Happiness adaptation to income and to status in an individual panel

Rafael Di Tella\textsuperscript{a,b,1}, John Haisken-De New\textsuperscript{c}, Robert MacCulloch\textsuperscript{d,*}

\textsuperscript{a} Harvard Business School, Boston, MA 02163, United States
\textsuperscript{b} National Bureau of Economic Research, United States
\textsuperscript{c} DIW, Berlin, Germany
\textsuperscript{d} Imperial College London, London SW7 2AZ, United Kingdom

\section{Introduction}

In a seminal paper, Easterlin (1974) showed that an indicator of well-being for the post-war period in the US remained flat in spite of the considerable rise in income. In the cross-section for any particular year, however, income and happiness exhibit the expected positive association. One explanation that has been proposed for this “paradox” is the hypothesis that people only care about their relative position or “status”. A second explanation is that people adapt to their income over time. In this case the cross-sectional evidence can be explained by relative position effects to which individuals do not adapt.\textsuperscript{2}

The narrow purpose of the present paper is to provide the first test of adaptation to status relative to adaptation to income.
As explained above, these theories are both part of an explanation to the Easterlin paradox (if there is adaptation to income but not to status).

Our paper employs the approach developed in the small happiness literature that has emerged in economics following Easterlin’s paper. Using individual-level panel data on happiness from households living in Germany between 1984 and 2000, we provide evidence on three behavioral hypotheses, namely adaptation, status effects and loss aversion. In particular, we compare the extent of adaptation to income with the extent of adaptation to status. Our main objective is to provide evidence on the relative sizes of the (short and long-run) effects of being on higher income compared to enjoying higher status. We also compare the effects across sub-samples of people with different ideological inclination, of different gender and with different employment status. Finally, we compare how losses versus gains affect happiness and provide one way to quantify them (in terms of current income).

One finding of our paper is that there is significant adaptation to income. We can reject the hypothesis that people do not adapt to income in the four years following an income shock. The size of adaptation is sufficiently large that no significant income effects on happiness remain after the fourth year. The adaptation effects we investigate are consistent with the model of Pollak (1970), Wathieu (2004), Rayo and Becker (2005), inter alia. A classic paper in psychology, Brickman et al. (1978), showed that individuals who had won between $50,000 and $1,000,000 at the lottery the previous year reported comparable life satisfaction levels as those that did not. Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) and Diener and Biswas-Diener (2002) present reviews of the evidence available, gathered largely in the psychology field. In the economics literature, Clark (1999) uses two waves of the British Household Panel to look at the relationship between workers’ job satisfaction and their current and past labour income. Gardner and Oswald (2007) use data on a panel of individuals who receive windfalls (by winning a lottery or receiving an inheritance) and Di Tella et al. (2003) estimate the effect of income lags in a panel of 12 OECD countries. The papers that are closest to our analysis are van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004, 2008) who study adaptation to income in the German panel using data on happiness. For a literature review, see Clark et al. (2008b) and Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006). Layard (2005) discusses several policy implications. Our explanation is also related to the important work of van Praag and Kapteyn (1973) showing that income aspirations rise in proportion to income (sometimes called “preference drift”). Indeed, van de Stadt et al. (1985) find that the hypothesis of one-for-one changes in income aspirations and income cannot be rejected (see also van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004 and Stutzer, 2004). Easterlin (2003) argues that family aspirations do not change as marital status and family size change but that material aspirations increase commensurately with household wealth.

Our paper also identifies significant status effects in a within-person analysis. We use the Treiman Standard International Occupation Prestige Score, a measure of the status attached to each job depending on the skills it requires, which has the advantage of having been designed by researchers in another context (see, for example, the description in Hoffmann, 2003). Controlling for changes in income, individuals declare themselves to be happier when they obtain a job that is deemed more prestigious. A one standard deviation increase in status is associated with a similar rise in happiness as an increase of 52 percent of one standard deviation in income during the first year. The evidence cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no adaptation to changes in status in the four years following a status shock. Using long-run (five year) averages, a one standard deviation increase in status is associated with a similar rise in happiness as an increase of 285 percent of a standard deviation in income. The short and long-run happiness effects of different kinds of labor and life events like unemployment, layoffs, marriage and divorce have been studied using happiness data from the German Socio-economic Panel by Lucas et al. (2004) and Clark et al. (2008). The effect of disabilities on long-run happiness is the focus of Wu (2001) and Oswald and Powdthavee (2008). Life satisfaction and financial satisfaction data have both been used to study the short and long-run effects of different kinds of events by van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008). Frey and Stutzer (2006) argue that people may mis-predict the extent to which they adapt to different kinds of goods and activities. Riis et al. (2005) provide some evidence in the context of renal patients receiving dialysis treatment. Helliwell (2003) and Blanchflower (2009) discuss international evidence.

Our estimates of status effects complement the findings in the growing literature testing if people care about their income relative to that of others, as in the models of interdependent preferences (where utility varies inversely with the average income of others) by Duesenberry (1949), Parducci (1968), Hamermesh (1975), Pollak (1976), Frank (1985) and Cole et al. (1992), inter alia. Empirical evidence on the effect of relative position using well-being data is presented in Clark and Oswald (1996), Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) and Brown et al. (2008). Senik (2004) studies the information content of reference group income. An interesting study by Luttmer (2005) involves a panel of almost 9000 individuals in the United States. He matches individual data on happiness and income with a measure of neighbor’s income, given by the average earnings in the locality in which individuals live (which contain 150,000 inhabitants, on average). He then observes that similar decreases in

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3 See Frey and Stutzer (2002) and Senik (2005) for reviews and Hamermesh (2001) for an example of a related approach focused on job satisfaction that can also be considered a measure of well-being, albeit on a particular domain. An important precursor of the happiness literature is work on the individual welfare function of income (see, for example, van Praag and Kapteyn, 1973).

4 This is also sometimes called the “hedonic treadmill” hypothesis or the “setpoint” model (see Costa et al., 1987). Easterlin (2003) stresses that the evidence, which is based on small samples, is consistent only with incomplete adaptation.

5 See also Clark (1999), Grund and Slawi (2003) and Burchardt (2005) for further well-being evidence on adaptation to income. On the stability of happiness, see Lykken and Tellegen (1996).

6 There is a large literature on the link between social hierarchy and primate health, reviewed in Sapolsky (2005).
happiness are produced when individual income falls as when the neighbor’s income increases and concludes that there are sizeable relative income effects. Suggestive supporting evidence is provided in the form of larger estimated effects amongst individuals who socialize more in the neighborhood. In a similar spirit, Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) finds strong comparison income effects (particularly upwards). A related paper by Clark (2003) provides evidence showing that the happiness drop associated with falling unemployed is smaller the higher is the unemployment rate in this person’s reference group.

We also present different patterns of habituation across sub-groups. In particular, we estimate the degrees of adaptation to income and to status for those individuals who declare themselves to be on the left of the political spectrum and compare them to those estimated for individuals on the right-end of the spectrum. This is interesting for two reasons. First, left and right-wing voters are important in determining economic policies. Second, it is hard to argue that the differential habituation patterns are due to left and right-wing individuals being affected by different stochastic processes for income and status. Indeed, under the assumption that income and status behave similarly for left and right-wingers, the differences in the estimates we present must be picking up true differences in preferences across these two sub-groups. Similarly, we present different estimates for other sub-groups (e.g., men compared to women) though the assumption of similar stochastic processes for income and status across them may be less compelling. As another strategy to deal with this potential concern, we show in Monte Carlo simulations how it is statistically unlikely to obtain our pattern of differential happiness adaptation across income and status due solely to their differential stochastic processes when the happiness data come from a model where there is equal adaptation.

Finally, our paper considers briefly loss aversion. Given that a standard utility function is concave in income, such tests are considerably harder than testing for adaptation and status, so our results remain exploratory. To identify a pure behavioral effect such as loss aversion, the challenge is to focus on sufficiently small changes to distinguish the asymmetric effect on happiness occurring solely from positive and negative short-run changes in income from the (non-behavioral) asymmetries that occur due to the utility function being concave in income. Still, we obtain some intriguing results. Our estimates indicate that a person on mean income of 60,971 DM (in 1995 values) reports similar happiness to someone on 64,031 DM, but who happens to be there as a result of a drop in their income of 2721 DM (the average drop in our sample). One way to gauge the size of the effect is to note that one standard deviation in income losses is only 21 percent of a standard deviation in income levels, and both give rise to similar changes in happiness.

More broadly, the questions discussed in this paper are particular examples of a problem that is common in economics and psychology, namely how to compare behavioral effects. ‘Economic psychology’ has made considerable progress without a unifying model or approach. Instead, progress has been made by individual researchers proposing alternative hypotheses that often imply considerable deviations from classical assumptions. A number of tests have then been performed establishing the statistical significance of these behavioral traits. But a shortcoming of this approach is that it is hard to get a sense of the relative importance of the effects. For example, although it is intuitively appealing that there are asymmetries implying some degree of loss aversion (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) previous research does not provide convincing answers concerning their relative economic importance. More precisely, we do not know how to value a study that ignores the degree of loss aversion.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical strategy used to quantify behavioral effects. Section 3 presents the data while Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 discusses some evidence on loss aversion. The final section concludes.

