 Moreover, they demonstrate significant changes in attitudes and inequality levels that dwarf
297 the more-stable advanced nations. To ensure the sample composition is not driving the
298 results, Column 4 includes Year x OECD dummies. Likewise, the fifth column incorporates
299 Year x Transition Economy dummies. The point estimates typically decline when forcing
300 the variation to be within the subgroups, but the elasticities mostly remain economically

301 and statistically important. The appendix discusses additional robustness checks.

302 *2.4. Discussion*

303 A causal interpretation for these results is reasonable, although not assured. Two ba-
304 sic concerns are the endogenous relationship between inequality and preferences (i.e., that
305 preferences also influence the inequality levels) and omitted-variable biases. The direction
306 of the results suggests that the reverse-causality concern is weak. It is difficult to argue
307 that changes in social preferences to favor more income equalization produced increases in
308 inequality, while it is very reasonable that increased inequality led to greater support for re-
309 distribution. Employing disposable-income inequalities rather than gross-income inequalities
310 may bias the coefficient magnitudes slightly, but will not change the direction of the findings.
311 On a similar note, this study concludes that adjustments in preferences for compensation
312 differentials allow inequality to become entrenched in the labor market. While these results
313 have greater scope for reverse causality, the growing concern by respondents over income
314 inequality and the greater support for government-led interventions suggest that the wider
315 proposed wage differentials are primarily a reaction to the inequality changes, albeit one that
316 sustains the inequality increase.

317 It may be possible, however, to argue an omitted factor prompted both the increases in
318 inequality and the changes in social preferences. For example, an increased openness to trade
319 may have raised inequality and also increased desire for government income stabilization out
320 of fear of globalization (and unrelated to the change in inequality itself). As noted earlier,
321 the consistent results of higher inequality being associated with greater concern over income
322 disparities suggest, however, that the most plausible interpretation is the increased inequality
323 acted directly on social preferences. A more-rigorous instrument strategy employed with the
324 U.S. data will also support this interpretation. Unfortunately, the U.S. survey employed in
325 the next section does not contain wage differential questions like the ISSP. Thus, the U.S.

instruments are only able to assess causality for the general redistribution result.⁹

3. Preferences in U.S. Surveys

To complement the international findings, regional variation in inequality and support for redistribution from the United States is explored next. This study is important for three reasons. First, while national inequality would be the most-perceived dimension for smaller countries such as Bulgaria or Ireland, regional differences may be more important for large nations that display significant heterogeneity in economic activity. Moreover, a substantial fraction of policy and budget decisions in the United States are made at the state or city level, with officials accountable to their local constituents. Finally, but certainly not least from a research perspective, the quality and quantity of U.S. data afford extensions and instruments that are not possible in international studies.

3.1. GSS Data Structure

U.S. social preferences are estimated from the General Social Survey (GSS). The GSS has been conducted on an annual or biennial basis since 1972 with sample sizes ranging from 1400 to 3000 adults. The analysis considers four questions on the survey through 2000. The first question asks on a three-point scale whether the United States should be spending more or less money on welfare (Welfare Spending); an identical question regarding spending for the space exploration program (Space Exploration Program Spending) is also considered as a falsification exercise. A third question (GSS Income Equalization) documents respondent support on a seven-point scale for the federal government's reduction of income differences between the rich and the poor. Responses are again ordered so that higher values correspond

⁹Suggestive evidence from the international panel can be taken from an approach that instruments each country's inequality trends using the inequality trend of its closest neighbor. Second-stage elasticities for Government Responsibility and Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Worker Wage Ratio are 0.234 (0.100) and 0.198 (0.125), respectively, when using the framework in Column 1 of Table 2. The instrument, however, is weak with a first-stage coefficient of 0.615 (0.336) and an F-statistic of 3.2 (standard errors clustered by country). This weakness and concerns over the exclusion restriction suggest cautious interpretation.

347 to higher support for the reduction of inequality.

348 The analysis also considers how changes in political-party affiliation correlate with chang-
349 ing inequality levels (Party Identification). Respondents are asked to state their party pref-
350 erence and the strength of this association on a seven-point scale, with one being strongly
351 Republican and seven being strongly Democrat. Of course, many other factors influence
352 party affiliation, and the platforms of parties demonstrate temporal and regional variation.
353 Nevertheless, it is reasonable to portray the Democratic Party over the last three decades as
354 supporting higher levels of redistribution from the U.S.' wealthy classes to its poorer classes
355 than the Republican Party. Regressions with this question study whether higher inequality
356 is associated with changes in political affiliation, in addition to changes in support for welfare
357 programs. The appendix details the wording of these four questions.

358 The final requirements for the U.S. analyses are the important inequality metrics. The
359 richness of U.S. data offers additional flexibility, and two metrics of overall inequality are
360 considered. Modeling inequality with regional log Gini estimates affords comparisons to the
361 earlier international work. The detailed data also allow consideration of inequality trends for
362 different parts of the income distribution. Thus, overall inequality is additionally modeled
363 as the differential between the log 80th and 20th percentiles. After considering overall
364 inequality, the 80-20 differential is disaggregated into the changes in inequality in the upper
365 and lower halves of the distribution. Inequality estimates in this section are calculated over
366 disposable family income for the four primary Census regions (i.e., Northeast, Midwest,
367 South, and West) from the March Current Population Surveys (CPS).

368 Figure 2 plots the mean response to the GSS Welfare Spending question and the 80-20
369 income differential for each region by year. Two identification issues for the U.S. findings can
370 be discerned from this graph. First, differences in regional inequality trends exist (the solid
371 line). While the South begins with significantly higher inequality than the other regions
372 in the early 1970s, the strong growth in inequality in the Northeast and West results in

373 the three regions being approximately equal by the late 1990s. The Midwest, while also
374 experiencing an increase in inequality, remains significantly lower than the South throughout
375 the period. Unlike the international analysis, however, none of the regions experience a period
376 of substantial decline in inequality. Thus, inference is from stable or growing inequality.

377 Second, the dramatic swings in the mid-1970s and 1990s highlight that regional varia-
378 tion in welfare support can be second-order to large national shifts, likely due to political
379 swings. The significant decline in support in the mid-1970s is linked to the explosion in
380 welfare caseloads in the prior decade, while the large dip in the mid-1990s surrounds the
381 1994 Republican Revolution during Clinton's first term. The close co-movement of regional
382 inequality and Welfare Spending preferences between these periods is quite striking. The
383 national trends in inequality and social preferences are absorbed by the year effects, while
384 systematic levels differences between regions are controlled for by geographic fixed effects.
385 Given the importance of these national elements, the regression coefficients for the regional
386 variation may be smaller than those captured in the international estimations.

387 *3.2. U.S. Preferences Results*

388 Table 3A considers a set of specifications similar to the international regressions studied in
389 Table 2; Table 3B replaces the log Gini inequality metrics with log 80-20 income differentials.
390 Standard errors are bootstrapped for the U.S. analysis. Column 1 of both specifications
391 finds changes in regional inequality partially correlate with a statistically significant increase
392 in support for all three preferences when only year and region fixed effects are included.
393 As expected, the coefficients are somewhat smaller than those found in the international
394 regressions, as the regional variation is weaker than national trends. As a falsification exercise
395 for Welfare Spending, if anything respondents urge a decline in Space Exploration Program
396 Spending when inequality increases, but this result is not precisely measured.

397 As before, Columns 2 and 3 further show the magnitudes and statistical significance of the

398 coefficients are robust to including the regional median income (akin to the national GDP
399 per capita) and Demographic Controls, Economic Mobility Controls, and Work Controls.
400 Unfortunately, incorporating many GSS social-mobility variables severely limits the sample
401 size, but one can control for whether the financial position of a respondent's family has
402 improved, worsened, or stayed the same over the last few years. The GSS does, however,
403 collect race data. Non-white respondents are found in the fourth column to have significantly
404 higher support for redistribution, even after including the other controls.

405 The coefficients for Welfare Spending and Party Identification remain of similar size and
406 significance with these controls, but those for Income Equalization diminish. In general, once
407 controlling for a basic set of covariates and perceptions of mobility levels, the U.S. analysis
408 does not find a strong link between inequality and this support for Income Equalization.
409 In many respects, this question amalgamates respondents' views regarding pay scales in the
410 labor market and redistribution policy. As the international evidence shows these dimensions
411 can move in opposite directions, the limited overall response for Income Equalization is not
412 too surprising. The most robust support again goes to increases in redistribution policies.¹⁰

413 The appendix also reports several extensions to this work. Decomposing the 80-20 in-
414 equality into the 80-50 and 50-20 differentials emphasizes that inequality growth in the lower
415 half of the distribution (i.e., the poor being increasingly left behind) is most responsible for
416 the aggregate results identified for the United States. A second analysis finds fairly limited
417 differences across the income distribution—while the overall levels of support are higher in

¹⁰These results are robust to a variety of specification checks. First, demographic surveys often find respondents over-estimate their relative financial position. In addition to actual incomes, the GSS collects respondents' perceptions of their incomes compared to the national average. The results are robust to using these perceptions rather than actual income levels. Second, the southern parts of the United States experience distinct economic and political adjustments during this period compared to the rest of the country. While this variation is useful, similar outcomes are found when excluding this region. Finally, a concern using regional variation in the United States is that spatial sorting by individuals over locations could influence the measured social preferences and inequality levels (e.g., migration of poor to an area that would raise income inequality and increase support for redistribution). The individual covariates control for this phenomenon with respect to observables (e.g., income levels, age), and the appendix provides additional tabulations from the 2000 Census of Populations that suggest sorting of this form is not biasing the results.

418 poor households, concern over rising inequality grows in all income groups. On the other
419 hand, the increase in redistribution support associated with rising inequality is diminished in
420 racially heterogeneous neighborhoods (e.g., Luttmer 2001, Lind 2007). These results suggest
421 changes in support for government-led redistribution are fairly uniform across income groups.
422 This finding is in agreement with Rawlsian models like Piketty (1995), where different classes
423 have similar views on distributive equality holding fixed beliefs about incentive costs. On
424 the other hand, the standard median-voter model suggests increases in inequality lead to a
425 divergence in preferences for redistribution as gaps to the median income widen. Further
426 work is needed to understand the degree to which this finding applies to the extreme tail of
427 the income distribution (e.g., Atkinson et al. 2011).

428 3.3. *U.S. Minimum-Wage Instrument*

429 U.S. regional estimations agree with the earlier international results: increases in inequal-
430 ity partially correlate with increases in desire for government-led redistribution. In addition
431 to finding this effect on two levels, it was earlier noted that the direction of the results,
432 the lagging of inequality, and the significance of survey questions focused on inequality it-
433 self suggest a causal interpretation is reasonable, although still not assured. An instrument
434 designed for the U.S. regional variation further undergirds this claim.

435 In recent empirical studies, labor economists note the role of the minimum wage in rising
436 U.S. inequality, especially during the 1979-1989 period when the real (i.e., inflation-adjusted)
437 value of the federal rate declined by 24%. While these substantial swings in mandated federal
438 rates can be taken as exogenous from the perspective of individual states or regions, they do
439 not provide the necessary regional variation by themselves. An appropriate instrument can
440 be designed, however, through the interaction of these national trends with predetermined
441 regional characteristics that govern how important minimum-wage mandates are for the local
442 economy. The year effects absorb the national dynamics of the changing federal rate, and the

443 pre-existing regional traits are controlled for by the geographic fixed effects. The identifying
 444 assumption is that the residual region-year interactions can serve as an instrument for the
 445 residual region-year inequality trends.

This study employs regional coverage ratios, defined as the percent of the working population protected by the minimum-wage statutes, as the interaction terms. The inequality instrument for region r and year t takes the form

$$INEQ - IV_{r,t} = \ln(FED_{1970}/FED_t) \cdot E_{1970}COV_{r,t},$$

446 where $E_{1970}COV_{r,t}$ is the expected coverage rate in region r for year t , estimated from the
 447 1970 industrial composition of the working poor by region and changes in national coverage
 448 rates by industry. The first term, $\ln(FED_{1970}/FED_t)$, is the log ratio of the real federal
 449 minimum-wage rate in 1970 to the rate in year t . It has an initial value of zero for 1970. In
 450 years when the real federal rate is greater than the real federal rate for 1970, this component
 451 of the instrument has a negative value, and vice versa. Some states have mandated minimum
 452 wages that exceed the federal rate. These are not considered as the local legislation could
 453 clearly be endogenous to the inequality levels and will instead be analyzed below. The
 454 appendix provides an extensive discussion of the instrument design and descriptive statistics.

455 Figure 3 plots a graphical version of the first stage for each region. The lines for the
 456 minimum-wage instrument (the solid line) and the inequality level (the line with circles)
 457 are residuals after year and geographic fixed effects are removed. The expected first-stage
 458 relationship is apparent within each region. Estimated at the regional level and using boot-
 459 strapped standard errors, the first-stage coefficient for regional Gini inequality is 1.50 (0.40),
 460 with an F statistic of 11.7 and a partial R^2 of 0.16.

461 Table 4 presents the detailed results of the instrumental-variable specifications for the log
 462 Gini metric, and the appendix tabulates very similar outcomes using the 80-20 differential.
 463 As inequality is lagged one year in the estimations, the instrument is lagged as well. The

second-stage results confirm the least-square specifications discussed earlier; a one standard-deviation increase in inequality is now found to produce 20% of a standard-deviation shift in support for government-led redistribution and political party identification. Substantially weaker results are found on the other two variables. The instrument specifications are robust to using other forms of aggregate inequality (90-10 differentials, entropy) or focusing on the lower half of the income distribution through 50-20 differentials. The small increase in coefficient magnitude from the least squares results is likely due to the instrument focusing on inequality in the lower part of the income distribution.

3.4. *Types of Inequality*

There are many forms of inequality: hourly wage, annual wage, total income, wealth, and consumption inequality, in addition to their subvariants (e.g., before and after tax, individual versus household). These forms of inequality are related to each other, but they are also distinct from conceptual and empirical perspectives. The international portion of this study is limited to income inequality due to simple data constraints, while the U.S. analysis can consider more options. The appendix provides a detailed discussion about these various types of inequality and social preferences that includes conceptual/theoretical perspectives, observations about how concerns over inequality are most often expressed in the media, the manner in which policy interventions most often occur, and simple data quality considerations. From a welfare perspective, long-term consumption inequality is the most natural link. In terms of the formation of social preferences, the discussion mostly emphasizes income inequality as being the clearest metric available, but there is ambiguity.¹¹

Table 5 replicates the Column 2 regressions of Table 3B (i.e., estimations including median income levels, Demographic Controls, and Economic Mobility Controls) and its instrumental-variable equivalent across three levels of geographic aggregation and three income definitions.

¹¹Pope (2009) provides an even broader description of well-being in the United States that includes access to education, lifetime expectancy, and similar.

488 The first three columns are for least-squares regressions, while the last three columns are for
489 instrumental-variable specifications. The two regional specifications are annual and derived
490 from the March CPS while the state specifications are at the decade level and derived from the
491 Census. The least-squares permutations are well-behaved and generally indicate a moderate
492 decline in coefficient size as specifications move away from disposable family income towards
493 the hourly wage definition. The declining coefficient sizes with lower levels of geographic
494 aggregation mirror the earlier coefficient reduction from the international regressions to the
495 four Census regions variation. In words, the trend suggests that the preferences of individuals
496 in Vermont regarding inequality depend as much on the level of inequality throughout the
497 New England region as within the local state. However, these two trends are weaker in the
498 instrumental-variable permutations. While larger standard errors are evident in some state-
499 level or hourly wage specifications, the instrumental-variable results in general are robust
500 across these dimensions. This may indicate that the lower coefficient estimates are due to
501 greater measurement error in the more disaggregated series.

502 The appendix describes how income inequality shows a tighter empirical link to social
503 preferences than consumption inequality derived from food expenditures reported in the
504 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (e.g., Attanasio and Pistaferri 2014). The limited panel
505 correlation of the two forms of inequality at the region-year level allows direct contrast, and
506 food consumption inequality only marginally increases the explanatory power. This study
507 is very cautious, however, about these results due to the uncertainty about how best to
508 measure consumption inequality and multiple data challenges discussed in the appendix.

509 3.5. *U.S. Policy Outcomes*

510 This study mostly focuses on inequality and social preferences given the many ways in
511 which these two forces can interact and the limited understanding of preferences to date.
512 Table 6 evaluates the degree to which these social preferences are further observed in policy

513 choices. This is best done in the regional context of the United States given the consistent
514 U.S. data over states and the ability to construct comparable measures. To some degree, this
515 exercise is important for simply showing that the responses have meaning and are not just
516 "cheap talk."¹² But more important, they also begin to trace out how preferences translate
517 into policy responses and where differences might arise.

518 Table 6 demonstrates a simple longitudinal link for several forms of state-level policy
519 outcomes and regional inequality. Column headers indicate the outcome variable studied.
520 Panels A and B provide least squares results using the regional Gini and 80-20 income dif-
521 ferential metrics, respectively. Panels C and D provide comparable instrumental variables
522 specifications. Variables are transformed to have zero mean and unit standard deviation to
523 aid interpretation. Estimations include state and year fixed effects, control for the contem-
524 poraneous log median income, report bootstrap standard errors, and have 1,152 observations
525 from the cross of the 48 continental states and 24 years from 1977-2000.

526 The first four columns consider state-level tax code features taken from the NBER
527 TAXSIM database. U.S. states differ substantially in the extent to which they tax income
528 beyond the federal level and how progressive this taxation structure is. Columns 1-3 combine
529 state and federal tax obligations to capture total tax liability in the state, inclusive of offsets
530 between state and federal obligations. These metrics include the total top marginal tax
531 rate and the difference between the top and average marginal rates. Column 4 alternatively
532 isolates the state's top marginal tax rate, and a zero value is given for states without income
533 tax. There is reasonably strong evidence of a shift towards a more-progressive state-level
534 tax structure with higher inequality. Unreported estimations likewise find a very sharp link
535 between inequality increases and an indicator variable for the state imposing at least some
536 additional income tax above the federal level.

¹²To validate these surveys, Luttmer (2001) demonstrates that over 30% of the variation in state welfare-benefit levels can be explained through an interaction of attitudes towards welfare with state demographic compositions. He also considers how norms for redistribution modeled with the GSS mirror voting patterns in a California proposition.

537 The next two columns consider state minimum wages, which are explicitly excluded
538 from the instrumental-variables design that focused on the changing federal rate. Column 5
539 considers the state minimum wage, with the federal minimum wage being the floor for states
540 without higher minimum wages. Column 6 considers the gap between the state and federal
541 levels, with an increase of zero being assigned for states that do not have higher minimum
542 wages. The connection on this policy dimension is quite strong, and there is again a very
543 sharp link between inequality increases and an indicator variable for the state imposing at
544 least some additional minimum wage increment above the federal level. The instrumental
545 variable elasticities are especially strong given the local treatment on this margin.

546 Columns 7 and 8 consider total and direct public welfare expenditure per capita taken
547 from state budget reports. There is evidence of growing welfare expenditure with higher
548 inequality, although this link should be treated with caution since the link is substantially
549 weaker with a log transformation of per capita expenditures. Supplementary regressions also
550 find rising benefits per recipient in the Aid to Family with Dependent Children program with
551 rising inequality using the five-year intervals for which these data are available.

552 On the whole, these estimations suggest a substantial link between regional inequality
553 and policy choices. Reflective of the lower connections of preferences to inequality at more-
554 disaggregated spatial scales, these relationships tend to weaken with narrower measures
555 of inequality.¹³ Panels E and F instead use the regional averages of the government-led
556 redistribution and income equalization preferences, respectively. The averages again link
557 to policies, with elasticities somewhat lower than those derived with inequality itself. This
558 may indicate a connection of inequality and policy outcomes outside of preferences. It is
559 also likely that greater measurement error in preferences averages is downward biasing the
560 elasticity. Either way, this connection of preferences to policy outcomes is helpful to observe.

¹³This connects to the more mixed results in earlier studies of increases in inequality to policy changes related to redistribution, which often use more localized metrics. Recent examples include Boustan et al. (2010), Cooper et al. (2011), Corbae et al. (2009), and Corcoran and Evans (2010). Extended references are provided in the appendix.

561 An important topic for future research should trace out how changes in social preferences
562 translate into policy outcomes. The findings of this paper suggest that social preferences
563 regarding inequality adjust to desire more redistribution while allowing greater labor market
564 inequality. Different political systems—including such diverse issues as government struc-
565 ture, campaign financing laws, voter participation, etc.—will influence whether shifts in
566 preferences produce important policy changes or not. The importance of franchising groups
567 favoring higher redistribution and the disproportionate influence of elites and special interest
568 groups are often noted in particular. How political systems are structured will govern the
569 degree to which rising concerns for redistribution generate effective political support.

570 To illustrate, this study closes with one example using voter participation. The GSS re-
571 ports information about the voting behavior of respondents. Respondents differ in political
572 engagement, with lower voter participation among lower-income groups well documented. A
573 simple comparison suggests that the average voter expresses about 3% less support for redis-
574 tribution compared to the average individual overall. Moreover, declining voter participation
575 since the 1960s may be dampening support. This can be most easily seen using the pivotal
576 gap between the median income and the mean income in the median-voter model. In the
577 1970s, this gap is \$6,105 using the GSS income data. The gap between the median voter's
578 income and the mean income is smaller, however, at \$5,311 (13% reduction). This differen-
579 tial already suppresses support for redistribution in the 1970s, and it has since widened. In
580 the 1990s, the gap between the median and mean incomes is \$13,624, but the gap to median
581 voter is \$9,468 (31% reduction). This is one example of how future work needs to investigate
582 the degree to which preferences across society are realized in policy choices.

583 **4. Conclusions**

584 This study characterizes how changes in inequality affect social attitudes towards government-
585 led redistribution and compensation differentials. Market-based factors have substantially

586 increased inequality in the United States over the last three decades. If the inequality caused
587 by these mechanisms reduces social preferences regarding distributive equality, the inequality
588 can become amplified and entrenched. While international and U.S. regional cross-sections
589 often display a strong negative correlation between inequality and support for redistribution,
590 this study finds countries and states do not evolve along this pattern in the short-run.

591 Controlling for initial positions and respondent views of social mobility, local changes in
592 inequality are positively and significantly correlated with changes in support for government-
593 led redistribution. While greater class conflict is perceived along income dimensions, the
594 increases in support for redistribution among wealthy individuals are as strong as those of
595 poorer individuals. To the extent the forces driving inequality also alter the underlying
596 beliefs (e.g., determinants of success, mobility experiences, incentive costs) most important
597 for determining the long-term trade-off between inequality and redistribution preferences,
598 then these forces may contribute to reduced concern over the disparity. But the results of
599 this study suggest that a short-term increase in inequality is unlikely to prompt a vicious cycle
600 where support for redistribution declines, thereby promoting further increase in inequality.