2. Empirical strategy

Our purpose is to identify whether income and status have long-lasting (historical) impacts on happiness or whether these dissipate over time. To do so, we run a series of regression specifications that are based on the following general form:

\[
\text{Happiness}_{it} = (\alpha_1 \log y_{it+1} + \alpha_2 \log y_{it} + \alpha_3 \log y_{it-1} + \alpha_4 \log y_{it-2} + \alpha_5 \log y_{it-3} + \cdots + \alpha_T \log y_{it-T}) \\
+ (\beta_1 \log S_{it+1} + \beta_2 \log S_{it} + \beta_3 \log S_{it-1} + \beta_4 \log S_{it-2} + \beta_5 \log S_{it-3} + \cdots + \beta_T \log S_{it-T}) \\
+ \delta X_{it} + f_t + \eta_t + e_{it}
\]

where lags and leads on both income, \(y_{it}\), and status, \(S_{it}\), are used to explain (current) life satisfaction levels, \(\text{Happiness}_{it}\), of individual, \(i\), at time, \(t\). The level of income is measured by the logarithm of real (net) household income from all sources during the current year. The proxy, \(S_{it}\), measures the status (i.e., relative standing) of one’s job. Consequently Eq. (1) measures the degree to which people’s happiness adapts to income and compares it with degree to which there is adaptation to a status good. The maximum number of lags used initially is arbitrary (\(T = four\)) but further tests are provided in the discussion of the results. The vector, \(X_{it}\), consists of individual characteristics: marital status (a set of dummies depending on whether the respondent is married, divorced, separated or widowed), employment status (a set of dummies depending on whether the respondent is in the military, self-employed or a public servant) and education (a set of dummies measuring high school education).
achievement, vocational training or college degree). Given that our emphasis is on status we do not include individuals who become unemployed. We also control for whether the respondent has recently been in hospital (to proxy for physical health), number of children and whether there has been a child birth in the household the past year.

Of the remaining variables, \(f_i\) is an unobserved fixed-individual trait, \(\eta_t\) is a year fixed effect and \(e_{it}\) is random noise. That is, we follow the same individuals over time by conducting a “within-groups” analysis. Data exists for a sample of 7812 West Germans between 1984 and 2000. Happiness is measured on a 0–10 point scale. Estimation is done using an Ordinary Least Squares fixed-effects model although similar conclusions emerge when a more flexible cardinalization is used (see Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004 for a discussion as well as the results reported in Kohler et al., 2005; see also the approach in Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2005).

We begin by testing for whether there is adaptation to income by running regression (1) with the restrictions, \(\alpha_1 = \beta_1 = \beta_0 = \beta_{-1} = \ldots = \beta_{-T} = 0\). In the other words, we estimate:

\[
\text{Happiness}_{it} = (\alpha_0 \log y_{it} + \alpha_{-1} \log y_{it-1} + \ldots + \alpha_{-T} \log y_{it-T}) + \delta X_{it} + f_i + \eta_t + e_{it} \tag{2}
\]

To test for whether there is adaptation to status the following restrictions are imposed: \(\beta_1 = \alpha_1 = \alpha_{-1} = \ldots = \alpha_{-T} = 0\). We also estimate a specification with an unrestricted lag structure on both status and income jointly (i.e., assuming only that \(\alpha_1 = \beta_1 = 0\)) and test for the importance of their average levels, which imposes the additional restrictions: \(\beta_0 = \beta_{-1} = \ldots = \beta_{-T}\) and \(\alpha_0 = \alpha_{-1} = \ldots = \alpha_{-T}\). See van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008) for an alternative approach to estimate adaptation effects.

These tests are relevant to reconciling the strong positive effects of income position on happiness in a cross-section of people within a nation, with the lack of any noticeable effects of increasing average incomes on happiness over long periods of time. Two basic hypothesis have been suggested, adaptation and relative position effects. As explained above, the latter requires that there is no adaptation. Although some work has explored the significance of these effects, the comparative size and importance of these different explanations has not been directly tested. The formal hypotheses that we use to test for adaptation effects are:

\[
H_0 : \sum_{i=1}^{T} \alpha_{-i} = 0 \quad \text{versus} \quad H_1 : \sum_{i=1}^{T} \alpha_{-i} \neq 0 \tag{3}
\]

\[
H_0 : \sum_{i=1}^{T} \beta_{-i} = 0 \quad \text{versus} \quad H_1 : \sum_{i=1}^{T} \beta_{-i} \neq 0 \tag{4}
\]

and for long-run effects are:

\[
H_0 : \sum_{i=0}^{T} \alpha_{-i} = 0 \quad \text{versus} \quad H_1 : \sum_{i=0}^{T} \alpha_{-i} \neq 0 \tag{5}
\]

\[
H_0 : \sum_{i=0}^{T} \beta_{-i} = 0 \quad \text{versus} \quad H_1 : \sum_{i=0}^{T} \beta_{-i} \neq 0 \tag{6}
\]

We also check to see whether there are significant differences between the degree of adaptation to income and relative position that occurs after the initial period:

\[
H_0 : \sum_{i=1}^{T} \alpha_{-i} - \sum_{i=1}^{T} \beta_{-i} = 0 \quad \text{versus} \quad H_1 : \sum_{i=1}^{T} \alpha_{-i} - \sum_{i=1}^{T} \beta_{-i} \neq 0 \tag{7}
\]

If people adapt to income but not to status then we may be able to explain how there can exist a positive relationship between happiness and income rank within a nation (if the rank is correlated with status) and also a flat long-run happiness time-series (in spite of rising average incomes).\(^8\)

\(^8\) Since Eq. (1) takes log transformations of income and status, we are testing whether it is possible to reject the hypothesis that the (absolute) changes in happiness that occur following a 1% rise in income and a 1% rise in status are equal. A related test is whether the (proportionate) changes in happiness that occur (as a ratio of initial effects) following a 1% rise in income and a 1% rise in status are equal: \(H_0 : \frac{1}{T} \sum_{i=1}^{T} \alpha_{-i} - \frac{1}{T} \sum_{i=1}^{T} \beta_{-i} = 0 \quad \text{versus} \quad H_1 : \frac{1}{T} \sum_{i=1}^{T} \alpha_{-i} - \frac{1}{T} \sum_{i=1}^{T} \beta_{-i} \neq 0\).
3. Data

We collect data from the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP), a longitudinal data set begun in 1984 that randomly samples households living in the western states of the Federal Republic of Germany. In 1990 the eastern states were added to provide a representative sample of the (reunited) Germany, although in this paper we concentrate only in the West German sample. Given the role of lags in our empirical strategy we consider only individuals for which we have at least 5 years of data. The GSOEP survey contains the following ‘happiness’ question: “In conclusion, we would like to ask you about your satisfaction with your life in general, please answer according to the following scale: 0 means completely dissatisfied and 10 means completely satisfied: How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered?”. The possible answers appear on a scale showing the numbers 0, 1, 2, . . . , 9, 10, with the words “Completely dissatisfied” below 0 and “Completely satisfied” below 10.

3.1. Measurement of income

The second key variable used in the present study is a measure of each individual’s income. There are several different income-related questions in the survey that are relevant to this measurement. We use ‘Real Household Post-Government Income’ from the Cross-National Equivalent File (1984–2000). This variable represents combined household income after taxes and government transfers (of the head, partner and other family members). It equals the sum of pre-government income, social security and annual public transfer income, minus net household annual taxes. Household pre-government income consists of annual gross labour income, asset income, private transfer income and private retirement income. Since the income variables in GSOEP are reported as average monthly amounts received, they first had to be annualized by calculating the number of months in each year various types of income are received and multiplying this number by the reported average monthly amount. Next an estimated tax burden for households or individuals was computed using a tax-estimation routine. This tax package produces estimated annual tax burdens for all households in the GSOEP.

3.2. Measurement of status

Status (i.e., an individual’s relative standing to others) is measured using the Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale (SIOPS) which is an independent score (ranging from 1 to 90) that is given to each person’s job (see the discussions in Treiman, 1977, Ganzeboom and Treiman, 1996, Hoffmann, 2003, inter alia). Each individual’s status is calculated in two steps: first, the occupation is determined using the International Standard Classification of Occupations, 1988 (ISCO88) of the International Labor Office, and then in the second step the occupation is assigned a prestige score.