601 On the other hand, significant growth in proposed wage differentials are evident in the
602 international analyses with higher inequality. While less than one-for-one, increases in in-
603 equality are associated with greater acceptance of wage disparities. This pattern suggests
604 that labor market changes may reinforce inequality growth. Establishing these empirical reg-
605 ularities is important given that theory provides ambiguous predictions and understanding
606 the relative strength of the underlying forces requires quantification.

607 Several important areas for future research exist beyond the policy and institutional
608 channels described earlier. Political economists have long studied reasons for the negative
609 cross-sectional relationship between inequality and support for redistribution; this study
610 explored localized movements around these long-run positions. Recent theoretical research
611 considers endogenous shifts in long-term positions; as more data become available, future

612 research should empirically test these longer-term dynamics. Such shifts will clarify primal
613 factors behind cross-sectional differences, highlight whether the concerned responses noted
614 here are governed by important thresholds or critical-mass points, and identify mechanisms
615 beyond ideology that can contribute to the formation of vicious cycles.

616 It is also important to characterize the channels through which inequality and preferences
617 interact. For instance, increasing social stratification may amplify or diminish the direct
618 effect of increasing inequality on social preferences. Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) report
619 greater inequality is particularly correlated with reduced membership in church and service
620 groups, activities often associated with assisting the less fortunate. Watson (2009) links
621 inequality with greater income segregation in cities. This deterioration of civic bonds may
622 weaken support for redistribution. On the other hand, Luttmer (2001) argues free-rider
623 concerns likely reduce support for welfare policies, and perhaps these concerns are weakened
624 in more-segmented communities. It is also unclear how the non-pecuniary status desires
625 that can limit support for redistribution change in a more-stratified society (e.g., Corneo
626 and Gruner 2000, 2002). A better understanding of how stratification and other channels
627 facilitate the interaction of inequality and preferences is an important next step.

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



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
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Fig. 1: Social Preferences Regarding Inequality in ISSP Surveys




Notes: Panel 1A plots 1992 ISSP responses on the government’s responsibility to reduce income differences, with higher values indicating greater responsibility. Panel 1B plots the average proposed wage ratio for a doctor vs. unskilled worker. Countries with greater inequality express lower redistribution preferences and propose a wider wage distribution. Panels 1C and 1D consider 1992-1999 changes. Increased inequality is associated with greater redistribution support and wider proposed wage ratios.

Fig. 2: U.S. Welfare Spending Preferences and Regional Inequality



Notes: Figure plots the co-movement in U.S. regional inequality and average support for welfare spending among GSS respondents. The solid lines without circles are the average support on a three-point scale for greater welfare spending by respondents in the region, with higher values indicating greater support. The lines with circles are regional inequalities measured as the log 80-20 income differential from the March CPS.

Fig. 3: First Stage for U.S. Minimum-Wage Instrument



Notes: Figure plots the first-stage relationship between the U.S. minimum-wage instrument and regional inequality. The solid lines without circles are the residuals from regressing the minimum-wage instrument on region fixed effects, year fixed effects, and the region's log median income level. The lines with circles are the residuals for regional inequality similarly constructed.

Table 1: ISSP and WVS Descriptive Statistics

	Total Sample	Long-Term OECD	Non Long-Term OECD
A. ISSP Social Inequality Panel			
Countries	19	11	8
Respondents	54,091	31,083	23,008
Government Responsibility (1-5 Scale)	3.65 (1.19)	3.41 (1.20)	3.96 (1.10)
Progressive Taxation (1-5 Scale)	4.02 (0.77)	3.97 (0.73)	4.10 (0.82)
Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Wage Ratio	3.80 (8.17)	4.16 (8.17)	3.35 (8.16)
Inequality Acceptance (1-5 Scale)	4.05 (0.99)	3.88 (0.99)	4.28 (0.95)
Poor-Rich Conflict (1-4 Scale)	2.52 (0.84)	2.45 (0.77)	2.62 (0.90)
Young-Old Conflict (1-4 Scale)	2.21 (0.80)	2.22 (0.75)	2.19 (0.86)
Log Gini Coefficient	3.37 (0.17)	3.35 (0.13)	3.40 (0.22)
B. WVS Social Inequality Panel			
Countries	37	15	22
Respondents	137,006	51,104	85,902
WVS Income Equalization (1-10 Scale)	5.25 (3.01)	5.31 (2.73)	5.22 (3.17)
Log Gini Coefficient	3.51 (0.30)	3.35 (0.16)	3.60 (0.32)

Notes: Table provides descriptive statistics on social preferences for income inequality and government redistribution taken from the ISSP and WVS surveys. Survey responses are ordered such that higher values indicate more-concerned responses, excepting the proposed doctor-unskilled wage ratio. Variable means are reported with standard deviations indicated in parentheses. Sample sizes in some regressions are smaller than total respondents as some respondents skipped questions; surveys also varied on the demographic and mobility information collected. ISSP Long-Term OECD Members include AUS, AUT, CAN, DEU, GBR, ITA, JAP, NOR, NZL, SWE, and USA. ISSP Non-Long-Term OECD Members include BGR, CZE, HUN, PHL, POL, RUS, SVK, and SVN. WVS Long-Term OECD Members include AUT, BEL, CAN, DEU, ESP, FIN, FRA, GBR, IRL, ITA, JAP, NLD, NOR, SWE, and USA. WVS Non-Long-Term OECD Members include ARG, BGR, BLR, BRA, CHL, CHN, CZE, EST, HUN, IND, KOR, LTU, LVA, MEX, NGA, POL, ROM, RUS, SVK, SVN, TUR, and ZAF.

Table 2: ISSP and WVS Regressions with Aggregate Gini Inequality

	Including Demographic & Economic Mobility Controls				
	Base Regression	Base Regression	Including Worker Controls	Including OECD-Yr. Effects	Including Trans.-Yr. Effects
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ISSP Social Inequality Panel					
A. Government Responsibility Responses					
Log National Gini Coefficient	0.161 (0.048)	0.153 (0.049)	0.158 (0.051)	0.129 (0.056)	0.093 (0.058)
Observations	54,054	45,918	45,918	45,918	45,918
B. Progressive Taxation Responses					
Log National Gini Coefficient	0.238 (0.071)	0.234 (0.077)	0.235 (0.076)	0.188 (0.072)	0.187 (0.090)
C. Inequality Acceptance Responses					
Log National Gini Coefficient	0.160 (0.046)	0.142 (0.045)	0.148 (0.046)	0.084 (0.049)	0.072 (0.067)
D. Poor-Rich Conflict Responses					
Log National Gini Coefficient	0.148 (0.039)	0.161 (0.041)	0.162 (0.039)	0.138 (0.036)	0.159 (0.042)
E. Young-Old Conflict Responses					
Log National Gini Coefficient	-0.009 (0.052)	-0.008 (0.048)	-0.009 (0.048)	-0.088 (0.075)	-0.016 (0.077)
F. Log Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Wage Ratio Responses					
Log National Gini Coefficient	0.256 (0.089)	0.238 (0.081)	0.239 (0.080)	0.302 (0.080)	0.241 (0.089)
WVS Panel					
G. WVS Income Equalization Responses					
Log National Gini Coefficient	0.358 (0.100)	0.374 (0.106)	0.371 (0.106)	0.341 (0.116)	0.266 (0.146)
Observations	137,006	118,499	118,499	118,499	118,499

Notes: Regressions consider the relationship between national inequality and preferences for redistribution and compensation differentials taken from ISSP and WVS. Survey responses are ordered such that higher values indicate more-concerned responses, excepting the proposed doctor-unskilled wage ratio. Regressions include country and year fixed effects. Regressions include country-year controls for log GDP per capita, share of workers in industry, and share of workers in services. Demographic Controls include sex, marital status, age, education, and income dummies. Economic Mobility Controls include respondents' views on the determinants of success (e.g., knowledge, family connections) and comparisons of their jobs to their fathers' jobs (ISSP). Work Controls include self-employed, unemployed, supervisor, and union-member dummies. Inequality measures are lagged one period. Variables are transformed to have zero mean and unit standard deviation. Regressions are weighted for nationally representative samples and equal cross-national weight. Standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. Observation counts for Government Responsibility are representative for other ISSP variables.

Table 3A: GSS Regressions with Aggregate Gini Inequality

	Base Regression	Including Demographic & Economic Mobility Controls		
		Base Regression	Including Worker Controls	Including Racial Controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Welfare Spending Responses				
Log Regional Gini Coefficient	0.130 (0.035)	0.135 (0.035)	0.114 (0.039)	0.132 (0.031)
Observations	24,247	21,965	14,704	21,965
B. Income Equalization Responses				
Log Regional Gini Coefficient	0.086 (0.043)	0.040 (0.043)	0.059 (0.043)	0.023 (0.040)
Observations	20,414	18,344	17,293	18,344
C. Political Party Identification Responses				
Log Regional Gini Coefficient	0.198 (0.024)	0.206 (0.024)	0.217 (0.033)	0.196 (0.028)
Observations	37,763	33,971	23,026	33,791
D. Space Exploration Program Spending Responses				
Log Regional Gini Coefficient	-0.044 (0.031)	-0.047 (0.034)	-0.067 (0.032)	-0.047 (0.030)
Observations	23,942	21,757	14,574	21,757

Notes: Regressions consider the relationship between regional inequality and preferences for redistribution taken from GSS. Survey responses are ordered such that higher values indicate more-concerned responses. Regressions include the log median income for each region, region fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Demographic Controls include sex, marital status, age, education, and income dummies. Economic Mobility Controls include recent changes in family financial position. Work Controls include self-employed, unemployed, and union-member dummies. Racial Controls include non-white respondent dummy. Inequality measures are lagged one period. Variables are transformed to have zero mean and unit standard deviation. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 3B: GSS Regressions with 80-20 Income Differential Inequality

	Base Regression	Including Demographic & Economic Mobility Controls		
		Base Regression	Including Worker Controls	Including Racial Controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Welfare Spending Responses				
Log Regional 80/20 Differential	0.098 (0.030)	0.114 (0.026)	0.127 (0.036)	0.112 (0.030)
Observations	24,247	21,965	14,704	21,965
B. Income Equalization Responses				
Log Regional 80/20 Differential	0.099 (0.024)	0.040 (0.039)	0.051 (0.035)	0.026 (0.028)
Observations	20,414	18,344	17,293	18,344
C. Political Party Identification Responses				
Log Regional 80/20 Differential	0.135 (0.022)	0.164 (0.022)	0.173 (0.029)	0.158 (0.028)
Observations	37,763	33,971	23,026	33,791
D. Space Exploration Program Spending Responses				
Log Regional 80/20 Differential	0.002 (0.026)	-0.015 (0.029)	-0.021 (0.038)	-0.016 (0.032)
Observations	23,942	21,757	14,574	21,757

Notes: See Table 3A.

Table 4: GSS Gini Regressions with Minimum-Wage Instrument

	Base Regression	Including Demographic & Economic Mobility Controls		
		Base Regression	Including Worker Controls	Including Racial Controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Welfare Spending Responses				
Log Regional Gini Coefficient	0.222 (0.064)	0.225 (0.066)	0.220 (0.080)	0.218 (0.073)
Observations	24,247	21,965	14,704	21,965
B. Income Equalization Responses				
Log Regional Gini Coefficient	0.122 (0.112)	0.079 (0.089)	0.095 (0.093)	0.063 (0.124)
Observations	20,414	18,344	17,293	18,344
C. Political Party Identification Responses				
Log Regional Gini Coefficient	0.220 (0.049)	0.247 (0.061)	0.204 (0.058)	0.239 (0.054)
Observations	37,763	33,971	23,026	33,971
D. Space Exploration Program Spending Responses				
Log Regional Gini Coefficient	-0.058 (0.067)	-0.038 (0.062)	-0.036 (0.077)	-0.041 (0.070)
Observations	23,942	21,757	14,574	21,757

Notes: See Table 3A. Estimated at the regional level and using bootstrapped standard errors, the first-stage coefficient for regional Gini inequality is 1.50 (0.40), with an F statistic of 11.7 and a partial R² of 0.16.

Table 5: GSS Regressions with Extended Income Definitions and Regions

Source of Log 80/20 Inequality Metric	OLS			IV		
	Four	Nine	State	Four	Nine	State
	Regions	Regions	Level	Regions	Regions	Level
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Welfare Spending Responses						
Post-Tax Family Disposable Income	0.114 (0.028)	0.061 (0.028)	0.081 (0.024)	0.206 (0.061)	0.194 (0.056)	0.151 (0.065)
Pre-Tax Family Labor Earnings	0.105 (0.034)	0.068 (0.023)	0.041 (0.022)	0.209 (0.057)	0.215 (0.056)	0.207 (0.089)
Total Population Hourly Wage	0.030 (0.020)	0.056 (0.016)	0.067 (0.018)	0.593 (0.216)	0.227 (0.069)	0.157 (0.074)
B. Income Equalization Responses						
Post-Tax Family Disposable Income	0.040 (0.032)	0.027 (0.030)	0.068 (0.035)	0.070 (0.074)	0.042 (0.082)	0.125 (0.211)
Pre-Tax Family Labor Earnings	0.032 (0.034)	0.023 (0.023)	0.020 (0.024)	0.098 (0.149)	0.049 (0.098)	0.212 (0.333)
Total Population Hourly Wage	0.054 (0.021)	0.018 (0.020)	0.053 (0.027)	0.305 (0.655)	0.047 (0.163)	0.268 (0.494)
C. Political Party Identification Responses						
Post-Tax Family Disposable Income	0.164 (0.027)	0.099 (0.021)	0.050 (0.020)	0.232 (0.056)	0.202 (0.040)	0.171 (0.044)
Pre-Tax Family Labor Earnings	0.143 (0.024)	0.100 (0.018)	0.018 (0.017)	0.250 (0.051)	0.226 (0.047)	0.218 (0.061)
Total Population Hourly Wage	0.066 (0.014)	0.038 (0.014)	0.056 (0.013)	0.636 (0.180)	0.235 (0.053)	0.202 (0.060)
D. Space Exploration Program Spending Responses						
Post-Tax Family Disposable Income	-0.015 (0.029)	-0.006 (0.023)	0.012 (0.022)	-0.035 (0.061)	-0.022 (0.044)	0.005 (0.067)
Pre-Tax Family Labor Earnings	-0.034 (0.024)	-0.055 (0.029)	-0.007 (0.020)	-0.033 (0.071)	-0.023 (0.047)	0.007 (0.073)
Total Population Hourly Wage	-0.022 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.013)	-0.012 (0.017)	-0.109 (0.211)	-0.032 (0.072)	-0.005 (0.057)

Notes: See Tables 3A, 3B, and 4. Each coefficient is the result of a separate regression with the inequality measure indicated by the row title and the sample design indicated by the column header. Regressions include Demographic and Economic Mobility Controls, the log median income for each geographic region, geographic region fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Median income covariates and geographic panel effects mirror the inequality measure employed.

Table 6: Policy Regressions with Inequality and Social Preferences

	Top marginal state tax rate for wage inc. (incl. federal)	Difference btwn top and average rate, nominal	Difference btwn top and average rate, actual	State's own top marginal tax rate	State minimum wage level (incl. federal)	State increase over the federal min wage	State total public welfare expenditure per capita	State direct public welfare expenditure per capita
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
A. Least Squares with Regional Gini Metric								
Log Regional Gini Coefficient	0.056 (0.017)	0.049 (0.021)	0.094 (0.028)	0.174 (0.063)	0.082 (0.031)	0.516 (0.179)	0.555 (0.065)	0.443 (0.066)
B. Least Squares with Regional 80-20 Inequality								
Log Regional 80/20 Differential	0.035 (0.013)	0.038 (0.016)	0.066 (0.021)	0.099 (0.061)	0.048 (0.023)	0.303 (0.153)	0.373 (0.055)	0.266 (0.046)
C. Instrumental Variables with Regional Gini Metric								
Log Regional Gini Coefficient	0.088 (0.042)	0.083 (0.054)	0.208 (0.082)	0.238 (0.211)	0.314 (0.048)	1.978 (0.273)	0.718 (0.119)	0.530 (0.131)
D. Instrumental Variables with Regional 80-20 Inequality								
Log Regional 80/20 Differential	0.066 (0.033)	0.062 (0.038)	0.151 (0.048)	0.179 (0.146)	0.236 (0.038)	1.487 (0.242)	0.540 (0.078)	0.399 (0.092)
E. Least Squares with Regional Welfare Spending Response Average								
Average Regional Preference	0.018 (0.008)	0.024 (0.010)	0.026 (0.011)	0.062 (0.030)	0.028 (0.014)	0.179 (0.081)	0.046 (0.020)	0.027 (0.022)
F. Least Squares with Regional Income Equalization Response Average								
Average Regional Preference	0.003 (0.006)	0.009 (0.007)	0.014 (0.009)	0.010 (0.023)	0.036 (0.011)	0.228 (0.069)	0.034 (0.016)	0.023 (0.019)

Notes: Regressions consider connections between state-level policy outcomes and regional inequality. Columns 1-4 consider tax code features taken from the NBER TAXSIM database. Columns 1-3 combine state and federal tax obligations to capture total tax liability in the state, inclusive of offsets between the state and federal obligations. Column 4 isolates the state's top marginal tax rate, and a zero value is given for states without income tax. Column 5 considers the state minimum wage, with federal minimum wage being the floor for states without higher minimum wages. Column 6 considers the gap between the state and federal levels, with an increase of zero for states that do not have higher minimum wages. Columns 7 and 8 consider total and direct public welfare expenditure per capita in the state. Regressions include the log median income for each region, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Inequality measures are lagged one period. Variables are transformed to have zero mean and unit standard deviation. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions in Panels A-D include 1,152 observations from the cross of 48 states (minus DC, AK, and HI) and 24 years. Observations counts for actual differences in tax rates are 1,056 due to the outcome not being available in 1977. Regressions in Panels E and F have 864 and 720 observations, respectively, due to a reduced set of years in which the GSS surveyed the preference.

1 Appendix: Introduction

This appendix provides additional materials for "Income Inequality and Social Preferences for Redistribution and Compensation Differentials". The order of the appendix is:

- Dataset Construction
- Extended Empirical Results
- Extended Literature Notes

2 Dataset Construction

2.1 International Opinion Polls (ISSP and WVS)

The international exercises employ the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the World Value Survey (WVS). To maintain a consistent presentation across international and U.S. surveys, responses are ordered such that more-concerned views are associated with higher numbers.

The ISSP analysis focuses on the 1987, 1992, and 1999 Social Inequality module; the Government Responsibility and Progressive Taxation questions are also included in the 1985, 1990, and 1996 Role of the Government module. Responses to three complementary questions proxy social preferences for government-led income redistribution: the first focusing on the responsibility of the government in the transfer of income, the second considering progressive taxation, and the third considering the acceptability of current income differences:

Q. (Government Responsibility) "It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes."

1. Disagree strongly
2. Disagree
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Agree
5. Agree strongly

Q. (Progressive Taxation) "Do you think that people with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes, the same share, or a smaller share?"

1. Much smaller share
2. Smaller
3. The same share

4. Larger
5. Much larger share

Q. (Inequality Acceptance) "Are differences in income in <Respondent's country> too large?"

1. Disagree strongly
2. Disagree
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Agree
5. Agree strongly

Three important characteristics of these questions should be noted. They shy away from sensitive wording (e.g., words like "welfare" carry negative connotations) and they offer respondents a range of options that include a neutral stance. The Government Responsibility and Progressive Taxation questions also do not reference a country's current policy position (e.g., "do you think the government should be doing more to reduce the differences..."). Such relative questions are more difficult to evaluate in panel exercises.

Respondents are also asked their opinions on the appropriate salaries for a variety of occupations. Instructions request preferences be pre-tax and regardless of perceptions of current pay scales. From these responses, a Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Worker Wage Ratio is developed as the log ratio of the wages suggested for a "doctor in general practice" and an "unskilled worker in a factory". A higher ratio indicates a wider wage distribution (i.e., a ratio of one would indicate unskilled workers and doctors should earn the same amount). Note that while it is possible that respondents interpret a proposed occupation like "unskilled worker in a factory" differently based upon the country's economic setting, most of our focus is on panel estimations that control for time-invariant differences in this regard. The reported results winsorize the raw ratio using the range [0.5, 100] prior to log transformation to limit the influence of outliers in descriptive exercises like Table 1. Regression analyses are very robust to adjustments of this procedure.

Other occupations present in all three Social Inequality surveys include a skilled factory worker, a government minister, and a chairman of a large national company. When discussing compensation differentials, the text also describes the evolution of the wage premiums between these positions. Unfortunately, some surveys substitute a representative value for a salary range or top code the maximum value. These adjustments have the most potential to influence the chairman salary, which is why this study focuses more on the doctor wage rate. Several techniques—dropping various survey years, using median estimations, imposing top codes, winsorizing—demonstrate very similar outcomes to the primary panel.

Finally, two questions regarding the presence of conflicts between social groups are employed. The first focuses on conflicts between the poor and the rich to validate respondents' awareness

of the inequality in their countries, while a second question regarding conflict between young and old people is considered as a falsification exercise.

Q. (Poor-Rich Conflict) "In all countries there are differences or even conflicts between different social groups. In your opinion, in <R's country> how much conflict is there between poor people and rich people?"

1. No conflicts
2. Not very strong conflicts
3. Strong conflicts
4. Very strong conflicts

Q. (Young-Old Conflict) "... between young people and older people?"

1. No conflicts
2. Not very strong conflicts
3. Strong conflicts
4. Very strong conflicts

As a complement to the ISSP, this study also considers responses to a question included in the 1990, 1995, and 2000 rounds of the WVS. This question (WVS Income Equalization) asks respondents to rate their views regarding income equalization on a ten-point scale. Ten is labeled, "Incomes should be made more equal." One is labeled, "We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort." While the WVS panel enjoys a more-diverse group of developing economies, interpretation of this question is limited by its reference to the country's current position (i.e., *more equal*, *larger* differences) and asymmetric labeling of the two extreme values. Nevertheless, finding quantitatively and qualitatively similar results in a different sample is an important robustness check.