The first step using the ISCO88 system classifies occupations into a hierarchy that attempts to capture two dimensions: skill level and specialization. The former refers to the nature of skills required for the job (but not necessarily the way the skills were acquired). Skill specialization refers to the areas (such as subject matter, products and services produced or types of equipment used). The second step uses the SIOPS scale constructed in 1977 by Donald Treiman who examined results of surveys on prestige evaluations of occupations carried out in sixty countries. Occupational prestige is a measure that captures either a relationship of deference or derogation between role incumbents, or the general desirability or goodness of an occupation (see Siegel, 1971). Prestige is based on rankings of occupations by survey respondents on the basis of worth, goodness, status and power and is a robust measure, showing little variation regardless of how people are asked to rate occupations (see Kraus et al., 1978), whether occupations are rated by men or women (see Bose and Rossi, 1983), the race of raters (see Siegel, 1970), the date on which raters ranked occupations (see Nakao and Treas, 1994) or raters’ own social class standing (see Treiman, 1977 and Hailer and Bills, 1979). It is important to note how the status data are so detailed that they give variation even in narrow categories. One example is the self-employed for whom those in business services earn a score of 78, construction earn a score of 69 whereas those operating food stores earn a score of just 44. Not all responders have a status measure assigned. Table A.1 provides summary statistics (total, between and within) of all the variables used and Appendix describes the data sets and gives variable definitions.

Finally, we note that our measure of status may capture the possibility that high status jobs are often also intrinsically interesting (rather than generate higher happiness to those on high status for external reasons such as admiration, deference, etc). While we stick to the status interpretation for expositional reasons, it is worth clarifying that our estimates refer to differential adaptation to monetary goods versus quality goods (where the latter is a broader category encompassing the two interpretations outlined above) and we are asking the question of whether the happiness we derive from things that money cannot buy wears off over time.

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9 A job is defined as a set of tasks or duties designed to be executed by one person. Jobs are grouped into occupations according to the degree of similarity in their constituent tasks and duties. As an example, the following jobs are grouped together in ISCO88 to form the occupation unit group “3472 Radio, Television and Other Announcers”: news announcer; radio announcer; television announcer; disc jockey; media interviewer; newscaster. Although each job may be distinct in terms of the output required from the person who executes the tasks, the jobs are sufficiently similar in terms of the abilities required as inputs into these tasks for them to be regarded as a single occupational unit for our purposes.

10 See the 2003 summary prepared by Sarah Burgard and Judith Stewart for the MacArthur Research Network on Socioeconomic Status and Health (http://www.maces.ucsf.edu) on which this description draws.
3.3. Comparison of the time series properties of income and status

Our income and status series have different properties. One of the primary differences between status and income is the frequency of changes in the two series. Although in every year-to-year observation in our sample (real) income changed by some discrete amount, in 81 percent of observations there was no observed change in status. This is partly due to income being measured on a continuous scale (including income from all sources) and status being measured on a discrete 1–90 scale, though also reflects how status is inherently slower to change since it depends, at least in part, on the set of skills that a person possesses. Put differently, status is a more ‘permanent’ process than income which has a sizeable ‘transient’ component. The cost of adjusting one’s status is large, leading to less frequent though, on average, larger changes than for income.\(^{11}\) For example, the average (absolute) size of changes in (log) status is 26.6 percent (standard error = 21.2 percent, \(n = 2601\)) whereas the average (absolute) size of changes in (log) income is 14.1 percent (standard error = 20.8 percent, \(n = 7812\)). The first quantile of the status changes is 8.4 percent and the second quantile is 16.5 percent (i.e., one-fifth of all status changes are less than 8.4 percent in magnitude and two-fifths are less than 16.5 percent). By comparison, the first quantile of the income changes is 2.5 percent and the second quantile is 5.8 percent. (Note that these figures are calculated excluding zero changes.)

The above pattern of larger, though less frequent, changes in status compared to income is reflected in the autoregressive properties of these two series. For example, the coefficient on the (first) lag of income in the regression: \[
\log y_{it} = \phi \log y_{i,t-1} + f_t + \eta_t + e_{it} \quad (n = 7812, \bar{T} = 6.8) \]
equal to 0.63 (standard error = 0.003) and on status in the regression:
\[
\log S_{it} = \varphi \log S_{i,t-1} + f_t + \eta_t + e_{it} \quad (n = 5581, \bar{T} = 6.4) \]
equal 0.44 (s.e. = 0.005). The coefficient on lagged status is significantly lower than the coefficient on lagged income. The other primary difference in the time series properties between income and status is the presence of a small upward trend in the former though not in the latter. At the start of the sample period, average status in our panel was equal to 41.8 (on the 1–90 scale) and by the end of the period in 2000 it equalled 43.6 (i.e., an increase of 4 percent). By comparison, average (real) income was equal to 56,688 DM in 1984 and 62,428 DM in 2000 (i.e., an increase of 10 percent).

4. Main results: adaptation to income and status

4.1. Main results 1: full sample

Table 1 tests for the presence of adaptation to income compared to status. We start in column (1) by presenting a benchmark estimate with just log of current income, individual and year fixed effects, as well as a set of personal characteristics. It reports a positive and significant effect of current income on happiness. In terms of size, note that the summary statistics reported in Table A.1 show that happiness has a total standard deviation equal to 1.74 (the between-equals 1.36 and the within-equals 1.20). Thus, a one standard deviation increase in log income accounts for 6.3 percent of a standard deviation increase in happiness (0.20/0.55/1.74).

In column (2) an arbitrary number of lags of each individual’s income are included. To keep it general we include four (but see the discussion on columns (5–6) below).\(^{12}\) The coefficient on current income is still positive and significant. One measure of the amount of adaptation in the sample is captured by the sum of the lags. They are negative and significant, at the 2 percent level, which allows us to reject the hypothesis of no adaptation to income in the sample (see Eq. (3) with \(T = 4\). The sum of the coefficients on the lags is equal to \(-0.15\) (i.e., \(-0.04 - 0.07 - 0.06 + 0.02\)). Consequently of the initial impact of income, 65.2 percent is lost over the ensuing four years (i.e., 0.15/0.23) leaving a long-run effect of 0.08. Put another way, although the current effect of income from this specification suggests that a rise in average real income of 12 percent (from 56,429 DM in 1986 to 63,042 DM in 2000) adds 0.03 units onto happiness scores (i.e., 0.23*ln(1.12)) after four years have passed, adaptation effects reduce the size of the effect to only 0.01 units (i.e., 0.08*ln(1.12)). An F-test of whether the sum of all five coefficients on income (i.e., current and four lags) is equal to zero (see Eq. (5) with \(T = 4\)) cannot be rejected (i.e., \(F(1,18765) = 2.2; \text{Prob.} > F = 0.14\)). Fig. 1 graphically depicts an example. It shows the happiness time series when a one-off permanent rise in income of 50 percent occurs at time 0.

Columns (3–4) test for status effects. In column (3) status has a positive and significant effect on happiness.\(^{13}\) In the short-run (i.e., first year) a one standard deviation increase in status is associated with a similar rise in happiness as an increase of 52 percent of a standard deviation in income. The effect is significant at the 1 percent level. A one standard deviation change in status explains 3.1 percent of the standard deviation in happiness. Column (4) estimates the comparable specification but instead using four lags of status (and the current level of income). Again, observing the lags to gauge the amount of adaptation, we cannot reject the hypothesis that there are no long-run changes to the current level of status.

\(^{11}\) This is a standard theoretical prediction of adjustment cost models (e.g., Caplin and Leahy, 1991).

\(^{12}\) The number of observations drops quite dramatically in this column since introducing the long lag structure requires a continuous time series that is only available for a subset of individuals (on average, we have 8.2 years of observations for each person). The earliest that we can have a full time series available is 1988 since we now require four years of lags for each person.

\(^{13}\) As explained in Section 1, status effects could explain the observed positive cross-sectional correlation between income and happiness. An alternative is that, at any point in time, the rich tend to receive bigger positive shocks (to which they will later adapt) than the poor. In our sample, the average change in income for the richest half of the sample is larger than that for the poorest half.
### Table 1

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: Happiness</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Current level of real income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Income in year ( t )</td>
<td>0.20 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.23 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.19 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.19 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.23 (0.05)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Past levels of real income</td>
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<td>Income ((t-1))</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income ((t-2))</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.06 (0.06)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income ((t-4))</td>
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<td>0.02 (0.05)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average income ((t \text{ to } t-4))</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.02 (0.06)</td>
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<td><strong>Current level of status</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Status in year ( t )</td>
<td>0.18 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.16 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.16 (0.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past levels of status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status ((t-1))</td>
<td>0.09 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status ((t-2))</td>
<td>0.05 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status ((t-3))</td>
<td>-0.09 (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.09 (0.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status ((t-4))</td>
<td>0.01 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average status ((t \text{ to } t-4))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.19 (0.11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Results of F-tests**

| \(\Sigma\) Income lags | -0.15 | -0.15 |
| Prob \(\Sigma\) Lags \(> F\) | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| \(\Sigma\) Current and lagged income | 0.08 | 0.08 |
| Prob \(\Sigma\) Current and lagged income \(> F\) | 0.14 | 0.14 |
| \(\Sigma\) Status lags |       |       |
| Prob \(\Sigma\) Lags \(> F\) | 0.06 | 0.08 |
| \(\Sigma\) Current and lagged status | 0.22 | 0.24 |
| Prob \(\Sigma\) Current and lagged status \(> F\) | 0.05 | 0.05 |
| \(R^2\) overall | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 |

**Note:** [1] Total no. of observations equals 64,296, individuals 7812 and mean years 8.2 for column (1); total no. of observations equals 22,609, individuals 3818 and mean years 5.9 for columns (2–6) as these columns restrict the sample to observations for which 4 lags are available. All OLS regressions include individual and year dummies, and personal controls (see Appendix for full list of variables). [2] Income: Log of real household net income. Status: Log of the Treiman Standard International Occupation Prestige Score. [3] Dependent variable is individual responses to the question: “Please answer according to the following scale, 0 means completely dissatisfied and 10 means completely satisfied: How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered?”

(see Eq. (4) with \( T = 4 \)). If anything, the adjustment appears to be positive. The sum of the coefficients on the status lags is equal to (an insignificant) 0.06 (i.e., 0.09 + 0.05 – 0.09 + 0.02). Consequently the initial impact of getting more status appears to grow over the ensuing years by 38 percent (i.e., 0.06/0.16) leaving a long run effect of 0.22. This lies in contrast to the above (opposite) result for income whereby the initial impact wore off over time. An \( F \)-test of whether the sum of all five coefficients on status (i.e., current and four lags) is equal to zero (see Eq. (6) with \( T = 4 \)) can be rejected at the 5 percent level of significance (i.e., \( F(1,18764) = 3.7 \); Prob. \( > F \) = 0.05). Fig. 2 depicts graphically an example of the happiness time series when a one-off permanent rise in an individual’s status of 50 percent occurs.

Column (5) estimates a symmetric lag structure for both income and status. The coefficients on the lags of income sum to –0.15 and are significant at the 2 percent level, rejecting the hypothesis that there is no adaptation to income. In terms of size they indicate that after four years the impact of income falls from 0.23 (i.e., the 1st year coefficient) to 0.08. For status, the coefficients on the lags sum to 0.08, suggesting that after four years the effect rises from 0.16 (i.e., the 1st year coefficient) to 0.24. The hypothesis that the size of the adaptation effect for income and status is equal can be rejected at the

**Fig. 1.** Happiness after a shock at \( t = 0 \) that causes income to rise by 50 percent.
7 percent level (see Eq. (7) with $T=4$). An $F$-test of the null hypothesis that the sum of all five income coefficients (i.e., current plus four lags) equals zero cannot be rejected (i.e., $F(1,18760)=2.2$; Prob. $> F=0.14$) whereas we can reject that the sum of the status coefficients is equal to zero at the 5 percent level (i.e., $F(1,18760)=3.8$; Prob. $> F=0.05$). Column (6) summarizes our discussion by regressing happiness on long-run averages, $(x(t) + x(t-1) + x(t-2) + x(t-3) + x(t-4))/5$, where $x$ is either income or status. Taken over this period no significant effects of income remain. However for status the effect is significant at the 10 percent level and, if anything, appears to be larger in size than the current effect. A full investigation of the mechanisms through which there appears to be more adaptation to income than to status changes is beyond the scope of this paper (but see Section 4.2 for some evidence consistent with a large role of prior ideological beliefs).\(^{14}\)

We also experimented with different specifications by repeating the regressions in columns (5–6) but instead using three lags (i.e., letting $T=3$ for $n=27,395$). The results are broadly very similar. The coefficients (standard errors) on the current level and past lags of income are $\alpha_0=0.25 (0.04)$; $\alpha_{-1}=0.01 (0.05)$; $\alpha_{-2}=-0.11 (0.05)$ and $\alpha_{-3}=-0.01 (0.04)$. The sum of the coefficients on the three lags equals $-0.11$ so what remains after the short-run effect of 0.25 is a long-run effect of 0.14. For status, the corresponding coefficients (standard errors) are $\beta_0=0.11 (0.06)$; $\beta_{-1}=0.08 (0.06)$; $\beta_{-2}=0.01 (0.06)$ and $\beta_{-3}=-0.10 (0.06)$. The sum of the coefficients on the lags equals (an insignificant) $-0.01$ so in this case what remains after the short-run effect of 0.11 is a (long-run) effect of 0.10. Comparison with the results using four lags reveals a similar pattern of significant adaptation to income over the three years following an income shock whereas we again cannot reject the hypothesis that no adaptation to status occurs over this period.\(^{15}\) We also repeated the column (6) specification but instead calculated averages between $t$ and $t-3$ (i.e., $(x(t) + x(t-1) + x(t-2) + x(t-3))/4$). The coefficients (standard errors) on average income and average status are $0.09 (0.05)$ and $0.11 (0.09)$, respectively, where the former is significant at the 6 percent level.\(^{16}\)

### 4.2. Main results 2: adaptation effects across sub-samples

Our approach allows us to provide estimates across different sub-groups.\(^{17}\) We can compare adaptation to income and status across gender, political groups (left and right) and the employed and self-employed. The main purpose of these regressions is to provide a broad description of the patterns in the data. Some of these sub-groups have considerable importance (for example, the influence of left and right-wing groups on policy). The results are also helpful in completing our empirical approach, as they provide some evidence on robustness. For example, the income data might have measurement error (e.g., with yearly data it is hard to pin down the precise timing of the income changes). Yet it is unlikely that any differences in the estimates across the left and right-wing subsamples would arise because the left and the

---

\(^{14}\) One possible explanation is that income changes always involve the same dimension (money) whereas status changes could involve different dimensions (e.g., time, prestige, etc). Wilson and Gilbert (2008) develop a model where adaptation involves the weakening of the response after one or more exposures to the same stimulus, so that events have an effect only when they capture the attention (when they are “extraordinary events”). On the role of small but frequent boosts to happiness, see Mochon et al. (2008).

\(^{15}\) However the hypothesis that the sum of all the coefficients on income (i.e., current and three lags) equals zero when $T=3$ can now be rejected at the 1 per cent level.

\(^{16}\) These results on adaptation effects raise the question of why individuals spend so much effort in trying to improve their economic condition. Some have argued that humans do not predict utility very well. For example, Ubel et al. (2003) study happiness predictions amongst people waiting for a kidney transplant. They find that those who receive one tend to report lower levels than they had predicted, whereas those who do not receive transplants report a higher quality of life that they had predicted. See also Gilbert et al. (1998) for evidence of predictions amongst academics concerning being denied tenure, Loewenstein and Schkade (1999) for a review of the evidence and Loewenstein et al. (2003) and Frey and Stutzer (2006) for detailed discussions.

\(^{17}\) For example, Diener et al. (2006) argue that people adapt to different baselines, depending on their emotional dispositions.
right have real differences in the timing of their income shocks. Finally, they might help with the interpretation of our results.

While we do not undertake a full discussion of the possible applications of the results, we note that they may help explain elements of the mechanism through which adaptation takes place. As an example, note that left and right wingers have different beliefs about what is important and how the world works. One example is that right wingers are more likely to believe that “effort pays” and to value material aspects. Increases in income are more valuable for people with that world view, both directly (as their utility functions may have a larger weights on material payoffs) and indirectly (because income gains may validate a right-winger’s identity, confirming to them that their views are correct). A related mechanism is that income is salient to right-wingers.18

A second reason for presenting them in detail is that comparing estimates across sub-groups is useful in dealing with a statistical problem that we now describe. One interpretation of the results in Table 1 is that they reflect a true difference in human adaptation to pecuniary shocks (i.e., higher income) versus non-pecuniary shocks (e.g., obtaining a job with higher status). However, a natural alternative explanation is that the result could be a statistical artifact caused by the different time series properties of our income and status variables. For example, income changes almost continuously though often by small amounts whereas status changes less regularly though by relatively larger amounts when it does (see Section 3).

A simple way to address this potential problem is to test for differences across sub-groups (like males versus females). If the two sub-groups have different long- versus short-run responses to income and status, as measured by the regression coefficients, then the reason is more likely to be differential adaptation to pecuniary versus non-pecuniary shocks (to the extent that the time series properties of income and status are similar across the sub-groups). Consequently we estimate Eq. (1) separately for each sub-group and, as an alternative approach, estimate for the full sample the following regression:

\[
\text{Happiness}_{it} = \left( \alpha_0^g + r_{it}(\alpha_0^g - \alpha_0^h) \right) \log y_{it} + \left( \alpha_1^g + r_{it}(\alpha_1^g - \alpha_1^h) \right) \log y_{it-1} + \cdots \left( \alpha_T^g + r_{it}(\alpha_T^g - \alpha_T^h) \right) \log y_{it-T} + \left( \beta_0^g + r_{it}(\beta_0^g - \beta_0^h) \right) \log S_{it} + \left( \beta_1^g + r_{it}(\beta_1^g - \beta_1^h) \right) \log S_{it-1} + \cdots \left( \beta_T^g + r_{it}(\beta_T^g - \beta_T^h) \right) \log S_{it-T} + \delta X_{it} + \xi_{it} + \epsilon_{it}
\]

where the dummy variable, \( r_{it} \), is equal to one when the individual is a member of sub-group, \( g \), and zero when she is a member of sub-group, \( h \). Our hypothesis test of differential adaptation to income and status across the two sub-groups is:

\[
H_0 : \left( \sum_{t=1}^T \alpha_{i-1} - \sum_{t=1}^T \beta_{i-1} \right)^g = \left( \sum_{t=1}^T \alpha_{i-1} - \sum_{t=1}^T \beta_{i-1} \right)^h \quad \text{versus} \quad H_1 : \left( \sum_{t=1}^T \alpha_{i-1} - \sum_{t=1}^T \beta_{i-1} \right)^g \neq \left( \sum_{t=1}^T \alpha_{i-1} - \sum_{t=1}^T \beta_{i-1} \right)^h
\]

A different approach is to use Monte Carlo simulations to test whether it is statistically possible to obtain differential lag structures on income and status in happiness regressions even when there is no difference in the true model (i.e., whether the different time series properties of income and status can lead to biased regression coefficients).