2.2 International Inequality Series

This subsection details the construction of the international Gini estimates employed in the main text. Nations participating in multiple International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) or World Values Survey (WVS) rounds are included, although the former is this study's primary interest. Table A1 documents the constructed series and outlines the data sources. Data collection relied heavily on the United Nations Development Programme's World Income Inequality Database (versions 1.0 and 2.0c), the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997, 2000), and the individual publications of national statistics agencies. The WIID1 includes the earlier work of Deininger and Squire (1996) and was the original basis for this study. WIID2 is a 2008 revision that has been used to confirm the earlier series and extend where feasible to include additional survey responses.¹

¹The task here is to develop Gini series covering the years included in the two survey programs. In doing so, a longer horizon is often considered than what the surveys require for a particular country to establish more

The target Gini concept is disposable household income based upon a nationally representative sample. Although many sources, including LIS, divide by the square root of the household size, equivalency scales are not consistent across countries. Data limitations prevent consideration of gross (pre-transfers) household-income inequality. Gross metrics have the theoretical advantage of being less influenced by current and past preferences for redistribution, although one can argue disposable-income differences are what respondents are recalling when questioned. In the U.S. portion of this study, the form of inequality (e.g., gross versus disposable household income, household labor earnings, hourly wage) is not critical for the results. A one-year lag in inequality is targeted for each survey round, but contemporaneous and two-year or three-year lagged measures are also accepted when necessary.

Selected series include multiple observations derived with a consistent technique and dataset. Other sources not listed in Table A1 are also used to substantiate both levels and trends of the chosen series, as well as to provide comparisons for how other income concepts are behaving during the same period. In a number of cases, two or three series are pieced together to span the time frame of this study (or as much of it as possible). In such cases, observations must share a common or adjoining year as a levels check; moreover, overlapping intervals are examined when available to ensure the series are following similar trends. Auxiliary series are also employed in these exercises for verification purposes. Finally, the Gini estimates are rescaled to match the levels of LIS estimates around 1990 if the LIS is not employed directly in the construction of the series (participating countries only).

Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) outline a number of pitfalls that can occur when piecing together series from secondary datasets. The dataset developed for this study attempts to address these concerns while still assembling a meaningful panel of countries. However, it certainly falls short of achieving "double harmonization" across countries and time, and Kerr (2005) identifies questionable series due to poor quality data, alternative income concepts, splicing concerns, and so on. The consistency of the results across the ISSP and WVS samples, dropping low-quality series, and looking at harmonized U.S. inequalities should nevertheless instill confidence that the findings of this study are not the product of irregularities in the constructed series.²

2.3 U.S. Opinion Poll (GSS)

Social preferences for the United States are estimated from the General Social Survey (GSS), which has been conducted on an annual or biennial basis since 1972 with sample sizes ranging from 1400 to 3000 adults. This study focuses on a question that has been included for the full term of the survey. The question gauges respondent attitudes towards spending more or less money on welfare, while a similar question regarding spending for the space exploration program

confidence in the trends developed. These series, however, do not exhaust the inequality data available; gaps in the sequences do not necessarily mean appropriate Gini estimates are not available.

²Macroeconomic covariates are taken from the United Nations. The sector distribution covariates employ the "Value added, national currency, constant prices, by industry groups (WB estimates) [code 29915]" series.

is used for contrast:

Q. (Welfare Spending) "Are we spending too much money, too little money, or about the right amount on welfare?"

1. Too much
2. About right
3. Too little

While Figure 2 in the main text is representative, the mean regional responses should be treated with caution. The sampling design of the GSS results in certain states or metropolitan areas with distinct differences in social preferences from their surrounding region entering and leaving the survey (e.g., the more-religious Utah in the West). While the regression results control for these shifts, the regional mean responses do not.

A third question, included in most surveys since 1978, asks respondents to rate on a seven-point scale how much the federal government should concern itself with the income differences between the rich and poor (GSS Income Equalization). Seven is labeled, "The government ought to reduce income differences between the rich and poor." One is labeled, "The government should not concern itself with reducing income differences."

For both the Welfare Spending and GSS Income Equalization questions, alternative versions are included in some years (e.g., substituting "assistance to the poor" for "welfare"). As the mean responses shift significantly with these alternative word choices, these questions are not incorporated; a visual check indicates trends for these alternative questions mirror those of the main questions. It should also be noted that the Welfare Spending question references current policies. Luttmer (2001) considers several corrections for this relative inquiry, finding his results using the base question alone are robust. This study does not attempt any such corrections.

Finally, respondents since 1972 are asked their political-party preference and the strength of this association on a seven-point scale.

Q. (Party Identification) "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?"

1. Strong Republican
2. Not very strong Republican
3. Independent, close to Republican
4. Independent (Neither, No Response)
5. Independent, close to Democrat
6. Not very strong Democrat
7. Strong Democrat

2.4 U.S. Inequality Series

There are many forms of inequality: hourly wage, annual wage, total income, wealth, and consumption inequality, in addition to other variants (e.g., before and after tax, individual versus household). These forms of inequality are related to each other, but they are also distinct from conceptual and empirical perspectives. The international portion of this study is limited to income inequality due to simple data constraints, while the U.S. analysis can consider more options. From a welfare perspective, long-term consumption inequality is the most natural link. In terms of the formation of social preferences, the discussion below mostly emphasizes income inequality as being the clearest metric available, but there is ambiguity. This discussion highlights some key issues involved and describes alternative estimates.

For a conceptual perspective, many foundational models for redistribution do not have relevant distinctions in this regard. As a classic example, the median-voter model has a simple income level before redistribution, abstracting from labor-leisure decisions, consumption inequality, and wealth accumulation. In dynamic models, the distinctions become more relevant. For example, in the permanent-income-hypothesis model, what matters most is lifetime consumption, with income variations being smoothed over. This might suggest it is most important to focus on long-term consumption patterns, and that income volatility might obscure this consumption baseline. On the other hand, annual levels of consumption may themselves have even greater scope for mis-measuring long-term consumption (e.g., different consumption bundles, discrete purchases, variations in time discounting). Perhaps even more important, the conceptual focus is on pre-transfers inequality, and yet this is impossible *ex post* to distinguish for consumption inequality. Likewise, it is quite reasonable to focus on inequality in wage opportunities, given that both income and consumption inequality include a labor-leisure trade-off that in some cases is being chosen by individuals with different utility functions.

In contrast to this conceptual ambiguity, most public expressions of inequality and concern over it have focused on income equality. One of the first expressions comes from Plato, who argued that the income differences between the richest and poorest in society should not exceed five-fold. Similarly, over the last three decades, two of the most consistent benchmarks used when discussing inequality have been the CEO pay ratio to the average employee and the stagnating median income levels in the United States. Both metrics have the benefits of being simple to understand and readily available from publicly available data. Likewise, popular accounts of inequality focus on income, from sports stars' contracts to the *Wall Street Journal's* annual report of average compensation of Goldman Sachs employees. Most recently, the top 1% has become a major focal point, with the phrase alternatively being applied to income or wealth. Wealth inequality is implicitly expressed in rankings of the "richest people in the world", but perhaps surprisingly this has been typically less linked to unfair inequality than the CEO pay ratio, for example.

Similarly, most policy interventions towards the rich are income based. This is easily observed

in the strong debates over the progressivity of the tax code. Direct wealth taxes are rarely used, although property taxes have some connection to this concept. Consumption tax is also rarely viewed as means for rectifying inequality, although luxury taxes do exist in some locations (e.g., a higher tax rate for very expensive automobiles). In this context, it is particularly notable from the social surveys themselves that all of the questions focus on income levels rather than consumption or wealth. One exception is that near the poverty line, the focus of society and policy often shifts towards minimum support levels.

From this background and due also simply to data strength as described below, this study focuses most on income and wage inequality. Three levels of geographic aggregation and three forms of inequality are considered for the United States. On the geographic dimension, inequality estimates for Census regions (four or nine) are calculated from the March CPS files. These annual measures are preferred since decade-based measurements can miss important fluctuations, most noticeably the significant expansion in family-income inequality during the recessions of the early 1980s and 1990s. The sample sizes of the March CPS are insufficient, however, for state-level analyses and states are not identified until 1977. State-level statistics are instead calculated from the Census for each decade.

Three income definitions are considered: post-tax disposable family income from all sources, pre-tax family labor earnings, and hourly wages. The first two family measures are calculated over family equivalents using Danziger and Gottschalk's (1995) procedure of dividing by an inflation-adjusted poverty-line estimate for a family of similar composition (i.e., the number and ages of adults and children in the family unit). Additional procedures for preparing the sample (e.g., the exclusion of military families, adjustment of top-codes) follow Danziger and Gottschalk (1995), Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), and Katz and Autor (1999). In each analysis, the region fixed effects and median income levels are adjusted to the appropriate geographic aggregation; median income levels are additionally adjusted to reflect the income definition used in the inequality calculation. Table A2 documents the log 80-20 income ratios employed in the primary estimations. Later in this appendix the robustness of the results over these definitions is described.

Beyond these metrics, the study also compared income inequality to consumption inequality. There are several basic empirical challenges to describe first. To begin, debate exists about the measurement of consumption inequality for the United States over post-war period. Recent work suggests high correlation in the macro-trends between income and consumption inequality (e.g., Attanasio, Hurst, and Pistaferri 2012), while others point to substantially lower consumption trends (e.g., Krueger and Perri 2006). The study follows Attanasio and Pistaferri (2014) in using food consumption inequality from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). This approach was needed to provide a comparable baseline across the sample period. It comes with several important caveats. First, food expenditures represent a narrow slice of the overall basket on which consumption can expand. Second, the PSID is not designed to be a representative sample

of geographic regions (or even the United States over time). Finally, and most essential for this purpose, food expenditure is directly influenced by policy (e.g., food stamps to counteract imbalances forming) and the data do not separate these interventions over the period, reflective of the conceptual issue noted above about the inability to separate pre-transfers consumption inequality.

With these caveats, we estimate from the PSID a food consumption differential similar to our 80-20 income differential. This series has a 0.7 correlation to our main inequality metric across regions and years, and Attanasio, Hurst, and Pistaferri (2012) and Attanasio and Pistaferri (2012) calculate a similar correlation across other datasets. This correlation is much lower, however, at 0.2 or less when looking at longitudinal changes in inequality and their regional differences (i.e., residuals from regressions of the inequality variables on region and year fixed effects, which is the effective variation used in the estimations).

This limited panel correlation allows the two forms of inequality to be tested against each other. Including this variable in our estimations shows primarily that the income inequality metric has the tighter link to social preferences. Second, for support for income equalization, consumption inequality has some additional predictive power beyond the income inequality measure. For welfare support, this relationship is ambiguous over specifications, likely in part due to welfare support directly determining food consumption for poor (lower local support per our policy analysis almost directly translates into greater realized food expenditure inequality given the role of food stamps and similar).

On the whole, these extra analyses empirically suggest that income inequality has the stronger link to social preferences. This study is very cautious about these results, however, due to the uncertainty about how best to measure these patterns. Said perhaps more colorfully, if there is substantial disagreement over whether the consumption inequality trend for the United States is flat or rising, regional-based comparisons of longitudinal changes are likely to be mis-measured. Thus, the better performance of income inequality econometrically could be simply due to its better measurement and substantially higher quality data. It is hope that future work can continue to clarify these features.