Table 2 compares adaptation to income and status across males versus females, right versus left-wingers and employees versus the self-employed. Columns (1–2) are for males and females.20 We can reject the hypothesis of no adaptation to income for females. The sum of the income lags for this sub-group is negative and significant. The size is sufficiently large that the hypothesis of no long-run effect of income on happiness cannot be rejected for females (i.e., the sum of both current and lagged coefficients is not significantly different from zero). In contrast, adaptation to income amongst males is small and not precisely estimated, resulting in positive long-run effects. The coefficients on status show a different pattern and suggest that there is a significant positive long-run effect for females while not for males. The hypothesis test of whether the degree of adaptation to income relative to status is the same across these sub-groups (see Eq. (9) where \( g = \text{male} \) and \( h = \text{female} \)) shows a rejection of the null at the 12 percent level.21

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18 Kahneman et al. (2006) discuss the more general phenomenon whereby people value something because they are focusing on it (“Nothing in life is quite as important as you think it is while you are thinking about it”). If the surveys have the income question before the life satisfaction question, then them from fading into the background.

19 Alternatively the hypothesis test may use proportionate changes in happiness (as a ratio of the initial effects): \( H_0 : \left( \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^T \alpha_{i-1} - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^T \beta_{i-1} \right)^g = \left( \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^T \alpha_{i-1} - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^T \beta_{i-1} \right)^h \quad \text{versus} \quad H_1 : \left( \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^T \alpha_{i-1} - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^T \beta_{i-1} \right)^g \neq \left( \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^T \alpha_{i-1} - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^T \beta_{i-1} \right)^h \). The results are similar whichever metric is chosen.

20 We note that the results presented in Table 2 differ in the extent to which they are (potentially) affected by voluntary selection into the sub-samples. This problem has lowest incidence across female and male sub-samples (and for results involving ratios of magnitudes within sub-samples). Lyubomirsky et al. (2005) discuss how discrete actions in which people choose to engage may increase happiness by focusing attention to positive events and preventing them from fading into the background.

21 An alternative explanation to preferences over income being different between women and men is that there is an omitted variable like hours of work whereby women who work more start experiencing more unhappiness compared to men due to spending less time with their children and family. This effect may lead to the appearance of full adaptation to income for women.
We next divide people along party political lines. Columns (3–4) show that leftists (i.e., supporters of the Social Democrats or Greens) adapt to income but not status changes. We can reject the hypothesis of no adaptation to income for leftists at the 9 percent level. The size of the effect is large (leading to no long-run effect). By comparison rightists (i.e., supporters of Christian Democrats or Christian Social Union) exhibit no adaptation to income (leading to significant long-run effects at the 4 percent level). The coefficients on status present a different pattern: though there do not appear to be significant lagged effects across either sub-group, there is evidence of a positive long-run effect for leftists and not for rightists.22 The hypothesis test of whether the degree of adaptation to income relative to status is the same across these two sub-groups (see Eq. (9) where \( g = \text{left} \) and \( h = \text{right-winger} \)) shows a rejection of the null at the 5 percent level.

The last two columns in Table 2 show the results for the employed and self-employed sub-groups. They suggest that employees adapt to income (at the 4 percent level) leading to no significant long-run effect, whereas for status the sum of the current and lagged coefficients is significant at the 6 percent level. By comparison the self-employed (who may be expected to be in business to make money instead of seeking higher status) obtain long-run happiness gains from more income (at the 1 percent level) but not from more status. The hypothesis test of whether the degree of adaptation to income relative to status is the same across these sub-groups (see Eq. (9) where \( g = \text{employed} \) and \( h = \text{self-employed} \)) cannot be rejected. We also tested for differences in adaptation across the rich and poor (where ‘poor’ is defined as the bottom half and ‘rich’ the top half of income earners, respectively). The rich appear to adapt more strongly than the poor to both higher levels of income and status (results available on request).23

Another way to approach the problem of whether the differential lag structures between income and status is a statistical artifact caused by the different time series properties of these two series is by way of Monte Carlo simulations. We again

22 Given that the individuals who declare a political inclination is a smaller sample (and that we are studying a partition of this sub-sample) we consider individuals that have been in our sample for a shorter period of time (average \( T \) years in columns (3–4) in Table 2 drops relative to Table 1).

23 We also looked at the sub-group who did not have an unemployment spell and did not experience changing household size. We cannot reject that adaptation to income is complete for this sub-group. The sum of the current and four lagged coefficients on income equals 0.01 and is insignificant (i.e., the result is similar to the full sample reported in column (5) of Table 1).
assume a null hypothesis that there is an equal degree of adaptation to income relative to status and estimate a happiness regression equation with this restriction imposed (setting $T = 4$). This equation is then used to generate happiness data using our actual income and status series, the other covariates and random noise. These data are subsequently used to run an unrestricted happiness regression. One thousand repetitions of the above steps are done to generate confidence intervals. We are now unable to reject the null of equal adaptation (of income relative to status) suggesting that the differential lag structures between income and status identified in Table 1 derive from genuine differences in preferences and not from different properties of the income and status time series biasing our results. In other words, the Monte Carlo simulations help mitigate against the problem that when income changes are more transient than status changes (which may have a more permanent component) our regression estimates could be biased to give the misleading impression of the happiness impact of income being more transient than status.

4.3. How much of the Easterlin paradox can adaptation explain?

The above results are relevant to the Easterlin paradox. The regressions in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that status is a significant positive determinant of well-being and its effects do not wear off over time, whereas the effects of income last approximately four years. Consequently the strong correlation observed in cross-section regressions between income and happiness within a nation may be predominantly due to status (as it is correlated with income position and has a permanent effect). The pure income effects that are present appear to derive solely from the short-run whereby individuals who are doing well tick up their happiness scores. This explanation may put too much weight on statistical significance of the estimated effects. Given that the estimated long-run effect is positive (and insignificant), an alternative is to focus exclusively on the size of the estimated effects and ask if they are enough to explain the observed gap between happiness and income levels. In other words, can we account for the observed flat happiness levels over long-run periods of time by people adapting to income with the estimated coefficients?

First, we observe that the original ‘Easterlin paradox’ referred to the fact that “for the one time series studied, that for the United States since 1946 higher income was not systematically accompanied by greater happiness” (see p. 118 of Easterlin, 1974). A more recent calculation has been done by Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) using the US General Social Surveys between 1972 and 1998. They note that there is a reasonable amount of stability in the proportion of people giving different well-being scores over this period. Oswald (1997) notes these papers are based on surveys that use repeated (representative) cross-sections of different people and so run the risk of sampling from a population that is changing its composition. In Fig. 3 we deal with this problem by plotting life satisfaction from 1985 to 2000 using individual panel data so that the group of individuals sampled in 1985 are the same ones sampled in 2000. The time series of happiness again remains roughly flat (although this exercise has the advantage of controlling for sample composition, it has the obvious disadvantage of

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24 The 95% interval for the sum of the lagged income coefficients is (−0.20, −0.03) and for the lagged status coefficients is (−0.25, 0.11). We obtain similar results in simulations where happiness data are generated from regressions with the restriction that only current income and status matter. In this case, when we run our unrestricted regression and generate confidence intervals (using 1000 repetitions) no differences are found in the degree of adaptation to income and status (i.e., the lags of both income and status are insignificant).

25 The correlation coefficient between income and status is 0.24. However in a fixed effects regression of income on status, the overall $R^2$ is 0.06, between $R^2 = 0.06$ and within $R^2 = 1e-4$, indicating that most of the changes in income experienced by an individual are not related to changes in their status. This helps to account for why the coefficient on income is almost unchanged once we control for status in Table 1.
introducing the possibility that the flat time series reflects life-time consumption smoothing for the same individuals as they grow older).

In terms of the results in Table 1, since US real GDP per capita increased by 2.83 times between 1946 and 1998, the impact would have been to raise happiness by 0.21 units on the 0–10 scale had no adaptation occurred (i.e., 0.20*\ln(2.83) using the short-run coefficient in column (1)). The standard error of this estimate is 0.02. However we would expect the increase to have been just 0.08 (s.e. = 0.05) after taking account of adaptation (i.e., 0.08*\ln(2.83) using the long-run effect calculated from column (5)). Easterlin (1995) points to the special case of Japan after recovery from World War II where “between 1958 and 1987 real per capita income multiplied by a staggering five-fold” from a base income level “lower than or equal to those prevailing in a considerable number of today’s developing countries”. However over this time period “there was no improvement in mean subjective well-being” (see pp. 38–39). In terms of our results, the impact of the rise in Japanese real per capita income would have been to raise happiness by 0.32 units had no adaptation occurred (i.e., 0.20*\ln(5) using the short-run coefficient in column (1)). The size of the happiness effect reduces to 0.13 (s.e. = 0.10) after taking account of adaptation (i.e., 0.08*\ln(5) using the long-run effect calculated from column (5)). These “back of the envelope” calculations suggest that our estimates of adaptation are sufficiently large so as to be able to explain why no long-run trend in happiness is observable over several decades, even taking some of the more extreme cases actually observed (such as Japan).

4.4. Causality

There is, of course, the possibility that personality traits maybe driving the connection between happiness and income. Our approach to deal with this problem is to use a panel of individuals. Thus, the inclusion of individual fixed effects can deal with the special case of fixed traits, such as ability, preferences, personality or family background. However there is still the possibility of time-varying shocks to happiness that later change an individual’s income. Such shocks are closer to measures of positive affect than to those of overall life satisfaction that we employ in this paper. Lucas et al. (1996) present a series of tests studying different aspects of well-being, including some that demonstrate a low degree of correlation between measures of positive affect and a measure of overall life satisfaction. They concluded that there was ‘moderate to very good evidence’ suggesting that the two constructs measure theoretically different aspects of well-being.

We can also provide one estimate of whether endogeneity due to time-varying shocks to happiness is of sufficient economic magnitude to bias our results. For example, a person may get depressed and start working less, causing them to lose their job and income. To better understand the empirical importance of these effects, we turn momentarily to a sample that includes individuals who suffer an unemployment spell and compare the happiness response to an exogenous economic loss caused by one’s plant closing down with a potentially endogenous one arising from being fired. The 2.7 percent of our sample whose plant was closed experienced a decline in happiness from 7.0 to 6.5 (i.e., 0.5 on average) and the 5.7 percent loss caused by one’s plant closing down with a potentially endogenous one arising from being fired. The 2.7 percent of our sample whose plant was closed experienced a decline in happiness from 7.0 to 6.5 (i.e., 0.5 on average) and the 5.7 percent loss caused by one’s plant closing down with a potentially endogenous one arising from being fired. The 2.7 percent of our sample whose plant was closed experienced a decline in happiness from 7.0 to 6.5 (i.e., 0.5 on average) and the 5.7 percent loss caused by one’s plant closing down with a potentially endogenous one arising from being fired.

5. Further results: (asymmetric) change effects

Another way to illustrate the presence of adaptation is to estimate regressions where changes in income are included. This also helps us to approach loss aversion as an extension of the adaptation tests that are at the core of our study. People may care about changes in income for purely classical reasons as they may be better predictors of future income than current income levels. A more psychological version of the hypothesis that changes matter is focused on an asymmetry: some changes matter more than others. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) posit the idea of loss aversion as ‘an alternative theory of choice . . . in which value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets and in which probabilities are replaced by decision weights. The value function is normally concave for gains, commonly convex for losses, and is generally steeper for losses than for gains’. In other words, the loss aversion hypothesis says that losses (negative changes) matter more than gains (positive changes).

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26 See, for example, Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) for an early study of unemployment with this strategy. An interesting variation on the fixed individual effects strategy has recently been explored in Kohler et al. (2005) in their study of fertility and partnership decisions. Using happiness data on identical (monozygotic) twins, the authors are able to control for unobserved endowments (ranging from preferences and abilities arising in genetic dispositions to family history) that affect both happiness and fertility/marriage decisions.

27 Gardner and Oswald (2007) have argued that we can use windfalls (winning the lottery and receiving an inheritance) as exogenous events. See also Oreopoulos (2003) for a related strategy using school dropout laws.

28 In the 2003 version of this paper we also experimented with plant-closing as an instrument. As only a small percentage of people experience a closing and most of these also experience unemployment spells, a full analysis of adaptation to the income part of such a shock runs into a weak instrument problem. For example, estimation by 2SLS using plant-closing as an instrument for income yields a coefficient on log(Real Income) of 3.28 (s.e. = 1.97). Note that we control for falling unemployed in the second stage, so it is reasonable to assume that all of the effect of our instrument on happiness operates through income.
Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: Happiness</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current level of real income, t</td>
<td>0.13 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.17 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.17 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.13 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.17 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.17 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Income between t−1 and t</td>
<td>0.08 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.08 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Income between t and t+1</td>
<td>0.11 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.11 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.11 (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive changes</td>
<td>0.20 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative changes</td>
<td>−0.05 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results of F-tests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative–positive income change, t to t+1</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob (Negative–positive income change &gt; 0)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² overall</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: [1] Total no. of observations equals 33,273, individuals 5223 and mean years 6.4. OLS regressions include individual and year dummies, and personal controls (see Appendix for full definitions). [2] Income is the log of real household net income. Status is the log of the Treiman Standard International Occupation Prestige Score (on a 1–90 scale). [3] For Δ Income = Δ Income < 0, Positive changes = Δ 1 and Negative changes = Δ 2 whereas for Δ Income > 0 Positive changes = Δ 2 and Negative changes = Δ 1. For Δ Status = Δ Status > 0, Positive changes in Status = Δ Status and Negative changes in Status = 0 whereas for Δ Status < 0, Positive changes in Status = Δ Status whereas 0, Negative changes in Status = 0. [4] Dependent variable is individual responses to the question: “Please answer according to the following scale, 0 means completely dissatisfied and 10 means completely satisfied: How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered?”

5.1. Empirical strategy to study the effect of changes (and loss aversion)

We first estimate regression (1) with the restrictions: α−2 = α−3 = α−4 = β−1 = β0 = β−1 = . . . = β−4 = 0 to capture the rate at which (current) income is changing. This specification allows for happiness to be affected by current and anticipated (future) changes in income:

\[ \text{Happiness}_{it} = (\alpha_0 \log y_{it} + \alpha_1 \Delta_{-1} + \alpha_2 \Delta_{+1}) + \delta x_{it} + f_i + \eta_t + e_{it} \]  

where \( \Delta_{-1} = \log y_{i,t-1} - \log y_{i,t-2} \) and \( \Delta_{+1} = \log y_{i,t+1} - \log y_{i,t} \). We allow for asymmetries between positive and negative changes by relaxing the restriction that their coefficients are equal. For example:

\[ \text{Happiness}_{it} = (\alpha_0 \log y_{it} + \alpha_1 \Delta_{-1} + \alpha_2 \Delta_{+1} + \alpha_2^{\text{pos}} \Delta_{+1} + \alpha_2^{\text{neg}} \Delta_{+1}) + \delta x_{it} + f_i + \eta_t + e_{it} \]  

where \( \Delta_{-1} = \Delta_{+1} = 0 \) for \( \Delta_{+1} > 0 \) (i.e., positive future income changes) and \( \Delta_{+1} = 0 \) and \( \Delta_{-1}^{\text{neg}} = \Delta_{-1}^{\text{pos}} = 0 \) for \( \Delta_{+1} < 0 \) (i.e., negative future income changes). To investigate whether loss aversion is present we compare the sizes of the coefficients on the positive and negative income changes (e.g., by testing \( H_0: \alpha_2^{\text{pos}} = \alpha_2^{\text{neg}} \) versus \( H_1: \alpha_2^{\text{pos}} \neq \alpha_2^{\text{neg}} \)). We would also like to know how important these effects are in terms of income levels. Maybe the role of loss aversion is small and it is reasonable to use a description of preferences that ignores it.

We quantify relative importance by comparing the size of the happiness effect coming from negative income changes, \( \alpha_2^{\text{neg}} \), to the effect coming from the level of income, \( \alpha_0 \). For completeness we consider behavioral effects stemming from asymmetric weightings of gains versus losses of status by replicating the above empirical strategy but substituting income for status (see van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2008, for an alternative approach).29 We also provide estimates across the different sub-groups that we studied in the previous section. That is, we compare asymmetric weightings of gains versus losses of income and status across gender, the two main political groups (left and right) and the employed and self-employed.