2.5 U.S. Minimum Wage Instrument

The inequality instrument for region r and year t takes the form

$$INEQ - IV_{r,t} = \ln(FED_{1970}/FED_t) \cdot E_{1970}COV_{r,t}.$$

This instrument builds upon the fact that regions differ in the composition of their economic activity, and the federal minimum-wage mandates are not applied equally to industries (e.g., 1970-2000 coverage rates in agriculture averaged 41% versus manufacturing's 97%). The larger the fraction of a region's population covered by the federal statutes, the more impact federal rates have on the local economy. The simplest interaction term would be the 1970 coverage rate;

in a slight design improvement, the interaction term is built instead as the expected coverage in year t for each region. This modification allows incorporation of trends in national coverage rates due to changing federal legislation (especially in the mid 1970s), thereby raising the quality of the first-stage estimations.

The expected coverage ratio is $E_{1970}COV_{r,t} = 1 - \sum_j IND\%_{j,r,1970} \cdot (COV_{j,1970}/COV_{j,t})$, with j indexing industries. This term is estimated from the 1970 industrial composition of the working poor and changes in national coverage rates by industry. $IND\%_{j,r,1970}$ is the percent of a region's workforce from the 1970 Census who are both earning less than the minimum wage and working in industry j . By itself, $\sum_j IND\%_{j,r,1970}$ would produce the actual percentage of the region's working population earning less than the federal minimum wage in 1970. $COV_{j,1970}/COV_{j,t}$ is the ratio of the national coverage rate for industry j in 1970 to that in year t . From a starting value of one, the ratio moves above one for industries where the coverage rates decrease compared to 1970 levels; it moves below one when coverage rates increase.

The combination of these terms is the expected percentage of a region's workforce earning below the minimum wage in year t . The starting 1970 level of $\sum_j IND\%_{j,r,1970} \cdot (COV_{j,1970}/COV_{j,t})$ is still the actual workforce percentage earning below the 1970 federal rate in each region (as the coverage ratio for all industries is one). For subsequent years, it is expected that the percentage of the population earning below the minimum wage will decline in region r if its poor workers were primarily employed in industries where the coverage rate later increased. On the other hand, little change is expected in states or regions where very few workers were initially below the minimum wage or where the poor worked in industries for which the coverage rate did not change significantly. Finally, $1 - \sum_j IND\%_{j,r,1970} \cdot (COV_{j,1970}/COV_{j,t})$ estimates the percent of the population covered by the minimum-wage mandates and thus the potential importance of changes in the federal rate for the region's inequality level.

When developing the instrument, baseline coverage rates $COV_{j,1970}/COV_{j,t}$ are at the one-digit SIC level and exclude government employees (e.g., Nordlund 1997, United States Department of Labor 1998). Coverage rates have not been identified for 1989 or after 1996. For the main estimations, a linear interpolation is employed for 1989 and observations post-1997 are assigned 1996 values; the results are robust to dropping these missing years. Unfortunately, the coverage data are not disaggregated to where each observation's own region could be excluded. The expected coverage rate calculations produce only a slight trend vis-à-vis fixed 1970 levels.

The instrument is then the interaction of shifts in the real federal rate with the expected coverage level, or how much the federal legislation matters for a region. The instrument comes only from the interaction between these two elements. The individual trends of the real federal rate and industry coverage rates are absorbed by the year effects. Geographic fixed effects control for the region's predetermined industrial composition of poor workers. This latter control is important as the inequality of regions may influence industrial composition over a sufficiently long time horizon. For example, firms in certain industries may adjust location choices in response, or

policy interventions to fight poverty/inequality may push workers into certain industries. The interaction approach keeps the instrument’s regional component fixed at the pre-determined 1970 level to circumvent these issues, and the geographic fixed effects control for this trait.

Table A2 also provides the federal minimum wage ratios and expected regional coverage ratios used to construct the minimum-wage instrument employed in the U.S. analysis. The instrument does not have a level *per se*—its value for all regions is zero when the real federal rate is equal to its 1970 level (i.e., 1970 itself, approximately so in 1975, 1976 and 1981). It relies on the region fixed effects to control for the mean inequality positions of each area. Finally, the instrument is designed to have a positive first-stage coefficient. The $E_{1970}COV_{r,t}$ term is always positive and only governs the magnitude of the response; the $\ln(FED_{1970}/FED_t)$ component is positive when the current federal rate is below its 1970 level, which should correspond to rising inequality, and vice versa.

The robustness of the instrument design has been verified on several dimensions. First, the results are mostly robust to simply fixing the coverage rate at its 1970 level for each region; the only trouble spot is in regressions that contain only year and region fixed effects, as the simpler interaction captures some of the median-income level trend when it is excluded. Second, the total industrial composition of the region can be substituted for the industrial composition of the poor workers. Finally, as noted above, the instrument incorporates two aggregate trends—changes in the federal rate and changes in industry coverage rates. Close observation shows the instrument can work against itself. Focusing on movements in the minimum-wage level, the instrument correctly predicts regions with higher coverage levels will be more affected by federal changes. Yet, over a short horizon and holding the minimum wage fixed, the instrument incorrectly predicts an increase in the coverage rate will raise inequality if the real federal rate is below its 1970 level; its predicted direction is correct if the real federal rate is above its 1970 level. An alternative specification removes the competing effects by using two instruments, one interacting the dynamics of the federal rate with fixed 1970 coverage rates and the second interacting industry coverage rate trends with the 1970 industrial composition. The results are again very close to those presented in the main text.

3 Extended Empirical Results

3.1 International Preferences

Coefficients on the Demographic and Work Controls in Table 2 of the main text follow the patterns found in previous cross-sectional studies (e.g., Suhrcke 2001, Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). As the quality of income data varies substantially across surveys and countries, respondents are grouped into family-income quintiles for each survey year. Support for redistribution declines with income; support also tends to be lower among male and more-educated respondents. Self-employed workers and supervisors tend to have less support for redistribution, while unemployed

workers and union members are more supportive. While reasonable, the direction of these findings should be treated with caution as income variation not captured by the quintile groupings may be loading onto other demographic and work characteristics. Finally, race/minority status is not included in the demographics; later results indicate this is an important factor for the United States (e.g., Luttmer 2001, Luttmer and Singhal 2011, Fong and Luttmer 2011).

Four basic robustness checks on Table 2 are worth mentioning. First, regressions employ the logarithm of the Gini coefficient so that the magnitudes of the β coefficients are less sensitive to the outcomes of countries with extremely large inequality levels. This is not a very important adjustment, and Table A3 provides results with the base Gini coefficient. The same robustness applies to the U.S. estimations. Second, very similar results are also obtained without the macroeconomic controls. For example, elasticities for Government Responsibility and Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Worker Wage Ratio are 0.161 (0.057) and 0.260 (0.076), respectively, when only considering inequality and country and year fixed effects. Third, the ISSP and WVS have sample weights that prohibit bootstrapping. Estimations that exclude the sample weights and bootstrap confirm Table 2's findings, with the results stronger and more precisely estimated. Finally, the 1990 and 1995 WVS surveys asked respondents to rate whether hard work or luck determines success or failure. The reported WVS results are robust to focusing on these survey years and including this control.

The sample employed in Table 2 builds off of the ISSP Social Inequality module. The Government Responsibility and Progressive Taxation questions are also included in the Role of the Government modules since 1985. A longer panel can be constructed that combines surveys from these two modules. While the panel enjoys more countries and higher-frequency variation in macroeconomic conditions, it unfortunately lacks the important Mobility Controls. The findings from this longer panel mirror those in Table 2. A second version of the Government Responsibility question is also included in the Role of the Government surveys and the ISSP Religion modules. Results from this third panel are also consistent with those presented in Table 2. The stability of the findings through shifting time intervals and countries surveyed speaks to the robustness of the measured short-run response in redistribution preferences.

Finally, the U.S. results show shifts in party identification with higher inequality. Increases in inequality are also associated with shifts in party identification to the left in the ISSP and WVS samples. These results are not emphasized due to the lack of party comparability across countries compared to the U.S. analysis. There is also intriguing evidence of declines in political participation as inequality increases.

3.2 U.S. Inequality Disaggregation

The reported analysis focuses on inequality estimates that measure overall inequality. A detailed exploration should further identify the subsets of the income distribution that are most important for changes in social preferences. While more-disaggregated international statistics are very rare

and typically of poor quality, U.S. data are available. Table A4 reports results that decompose the 80-20 inequality into the 80-50 and 50-20 differentials. The results suggest that trends in inequality in the lower half of the distribution (i.e., the poor being increasingly left behind) are most responsible for the aggregate results previously identified for the United States. Using 90-50 and 50-10 trends, which demonstrate less co-movement than the 80-50 and 50-20 series, yields significant results for the 50-10 ratio in all regressions (including Income Equalization). Table A5 shows the instrumental variables analysis with the 80-20 income differential.

Moffitt, Ribar, and Wilhelm (1998) find evidence that declining welfare-benefit levels can be linked to declining low-skill wages, as voters seek to maintain a target benefit-wage ratio (perhaps to preserve equity between working and non-working poor or to minimize employment disincentives). The disaggregated income inequality results—in particular, the positive and significant coefficient on the 50-20 ratio—are robust to including measures of the 15th or 25th percentile wages.

3.3 U.S. Spatial Sorting Analysis

It is important to discuss whether spatial sorting may play a role in these results—for example, the migration of poor to a location could simultaneously weaken the local income distribution and increase support for redistribution. Similar to the country-level analysis in Figure 1, regions in the United States tend to have the cross-sectional pattern of places with higher inequality in the United States being less supportive for redistribution, which would not be consistent with this sorting model for all income groups. Yet, the longitudinal variation utilized in the main analysis could be. It is important to first note that the estimations are designed to the limit the scope for the results being driven by endogenous spatial sorting. In particular, the covariates in the analysis control for observables that link to persistent welfare choices (e.g., income, age, gender, race, education). Thus, to the extent that these factors are behind the endogenous sorting, per the migration of the poor example above, the estimations directly control for these traits regardless of where the individual lives. Likewise, the instrumental variables analysis can overcome this bias.

These controls, however, cannot capture sorting due to unmeasured philosophical bent. Could this still explain it? As the GSS does not contain spatial mobility data, this is ultimately unobservable. Two observations, however, suggest that this role is minimal. First, the aggregate swings in Figure 2 cannot be explained by migration due to their substantial size, both at the macro-level and at the local level and the shift across regions. This is *prima facie* evidence of attitudinal adjustments among non-movers being important.

Second, Table A6 provides calculations from the 2000 Census of Populations (IPUMS 5% state sample) that suggests sorting is not a key factor. The sample is restricted to individuals over 18 years of age who were born in the United States and not living in group quarters. IPUMS reports place of birth and current residence, and 79% of individuals are living in region of birth

(64% in state of birth). For each respondent, coefficient values on demographic covariates from GSS-based regressions for welfare spending support are used to predict baseline support for welfare spending. Values in the table are averages for cells based upon region of birth and region of current residence in 2000. Included covariates for prediction are indicator variables for income levels, age, education, gender, and marital status (the covariates from Column 2 of Table 3A). The coefficient values were originally centered around zero (the transformation of preferences to have mean zero and unit standard deviation in Table 3A), with the slight difference in this table (overall average of 0.004) coming due to the out-of-sample application to the 2000 Census. The higher average values for the South and West are also observed in the GSS, which is good confirmation since this was not targeted in the application.