5.2. Results

Table 3 presents our results. In column (1) happiness is regressed on the current income level and the past change in income (from \( t-1 \) to \( t \)). The past change enters positively and significantly (at the 5 percent level of significance). Column (2) estimates separate coefficients for past and future changes in income (from \( t-1 \) to \( t \) and \( t \) to \( t+1 \)). The past change loses significance at the 5 percent level whereas the future change in significant at the 1 percent level. We consequently focus on ‘prospective’ (future) changes in income as possibly being the most relevant ones for happiness. Column (3) tests for whether there is an asymmetry between the effect of positive and negative future changes. Controlling for the level of income, people declare themselves less happy when they are undergoing a decline in prospective income but not more happy when they are undergoing an increase in prospective income. We can reject equality of the coefficients on positive and negative prospective changes at the 2 percent level (i.e., \( F(1,28020) = 5.7 \)). The question of why we obtain significant

29 Previous studies purporting to show evidence in favor of loss aversion have typically been based on experiments. However Plott and Zeiler (2005, 2007) argue that these methods may have lead to incorrect conclusions due to subject misconceptions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: Happiness</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>Employment state</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female (1)</td>
<td>Male (2)</td>
<td>Left (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current level of real income, $t$</td>
<td>0.06 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.25 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.29 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta$ Income between $t - 1$ and $t$</td>
<td>0.18 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta$ Income between $t$ and $t + 1$</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.12)</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.10)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive change</td>
<td>0.11 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.27 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.12 (0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative change</td>
<td>0.25 (0.12)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.09)</td>
<td>0.44 (0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current level of status, $t$</td>
<td>0.01 (0.09)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.11 (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta$ Status between $t - 1$ and $t$</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.13)</td>
<td>-0.004 (0.10)</td>
<td>0.26 (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta$ Status between $t$ and $t + 1$</td>
<td>0.28 (0.14)</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.10)</td>
<td>0.33 (0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$ overall</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: [1] Total no. of observations equals 12,666, individuals equals 2244 and mean years equals 5.6 for column (1); 20,607 observations, 2979 individuals and 6.9 years for column (2); 10,313 observations, 2276 individuals and 4.5 years for column (3); 8481 observations, 2037 individuals and 4.2 years for column (4); 30,017 observations, 4902 individuals and 6.1 years for column (5); 3256 observations, 670 individuals and 4.9 years for column (6). OLS regressions include individual and year dummies, and personal controls (see Appendix for full definitions). [2] Income is log of real household net income. Status is log of the Treiman Standard International Occupation Prestige Score (on a 1–90 scale). [3] For $\Delta$ Income $= \Delta^+ > 0$, Positive changes in income $= \Delta^+$ and Negative changes in income $= 0$ whereas for $\Delta^+ < 0$, Positive changes in income $= 0$ and Negative changes in income $= \Delta^-$. For $\Delta$ Status $= \Delta^+ > 0$, Positive changes in status $= \Delta^+$ and Negative changes in status $= 0$ whereas for $\Delta^+ < 0$, Positive changes in status $= 0$ and Negative changes in status $= \Delta^-$. [4] Dependent variable is individual responses to the question: "Please answer according to the following scale, 0 means completely dissatisfied and 10 means completely satisfied: How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered?"

Effects for future (and not past) changes may be answered by reference to Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) original paper that introduced the idea was that people were particularly insecure about taking on risks that exposed them to the "prospect" of (future) losses whereas potential future gains were weighted less. That is, the original theory was framed in the context of insecurity about the future (and not the present).

In terms of the size of loss aversion, the coefficient on Negative changes (from $t$ to $t + 1$) suggests that a person who is on a steady (mean) income of 60,971 DM is expected to report a similar happiness level as a person who is on 64,031 DM but a loss of 2721 DM can be compensated by the individual receiving an annuity of 184 DM. We also test for loss aversion effects with respect to status. Column (4) tests for the importance of past changes in status on happiness (i.e., from $t - 1$ to $t$) and column (5) estimates separate coefficients for past and future changes (i.e., from $t - 1$ to $t$ and from $t$ to $t + 1$). There are no significant effects. Column (6) tests for evidence in favor of an asymmetry existing between positive and negative future changes in status. Again this is for the reason that 'prospective' changes may be the most relevant ones. There is little evidence in favor of this view.

In Table 4 we divide the sample into the same three sub-groups studied earlier in the paper (i.e., gender, left versus right political groups and the employed versus self-employed). The results provide some evidence into the possible channels through which loss aversion may work. For example, whereas men suffer loss aversion to income (at the 1 percent level) there are no significant effects for women. However the impact of a loss of status is reversed across the sexes: women suffer aversion to loss of status (at the 1 percent level) whereas men do not. Leftists’ happiness depends positively on changes in status (controlling for the level) although there is no evidence of asymmetries between gains and losses. For rightists there are no significant effects of status in either levels or changes. We also tested for differences in loss aversion across the poor and rich (where ‘poor’ is defined as the bottom half and ‘rich’ the top half of income earners, respectively). There is evidence of loss aversion to income (though not to status) for the poor (at the 1 percent level) although no evidence of loss aversion for the rich (results on request).

Finally, in the Appendix we present a more flexible approach. So far our results have imposed an assumption that the relation between income and happiness scores has a logarithmic functional form. We now drop this assumption and allow for a more general (non-linear) structure using dummies corresponding to a series of income intervals: 0–20,000 DM (the

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30 This number is the solution to the equation: $0.17 \ln(60,971) = 0.17 \ln(x) - 0.20(\ln(x + 2721) - \ln(x))$. 

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base category); 20–30,000 DM; 30–40,000 DM; 90–100,000 DM and >100,000 DM. We measure income changes with a
dummy equal to 1 if the change is positive (and zero otherwise) and another dummy equal to 1 if the change is negative
(and zero otherwise). Another advantage of using dummies defined over small increments to test for loss aversion is that
this hypothesis refers to local effects. Individual and year effects as well as a set of personal controls are included (to
keep the sample size as large as possible we do not include a status control). In column (1) the coefficients on the income
level dummies increase until income reaches 70–80,000 DM, although the differences between adjacent categories are not
statistically significant. The positive change dummy equals +0.02 (s.e. = 0.01) and the negative change dummy equals −0.07
(s.e. = 0.01). An F-test of their difference indicates that equality can be rejected at the 5 percent level (i.e., F(1,56460) = 4.3).

Column (2) estimates a less restrictive specification by dividing up the (positive and negative) changes into different
size categories: 0–2500 DM (the base change); 2500–5000 DM; 5000–7500 DM; 7500–10,000 DM; 10,000–12,500 DM and
>12,500 DM (similar categories are defined for losses). For positive changes the only significant category occurs for increases
in income that lie between 7500 and 10,000 DM. By comparison all of the negative change categories are significant (relative
to the base of −2500 to 0 DM). The income level that divides the sample into two is approximately 55,000 DM. Inspection
of the coefficients up to this level suggests that the effect of income on happiness is stronger (and monotonic) for the poor
compared to the rich (the difference in the effect of going from 50–60,000 DM to >100,000 DM is less than half of the effect of
going from the lowest to the 20–30,000 DM category). Splitting the sample confirms this and also suggests that the negative
change effects are stronger for the poorer sub-sample.

6. Conclusions

An important question for economists is the extent to which people adapt to changed circumstances. In order to study
aspects of this question we estimate a happiness equation with a distributed lag structure for income and status on individual
panel data on 7812 people living in Germany between 1984 and 2000.

We find strong adaptation to changes in income but not to changes in status in the full sample. The adaptation effects to
income are large in size. Once the long-run effects are estimated (by summing up the current and lagged income coefficients)
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that people adapt totally to income within four years. By comparison, significant effects
of status are found to remain after this time. In the short-run (first year) a one standard deviation increase in status is
associated with a similar rise in happiness as an increase of 52 percent of a standard deviation in income. Using long-run
(five year) average values of these variables, a one standard deviation increase in status is associated with a similar rise
in happiness as an increase of 285 percent of a standard deviation in income. Consequently these estimates (suggesting
adaptation to income but not to status) display precisely the pattern required to explain the Easterlin paradox.

Our strongest results, however, obtain when we estimate adaptation effects across different sub-groups (e.g., partitioning
the sample following gender and ideological lines as well as employment status). We can (cannot) reject the hypothesis of
no-adaptation to income for females (males), left-wingers (right-wingers) and employees (the self-employed). Adaptation
to status is insignificant and the lagged coefficients tend to be positive for females, left-wingers and employees (implying
that the effects may grow over time). We can reject the hypothesis of no long-run effects of status on happiness for these
three sub-groups. The paper also compares relative adaptation (income relative to status) across sub-groups. For example,
we find strong evidence that left-wingers adapt to income but not to status, while right-wingers adapt to status but not
to income. The null hypothesis of equal relative adaptation (of income relative to status) across sub-groups of left and
right-wing individuals can be rejected at the 1 percent level.

Finally we estimate loss aversion effects. We find suggestive (but weaker) evidence for the hypothesis that there is
an asymmetry between gains and losses in income (after controlling for levels) but the size of these effects appear to be
economically small.

Appendix A. Data definitions

Happiness: The individual responses to the question: “In conclusion, we would like to ask you about your satisfaction with
your life in general, please answer according to the following scale, 0 means completely dissatisfied and 10 means completely
satisfied: How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>completely dissatisfied</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>completely satisfied</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Current level of real income: The logarithm of Real Household Post-Government Income from the Cross-National Equivalent
File 1980–2000. This variable represents the combined income after taxes and government transfers of the head, partner,
and other family members. Household post-government income equals the sum of household pre-government income,
household social security income, household annual public transfer income minus net household annual taxes. Household

31 Testing for whether there is evidence in favor of a substantial concavity over relatively small bets has been a focus of the empirical loss-aversion
literature (since we may expect people to be roughly risk-neutral over small changes).
pre-government income consists of household annual gross labour income, household annual asset income, household private transfer income, household private retirement income. See, for example, Bardasi et al. (1999). Since all income variables in the GSOEP are reported as average monthly amounts received, they first had to be annualized by calculating the number of months in each year various types of income are received and multiplying this number by the reported average monthly amount. Next an estimated tax burden for households or individuals was computed by the DIW, using a tax estimation routine similar in method to the one developed by the PSID staff. This tax package produces estimated annual tax burdens for all households in the GSOEP. These annual tax values are combined with the annualized components of income to create the measure of household post-government income.