The table first shows that migrants from region of birth tend to be less supportive in terms of their demographic covariates for redistribution (e.g., reflective of higher income groups being more likely to migrate). The table second shows that the migrants towards regions with the most substantial support based upon demographics (South and West) are not themselves of a demographic bias to accentuate the preference structure of the destination region. For example, migrants from the Midwest and Northeast to the West tend to have the lowest predicted support for redistribution based upon covariates. Caution is warranted about a very strong interpretation of these patterns as the explanatory variables have a 5% adjusted R^2 (8% with region and year fixed effects). But, these patterns do suggest that any bias in the work due to endogenous sorting is very minor given how fundamental these traits themselves are for preferences.³

3.4 U.S. Respondent Heterogeneity

Two additional extensions reported in Kerr (2005) consider whether the average increase in support for redistribution with rising inequality masks differences among income classes. While the demographic characteristics of respondents are statistically significant for explaining survey answers, Piketty (1996a,b, 1999a) notes the overall level of disagreement within a country about distributive equality is usually small vis-à-vis other social issues (e.g., death penalty). Section 2 found, however, that perceptions of conflict between the poor and the rich increase with rising inequality, and it is important to clarify if the average response belies increasing disagreement among classes about appropriate redistribution levels. The rich may become more protective of their wealth as the gap grows, perhaps out of concern over larger transfers or perhaps out of reduced fear that they too may one day be poor. Altruistic motives, however, may yield greater assistance from the wealthy as disparity widens.

A first test for this heterogeneity interacts the inequality measures with whether respondents are in the top-two income quintiles or the bottom-two income quintiles. These estimations do not find significant differences by class for the GSS Welfare Spending or Income Equalization variables. These coefficient magnitudes are very small, and the standard errors are tightly

³Glaeser (2011) further discusses spatial mobility and the limits of redistribution at the local level.

estimated. Similar null results for income-quintile interactions are also present in the ISSP and WVS. Concern over rising inequality grows in all income groups (while the overall levels are higher in poor households). GSS respondents in the bottom-two quintiles are disproportionately more likely to align themselves with the Democratic Party as inequalities in their regions increase. This result, however, is sensitive to more structured controls like interacting a time trend with being in the upper-two or lower-two income quintiles, suggesting that other factors may be playing a role.⁴

A second test interacts the inequality measures with whether the respondent lives near someone of the opposite race. Luttmer (2001) finds support for welfare spending increases as the share of local recipients from a respondent’s racial group rises. Lind (2007) also finds aggregate evidence that inequality between racial groups versus inequality within racial groups can have opposite effects for redistribution outcomes. The interacted coefficient for the Welfare Spending regression agrees with these studies—the increase in redistribution support associated with rising inequality is diminished in racially heterogeneous neighborhoods. There is no clear effect for the Income Equalization measure.

These results suggest changes in support for government-led redistribution are fairly uniform across income groups. This finding is in agreement with Rawlsian models like Piketty (1995), where different classes have similar views on distributive equality holding fixed beliefs about incentive costs. On the other hand, the standard median-voter model (e.g., Meltzer and Richard 1981) suggests increases in inequality lead to a divergence in preferences for redistribution as gaps to the median income widen. A limitation to these findings, however, is important to note. Piketty and Saez (2003) find a tremendous increase in the concentration of wealth among the very rich in the United States (i.e., the top 1% and even smaller fractions). Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2011) review the work that has followed regarding top income shares. Unfortunately, the data cannot be used for an analysis for these super-wealthy individuals, executive compensation committees, and similar institutions.

4 Extended Literature Notes

Space constraints required a substantially shorter bibliography than was included in the working papers. Below is a complete list.

- Footnote 1: Gordon and Dew-Becker (2008), Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2010), and Acemoglu and Autor (2011) provide recent surveys of various inequality determinants from labor and macroeconomic perspectives. A small sample of the work includes Rosen (1981); Bok (1993); Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994); Frank and Cook (1995); Katz

⁴McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2003) note increases in U.S. inequality have moved in tandem with stronger ideological differences over redistribution and more-polarized party politics. While income has become a stronger predictor of party affiliation over the last twenty-five years, their work also suggests inequality bears limited responsibility for the polarization.

and Murphy (1995); DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996); Kremer and Maskin (1996), Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998); Lee (1999); Buchinsky and Hunt (1999); Krusell et. al. (2000); Card (2001); Card and Lemieux (2001); Acemoglu (2002); Card and DiNardo (2002); Rotemberg (2002); Clark (2003); Piketty and Saez (2003); Card, Lemieux, and Riddell (2004); Guadalupe (2007); Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008); Lemieux (2008); Autor, Manning, and Smith (2010); and Autor and Dorn (2011). Glaeser (2006) further discusses the differences between the United States and Europe on inequality.

- References for the minimum wage work include Card and Krueger (1995); DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996); Lee (1999); Golan, Perloff, and Wu (2001a,b); Card and DiNardo (2002); Autor, Manning, and Smith (2010); and Ahn, Arcidiacono, and Wessels (2011).
- Work on social stratification includes Putnam (2000); Benabou (1993, 1996); and Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000).
- References for recent policy examples include Rodriguez (1999); Piketty (1999b); Caminada and Goudswaard (2001); Moene and Wallerstein (2001, 2003); Hassler et. al. (2003); Gundersen and Ziliak (2004); Chernick (2005); Schwabish, Smeeding, and Osberg (2006); Leigh (2008); Schwabish (2008); Corbae, D'Erasmus, and Kuruscu (2009); Boustan et al. (2010); Corcoran and Evans (2010); and Cooper, Lutz, and Palumbo (2011).
- Examples regarding the franchising groups favoring higher redistribution and the disproportionate influence of elites include Husted and Kenny (1997); Lott and Kenny (1999); and Saint-Paul (2001).

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Table A1: Gini Coefficients

Country	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
ARG	37.0										43.1	44.1	43.6	43.8	46.3	45.8	44.8	46.7			
AUS		28.1				29.2				30.4					31.1	32.0	31.5	30.9	32.2		
AUT	21.8	21.8	21.8	22.3	22.3	22.3	22.3	22.7	22.7	22.7	22.7	23.1			28.0	27.7	26.6		24.3		
BEL						22.7			23.2					22.4					25.0		
BGR										24.3				31.1	31.9	35.6	37.2	34.8	34.6		
BLR									23.0						28.0					26.0	
BRA		55.3		56.2	55.5	56.7	55.9	57.0	58.6	59.5	58.3						58.1				
CAN	28.2	27.6	27.8	28.6	28.3	28.2	28.3	28.1	27.9	27.7	27.7	28.1	27.8	28.1	27.7	28.0	29.0	29.5	29.6		
CHE			30.9											30.7							
CHL								56.1			55.1			54.7		54.9		54.8		55.5	55.2
CHN									38.2	38.0	39.3	38.9	39.7	40.6	41.8	43.1					
CZE										20.4		21.2	21.4	25.8	26.0	28.2	25.4	25.9	25.8	25.7	27.0
DEU	25.4			25.0		26.0		25.2			26.0	26.3	26.4	27.4		27.5			27.3		
DNK								25.4						23.6		26.3		25.7			
ESP	34.5										32.4					37.1					34.6
EST													41.2	38.8	39.6	39.0	37.4	34.1			
FIN							21.3	20.7	21.2	21.3	21.2	21.0	20.7	21.8	21.6	21.8	22.6	23.6			
FRA					29.0						28.0								27.0		27.0
GBR	25.3	25.9	25.8	26.4	26.6	27.9	28.8	30.2	32.0	32.4	33.7	33.7	34.0	33.7	33.0	33.0	33.3	33.8	34.4	34.2	
HUN		26.7	26.7					30.7		29.7		28.3		31.4	32.1	33.7	33.9	34.1			
IND				33.4				35.6	35.6		35.6	34.0	35.5		34.5	33.4	35.4	36.1		36.1	
IRL	36.0							35.2							35.3				36.4		
ISR			30.0				30.8							30.5				33.6			

Table A1: Gini Coefficients (continued)

Country	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
ITA	30.9	30.3	28.4	28.9	29.8	29.9	29.9	31.6		29.3		28.9		32.2		32.0			32.9		31.6
JAP					28.0					29.3					29.7					30.1	
KOR	34.9					31.2				30.4	29.5	28.7	28.4	28.1	28.5	28.4	29.1	28.3	31.6	32.0	31.7
LTU										26.0			37.2		34.9	34.1	35.0				
LVA											22.5	22.5	29.6	24.5	30.7	31.7	32.2				
MEX					44.8					46.7			48.5		49.6		47.7		49.4		
NGA												45.0		45.0				50.6			
NLD		23.9		23.5		24.7			25.6	25.5	25.8	26.6	27.8	27.7	27.8	28.3				28.0	
NOR	22.5						22.2	22.3	21.9	23.4	22.8	23.3	23.7	24.3	25.4	24.8	25.7	26.1			
NZL			25.9		26.0		25.3		25.8	28.0	29.9	30.7	29.9	31.8	31.0	31.8	32.2	33.1			
PHL						44.6			44.5			46.8			45.1			48.7		48.2	
POL							27.7	28.1	27.6	28.6		26.5	27.4	36.2	37.3	36.9	37.8	39.0			
ROM														22.6				35.2	35.8		
RUS										26.5	28.5	26.5	28.9	39.8	40.9	38.1	37.5	37.5	37.9	39.4	
SVK										18.1	17.8	18.0	18.6	19.7	20.8	20.0	24.8	23.4			
SVN										19.0	20.1	22.7	22.6	25.0	22.0	23.4	24.0	25.0		24.9	
SWE		19.7						21.8		22.1	22.3	23.7	22.9	23.4	26.2	23.3	24.3	26.2	25.4	26.7	
TUR										43.6						41.5					40.0
USA	31.2	31.5	32.3	32.5	32.5	33.0	33.2	33.3	33.4	33.9	33.6	33.6	34.1	35.6	35.8	35.3	34.5	35.0	35.1		
ZAF											63.0					59.0					57.8

Notes: Table documents country-year Gini observations used with ISSP and WVS estimations. The target Gini estimates are one-year lags from the survey date, although contemporaneous or two-year or three-year lags are accepted when necessary. Survey responses are dropped if they do not meet these conditions. Kerr (2005) provides greater details on these calculations.