Status: The Treiman Standard International Occupation Prestige Score (on a 1–90 scale) measured in logarithms. Each individual’s occupation is given an occupational prestige score. These prestige score is based on the rankings of occupations by survey respondents on the basis of goodness, worth, status, and power as summarized, for example, in Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996).

Employment state: A set of dummy variables taking the value 1 depending on the respondent’s employment state: (1) retired; (2) at school; (3) at home; (4) in the military; (5) self-employed; (6) public servant. The base category is employed (in the private sector). These are derived from the answers to the following questions: “We’ve drawn up a type of calendar below. Listed on the left are various employment characteristics that may have applied to you last year. Please go through the various months and check all the months in which you were: . . . in retirement or early retirement . . . in school, at university or ‘Fachschule’, . . . housewife/houseman”. “Which of the following applies best to your status: Full time employed, Part time employed, In occupational/professional education or retraining, marginally employed, Doing your compulsory military service/community service as a substitute; Not employed”. “What position do you have at the moment? If you have more than one job at the moment, please answer the following in reference to your main job: self-employed (including family members). If so are you a: self-employed farmer, self-employed academic, other self-employed persons without or with up to nine employees, other self-employed persons with ten or more employees, family member helping out”. “What position do you have at the moment? If you have more than one job at the moment, please answer the following in reference to your main job: civil servant (including judges and professional soldiers). If so are you: lower level, middle level, upper level, executive level”.

Marital state: A set of dummy variables taking the value 1 depending on whether the respondent got married, divorced, separated or widowed over the course of the past year. The base category is being single. They are determined by the response to the following question: “Has your family situation changed since the beginning of [last] year. Please indicate if any of the following apply to you and if so, when this change occurred: I married; I moved in with my partner; I got divorced; I separated from my spouse/partner; My spouse/partner died; my son or daughter left the household; Had a child; Other”.

Education: A generated variable determined from the following questions: “Now to a completely different topic: education and training. First, what type of school leaving certificate do you possess? Have you (successfully) completed vocational training or studies (at an institution of higher education)? Yes/No. What type of vocational or higher education degree was that? Now to the topic of further education and training. Have you participated in further education in one of the following areas within the past year?”

Hospital: A dummy measuring if you went to hospital last year. It is derived from the question: “And what about stays in hospital in the last year? Were you taken into hospital once or more than once for at least one night last year? No, Yes”.

Number of children: A generated variable that measures the number of children in the household.

Birth of child: A dummy variable measuring whether there was the birth of a child occurring over the past year. It is derived from the following question: “Has your family situation changed since the beginning of [last] year. Please indicate if any of the following apply to you and so, when this change occurred: I married; I moved in with my partner; I got divorced; I separated from my spouse/partner; My spouse/partner died; my son or daughter left the household; Had a child; Other”.

Left-wing/Right-wing: A leftist is classified as a person whose political party identification is Social Democrat, The Social Democratic Party or The Greens. A rightist is classified a person who votes for either The Christian Democrats or The Christian Social Union.

Appendix B. Data sources

B.1. The German Socioeconomic Panel

The GSOEP is the public use version of the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a longitudinal data set begun in 1984. It was developed in a former Special Research Unit at the Universities of Frankfurt/Main and Mannheim in cooperation with the DIW, and initially financed by the German National Research Fund (DFG). In 1990, the DIW assumed control of the panel with funding from the Joint Federal-Land Commission for Promotion of Research Activities. The SOEP began with a sample of 6000 households living in the western states of the Federal Republic of Germany, including a disproportionate number of non-German migrant workers. In November 1990, the eastern states of Germany were reunited with the western states of the Federal Republic of Germany. In June 1990, the DIW began a survey of families in the eastern states and merged these data with the existing SOEP population to provide a representative sample of reunited Germany.
B.2. The Trieman Standard International Occupation Prestige Scale


B.2.1. The International Standard Classification of Occupations

ISCO88 is an internationally comparable classification that pools occupational titles into a hierarchical 4-digit system that can be aggregated to progressively broader groups, representing the different tasks and duties of jobs. It is organized according to two dimensions: skill level and skill specialization. The former refers to the nature of skills required for the job (but not necessarily the way the skills were acquired). Skill specialization is related more to areas such as subject matter, products and services produced or types of equipment used.

B.2.2. Deriving the SIOP Status Scales

Prestige measures are generated from the popular evaluation of occupational standing. They reflect the classical sociological hypothesis that occupational status constitutes the single most important dimension in social interaction. First, occupational titles from national and local prestige studies conducted in 60 countries are matched to ISCO groups. Second, the SIOPS scale is generated by averaging the national prestige scores, appropriately rescaled to a common metric. This scale has been used widely as a prestige scale in international research (Krymkowski, 1991) and has been applied at the national level as well.

B.2.3. Examples

The examples below report Standard International Occupational Prestige Scales (SIOPS) and International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) scores for a selection of occupational titles:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIOPS</th>
<th>ISCO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>1120 SENIOR [NATIONAL] GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS [incl. Minister, Ambassador]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>1110 LEGISLATORS [incl. Member of Parliament, Member of Local Council]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>1200 CORPORATE MANAGERS [LARGE ENTERPRISES]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>9200 AGRICULTURAL, FISHERY, ETC. LABORERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>9300 LABORERS in MINING, CONSTRUCTION, MANUFACT &amp; TRANSPORT [incl. Unskilled]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>9161 Garbage collectors [incl. Dustman]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Testing for asymmetric change effects, using dummies for earnings categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: Happiness</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real income dummies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income 20–30,000 DM</td>
<td>0.20 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.24 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income 30–40,000</td>
<td>0.31 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.35 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income 40–50,000</td>
<td>0.38 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.43 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income 50–60,000</td>
<td>0.48 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.52 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income 60–70,000</td>
<td>0.50 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.54 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income 70–80,000</td>
<td>0.54 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.58 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income 80–90,000</td>
<td>0.53 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.58 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income 90–100,000</td>
<td>0.50 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.55 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income &gt; 100,000 DM</td>
<td>0.58 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.63 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real income change dummies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income change positive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2500 &lt; Δ Income &lt; 5000 DM</td>
<td>0.02 (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5000 &lt; Δ Income &lt; 7500</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.03 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7500 &lt; Δ Income &lt; 10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.02 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000 &lt; Δ Income &lt; 12,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.05 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Income &gt; 12,500 DM</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.05 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income change negative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−2500 &gt; Δ Income &gt; −5000 DM</td>
<td>−0.07 (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−5000 &gt; Δ Income &gt; −7500</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.04 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−7500 &gt; Δ Income &gt; −10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.07 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−10,000 &gt; Δ Income &gt; −12500</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.09 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Income &lt; −12500 DM</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.14 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² overall</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: [1] OLS regressions include individual dummies, year dummies and personal controls. [2] Real income change dummies defined as follows: Income change positive = 1 if Δ’y > 0; Income change negative = 1 if Δ’y < 0 (where Δ’y = Δ Income). The size dummies equal 1 depending on magnitude of the positive changes (e.g., 2500 < Δ’y < 5000, 5000 < Δ’y < 7500) or negative changes (e.g., −2500 > Δ’y > −5000, −5000 > Δ’y > −7500). [3] Sample consists of 64,296 observations, 7812 individuals and 8.2 mean years.
Table A.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>No. of Obs.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std dev</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Happiness</td>
<td>0–10 scale</td>
<td>Total = 64,296</td>
<td>7.15</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-between</td>
<td>n = 7812</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-within</td>
<td>n = 7812</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>13.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Current level of real income</td>
<td>1995 Deutschmarks</td>
<td>Total = 64,296</td>
<td>60,971</td>
<td>31,847</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>639,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-between</td>
<td>n = 7812</td>
<td>30,912</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>520,055</td>
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<tr>
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<td>15,561</td>
<td>–141,325</td>
<td>392,524</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Current level of real income (logs)</td>
<td>log(Real Income)</td>
<td>Total = 64,296</td>
<td>10.89</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>5.01</td>
<td>13.37</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5.25</td>
<td>13.16</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5.61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Current level of status</td>
<td>1–90 scale</td>
<td>Total = 39,365</td>
<td>42.59</td>
<td>12.15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>78</td>
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<tr>
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<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Current level of status (logs)</td>
<td>log(Status)</td>
<td>Total = 39,365</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>4.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-between</td>
<td>n = 5978</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>4.36</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-within</td>
<td>n = 5978</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All variable definitions are contained in Appendix.

References


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References