Table A1: Gini Coefficients (continued)

Country	Sources
ARG (Argentina)	WIID1 (5 NOOK)
AUS (Australia)	Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS, Statistics Australia (2002)
AUT (Austria)	LIS, WIID1 (4), WIID2 (1)
BEL (Belgium)	LIS
BGR (Bulgaria)	WIID1 (1), World Bank
BLR (Belarus)	WIID1 (5), WIID2 (2)
BRA (Brazil)	WIID1 (1)
CAN (Canada)	Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS, Rupnik et al. (2001)
CHE (Switzerland)	LIS
CHL (Chile)	WIID1 (1), WIID2 (2)
CHN (China)	WIID1 (1)
CZE (Czech Rep.)	LIS, WIID1 (1), WIID2 (1,2)
DEU (W. Germany)	Frick and Grabka (2002), Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS, WIID1 (1)
DNK (Denmark)	Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS
ESP (Spain)	Fanjul and Renes (2002), LIS, WIID2 (1)
EST (Estonia)	WIID1 (1)
FIN (Finland)	Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), WIID1 (1)
FRA (France)	Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS, WIID2 (2)
GBR (Great Britain)	Goodman (2001), Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000)
HUN (Hungary)	LIS, WIID1 (1)
IND (India)	WIID1 (3), WIID2 (2)
IRL (Ireland)	Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS, WIID1 (1), WIID2 (1)
ISR (Israel)	Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS
ITA (Italy)	Brandolini (1999), Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), WIID2 (1)
JAP (Japan)	Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), Statistics Japan (2002)
KOR (South Korea)	WIID1 (1), Statistics Korea (2002)
LTU (Lithuania)	WIID1 (4), WIID2 (2)
LVA (Latvia)	WIID1 (4)
MEX (Mexico)	LIS
NGA (Nigeria)	WIID1 (1)
NLD (Netherlands)	Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS, WIID2 (1)
NOR (Norway)	Brandolini (1999), Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), Statistics Norway (2002), WIID1 (1)
NZL (New Zealand)	Statistics New Zealand (1999)
PHL (Philippines)	Statistics Philippines (2002)
POL (Poland)	LIS, WIID1 (1)
ROM (Romania)	WIID2 (2)
RUS (Russia)	LIS, Ovtcharova (2001)
SVK (Slovakia)	WIID1 (1)
SVN (Slovenia)	LIS, WIID1 (1,4)
SWE (Sweden)	Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS, WIID1 (1)
TUR (Turkey)	WIID2 (3)
USA (United States)	Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), United States Census Bureau (2000)
ZAF (South Africa)	WIID1 (1), WIID2 (3)

Table A2: Minimum-Wage Instrument Descriptive Statistics

Year	Nominal M. Wage	Real M. Wage	Log Ratio to 1970	Expected Coverage Ratios				Log 80-20 Family Disposable Income			
				Northeast	Midwest	South	West	Northeast	Midwest	South	West
1970	1.60	5.03	0.00	89.9	87.1	78.4	87.2	0.500	0.487	0.638	0.527
1971	1.60	4.81	0.04	89.9	87.1	78.3	87.2	0.509	0.495	0.649	0.555
1972	1.60	4.59	0.09	89.9	87.1	78.3	87.2	0.525	0.515	0.635	0.557
1973	1.60	4.46	0.12	90.2	87.5	78.9	87.6	0.532	0.504	0.649	0.597
1974	2.00	5.25	-0.04	90.3	87.7	79.2	87.8	0.525	0.503	0.628	0.578
1975	2.10	5.01	0.00	90.4	87.8	79.3	87.9	0.540	0.503	0.632	0.572
1976	2.30	5.07	-0.01	90.5	87.9	79.6	88.0	0.554	0.523	0.633	0.592
1977	2.30	4.80	0.05	90.6	88.0	79.6	88.1	0.553	0.528	0.634	0.576
1978	2.65	5.20	-0.03	90.7	88.2	79.8	88.2	0.569	0.536	0.640	0.592
1979	2.90	5.45	-0.08	90.7	88.2	79.8	88.2	0.565	0.523	0.646	0.589
1980	3.10	5.33	-0.06	90.8	88.4	80.1	88.4	0.574	0.538	0.646	0.593
1981	3.35	5.18	-0.03	90.8	88.4	80.1	88.4	0.577	0.550	0.659	0.605
1982	3.35	4.74	0.06	90.8	88.4	80.1	88.4	0.581	0.567	0.678	0.627
1983	3.35	4.48	0.12	90.8	88.4	80.1	88.4	0.601	0.587	0.690	0.652
1984	3.35	4.30	0.16	90.8	88.4	80.1	88.4	0.630	0.608	0.692	0.662
1985	3.35	4.13	0.20	90.9	88.4	80.1	88.4	0.631	0.601	0.685	0.644
1986	3.35	4.00	0.23	90.9	88.4	80.2	88.5	0.633	0.612	0.690	0.662
1987	3.35	3.93	0.25	90.9	88.5	80.2	88.5	0.617	0.609	0.706	0.670
1988	3.35	3.80	0.28	90.9	88.5	80.3	88.5	0.618	0.626	0.713	0.667
1989	3.35	3.66	0.32	90.9	88.5	80.3	88.6	0.619	0.612	0.713	0.674
1990	3.80	3.99	0.23	90.9	88.5	80.3	88.6	0.640	0.607	0.699	0.673
1991	4.25	4.25	0.17	90.9	88.4	80.2	88.5	0.638	0.627	0.687	0.682
1992	4.25	4.10	0.20	90.9	88.4	80.1	88.5	0.650	0.628	0.697	0.698
1993	4.25	4.00	0.23	90.9	88.4	80.2	88.5	0.650	0.637	0.719	0.698
1994	4.25	3.90	0.25	90.9	88.4	80.1	88.5	0.666	0.652	0.726	0.722
1995	4.25	3.82	0.27	90.9	88.4	80.2	88.5	0.678	0.630	0.705	0.745
1996	4.75	4.17	0.19	90.9	88.4	80.2	88.5	0.675	0.616	0.698	0.733
1997	5.15	4.40	0.13	90.9	88.4	80.2	88.5	0.689	0.617	0.702	0.739
1998	5.15	4.31	0.15	90.9	88.4	80.2	88.5	0.698	0.610	0.706	0.723
1999	5.15	4.25	0.17	90.9	88.4	80.2	88.5	0.702	0.621	0.702	0.731
2000	5.15	4.16	0.19	90.9	88.4	80.2	88.5	0.696	0.623	0.693	0.721

Table A3: Table 2 with Non-Log Gini Coefficient

	Base Regression	Including Demographic & Economic Mobility Controls			
		Base Regression	Including Worker Controls	Including OECD-Yr. Effects	Including Trans.-Yr. Effects
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ISSP Social Inequality Panel					
A. Government Responsibility Responses					
National Gini Coefficient	0.162 (0.056)	0.156 (0.055)	0.159 (0.060)	0.128 (0.066)	0.085 (0.068)
Observations	54,054	45,918	45,918	45,918	45,918
B. Progressive Taxation Responses					
National Gini Coefficient	0.261 (0.081)	0.264 (0.084)	0.264 (0.084)	0.214 (0.079)	0.214 (0.100)
C. Inequality Acceptance Responses					
National Gini Coefficient	0.145 (0.050)	0.128 (0.048)	0.131 (0.049)	0.069 (0.053)	0.043 (0.076)
D. Poor-Rich Conflict Responses					
National Gini Coefficient	0.138 (0.038)	0.155 (0.041)	0.155 (0.040)	0.140 (0.034)	0.153 (0.044)
E. Young-Old Conflict Responses					
National Gini Coefficient	-0.004 (0.055)	-0.001 (0.051)	-0.002 (0.050)	-0.085 (0.081)	-0.013 (0.078)
F. Log Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Wage Ratio Responses					
National Gini Coefficient	0.239 (0.106)	0.223 (0.097)	0.225 (0.095)	0.303 (0.104)	0.231 (0.110)
WVS Panel					
G. WVS Income Equalization Responses					
National Gini Coefficient	0.393 (0.114)	0.404 (0.119)	0.402 (0.119)	0.373 (0.127)	0.287 (0.140)
Observations	137,006	118,499	118,499	118,499	118,499

Notes: See Table 2. Variables transformed to have unit standard deviation to aid interpretation.

Table A4: Table 3B with Disaggregated Inequality

	Base Regression	Including Demographic & Economic Mobility Controls		
		Base Regression	Including Worker Controls	Including Racial Controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Welfare Spending Responses				
Log Regional 80/50 Differential	0.013 (0.028)	0.013 (0.031)	0.002 (0.032)	0.001 (0.030)
Log Regional 50/20 Differential	0.072 (0.020)	0.084 (0.023)	0.098 (0.030)	0.086 (0.027)
Observations	24,247	21,965	14,704	21,965
B. Income Equalization Responses				
Log Regional 80/50 Differential	0.067 (0.032)	0.042 (0.042)	0.042 (0.037)	0.028 (0.038)
Log Regional 50/20 Differential	0.046 (0.026)	0.011 (0.030)	0.020 (0.032)	0.007 (0.029)
Observations	20,414	18,344	17,293	18,344
C. Political Party Identification Responses				
Log Regional 80/50 Differential	0.036 (0.027)	0.035 (0.026)	0.002 (0.032)	0.015 (0.024)
Log Regional 50/20 Differential	0.093 (0.014)	0.114 (0.021)	0.137 (0.020)	0.118 (0.015)
Observations	37,763	33,971	23,026	33,791
D. Space Exploration Program Spending Responses				
Log Regional 80/50 Differential	0.017 (0.036)	0.002 (0.032)	-0.008 (0.033)	0.010 (0.036)
Log Regional 50/20 Differential	-0.006 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.022)	-0.013 (0.026)	-0.016 (0.023)
Observations	23,942	21,757	14,574	21,757

Notes: See Table 3B.

Table A5: Table 4 with 80-20 Income Differential Inequality

	Base Regression	Including Demographic & Economic Mobility Controls		
		Base Regression	Including Worker Controls	Including Racial Controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Welfare Spending Responses				
Log Regional 80/20 Differential	0.204 (0.062)	0.206 (0.063)	0.207 (0.062)	0.200 (0.067)
Observations	24,247	21,965	14,704	21,965
B. Income Equalization Responses				
Log Regional 80/20 Differential	0.128 (0.090)	0.070 (0.091)	0.083 (0.109)	0.055 (0.080)
Observations	20,414	18,344	17,293	18,344
C. Political Party Identification Responses				
Log Regional 80/20 Differential	0.209 (0.050)	0.232 (0.053)	0.196 (0.060)	0.224 (0.062)
Observations	37,763	33,971	23,026	33,971
D. Space Exploration Program Spending Responses				
Log Regional 80/20 Differential	-0.054 (0.066)	-0.035 (0.065)	-0.034 (0.077)	-0.038 (0.068)
Observations	23,942	21,757	14,574	21,757

Notes: See Table 4. Estimated at the regional level and using bootstrapped standard errors, the first-stage coefficient for the regional log 80-20 differential is 1.53 (0.53), with an F statistic of 7.3 and a partial R² of 0.10.

Table A6: Geographic Mobility Bounding

	Region of Current Residence				
	Midwest	Northeast	South	West	Total
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Region of Birth:					
Midwest	-0.001	-0.003	-0.007	-0.017	-0.004
Northeast	-0.008	-0.001	-0.011	-0.012	-0.003
South	0.001	0.006	0.013	-0.003	0.011
West	0.013	0.019	0.014	0.016	0.016
Total	-0.001	0.000	0.009	0.006	0.004

Notes: Tabulations assess the extent to which regional mobility influences observed changes in social preferences. The sample is from the 2000 Census of Populations 5% state public-use file. All respondents born in the United States over the age of 18 and not living in group quarters are retained. For each respondent, coefficient values on demographic covariates from GSS-based regressions for welfare spending support are used to predict baseline support for welfare spending. Values in the table are averages for cells based upon region of birth and region of current residence in 2000. Included covariates for prediction are indicator variables for income levels, age, education, gender, and marital status (the covariates from Column 2 of Table 3A). The coefficient values were originally centered around zero (the transformation of preferences to have mean zero and unit standard deviation in Table 3A), with the slight difference in this table (overall average of 0.004) coming due to the out-of-sample application to the 2000 Census. The table first shows that migrants from region of birth tend to be less supportive in terms of their demographic covariates for redistribution (e.g., reflective of higher income groups being more likely to migrate). The table second shows that the migrants towards regions with the most substantial support based upon demographics (South and West) are not themselves of a demographic bias to accentuate the preference structure of the destination region. For example, migrants from the Midwest and Northeast to the West tend to have the lowest predicted support for redistribution based upon covariates.