Relationships and Negotiations in Context

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Relationships, any form of social tie between parties, have become a common theme in negotiation research. A query in PsychINFO for articles between 1995 and 2005 that included both "negotiation" and "relationships" as keywords resulted in 422 citations. In social psychological studies, friends are compared to strangers (e.g., Halpern, 1994; McGinn & Keros, 2003; Thompson & DeHarpport, 1995), those from the same school are compared to those from different schools (e.g., Thompson, Valley, & Kramer, 1995), and those negotiating face to face are compared to those dealing with nameless, faceless others (e.g., McGinn, Thompson, & Bazerman, 2003; Moore, Kurzberg, Thompson, & Morris, 1999). In sociology, arms-length transactions—those between actors who share little familiarity or affect and no prolonged past or expected future social ties—are differentiated from socially embedded transactions—those facilitated by either direct or indirect social relationships between the actors (Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1974; Uzzi, 1999). Even economists are starting to view social ties between parties in economic transactions as within their purview (Manski, 2000).

The hundreds of studies on relationships and negotiation encompass a broad range of definitions of relationships. The most common approach in social psychological research is to conceptualize and operationalize relationships as dichotomous, for example, friends are compared to strangers. Greenhalgh and Chapman (1998) criticize dichotomous operationalizations of relationships as inadequate tools for exploring fully the effects of relationships on negotiations. To capture the complexities of interpersonal relationships, they created a composite relationship index, comprised of 15 constructs, including scope, common interests, trust and openness/disclosure, aggregating to one overall relationship score. While Greenhalgh and Chapman's multiattribute measure of relationships goes far beyond dichotomous, relationship/no-relationship distinctions, it collapses across types of relationships, and thereby misses the rules that come with the content of the tie, for example, friendship, peer, parent-child.
Research on specific types of relationships suggests that important differences may be found across types. Interactions between people who have previously existing relationships reflect the rules and norms in place for those ongoing relationships (Rusbult & Arriaga, 1997). Negotiations between parents and children, for example, are guided by the social roles of mother, father, and child: Mothers tend to defer when negotiating with their teenage sons, while fathers in similar negotiations are deferred to (Steinberg, 1981). Similarly, the presence of a friendship between the parties imposes guidelines for negotiations: Friends set lower prices when selling to, and are willing to pay higher prices when buying from, friends relative to strangers (Halpern, 1997). Relationships between people who work together within organizations or interact in professional settings reflect tensions between coworker and friend roles, and conflicting expectations for appropriate behavior across these roles (Sias, Krone, & Jablin, 2002). Explicitly restricting the sample to strangers does not eliminate the question of relationships from the research; it simply limits the relationships studied to one type.

No one definition of relationship can capture all of the important research on relationships and negotiation carried out over the past decade. This chapter restricts its purview to positive, ongoing relationships, giving special attention to the social rules occurring within specific types of relationships. This restriction is consistent with the underlying assumptions in most recent studies, but it does exclude a growing body of research focusing on negative relationships (e.g., Labianca, Brass, & Gray, 1998).

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING RELATIONSHIPS IN NEGOTIATIONS

Rather than asking the circumscribed question of how relationships affect negotiated outcomes, this chapter takes a broader perspective, asking how relationships between the parties fit into the larger picture of negotiations in context. One conclusion that is quickly reached from even the most cursory review of the last ten years of negotiation research is that negotiations affect and are affected by (for better and for worse, as this review will go on to discuss) the form and content of the relationship between the parties. To acknowledge this fundamental result, a negotiated order perspective (Strauss, 1978) is offered as an organizing structure for this chapter.

The negotiated order perspective depicts organizations and other social units (such as families or societies) as continuously changing via negotiations, and negotiations as continuously evolving in response to the organization or social unit in which they take place. Viewed through this lens, relationships are shaped by the social and economic context. In turn, relationships influence the occurrence as well as the process and outcome of negotiations, negotiation outcomes alter or reinforce the social and economic context, and the cycle continues (Figure 7.1). In short, relationships shape negotiations, and negotiations shape relationships through the socially driven and situated definition, enactment, and interpretation of social life (Bozon, 1989). Figure 7.1

FIGURE 7.1 Cycle of influence between relationships and negotiations from a negotiated order perspective.

Relationships Influence the Process of Negotiating

The process of negotiating includes all of the verbal and nonverbal actions of and interactions between the involved parties while they search for a mutually agreeable solution. Like other social issues in organizational life, the process of negotiation is not objectively determined and experienced. It rests on the coconstruction that takes place during the interaction (McGinn & Keros, 2003). Relationships affect this coconstruction in a number of ways: through the choice of interaction partner; through attributions and emotions; through shared knowledge structures; through procedural rules and norms; and through coordinated action and information sharing.

Relationships Influence Process Through the Choice of Interaction Partner The first step in any negotiation is choosing the party or parties with whom to try to shape a deal. Deciding whom to bring to the bargaining table can be thought of as a matter of search. A bounded rationality argument would assert that parties attempt to reduce search costs, just as they attempt to reduce other information-processing costs (March & Simon, 1958). Turning to someone with whom ties are already established reduces the cost of search. In situations in which trust is critical to successful negotiations, selecting known others as partners can not only reduce costs but also bring additional benefits (DiMaggio & Louch, 1998; Miller & Rempel, 2004).

Sociologists have long asserted that social ties drive partner choice (Baker, 1984; Granovetter, 1974). Recent empirical work on embeddedness in organizational and market contexts provides evidence of the benefits and costs of limiting partner selection. Embeddedness creates a logic of exchange with close others that saves time, increases joint gains, and enhances adaptation (Uzzi, 1998). But only to a point—beyond that, embeddedness can derail negotiations by insulating parties from critical information available only outside close ties. In the financial sector, Mizruchi and Stearns (2001) found that bankers attempting to close risky deals with corporate customers tended to rely on close, trusted colleagues for advice and support during negotiations (Mizruchi & Stearns, 2001). While this reduced search ensures trust, it comes at a cost, reducing the likelihood that multiple points of view will be conveyed and incorporated into the deal. In a study
of auditor-client interactions, Seabright and colleagues found that positive personal relationships between boundary spanners reduced the likelihood of negotiating a contract with a new auditor, even when there were economic forces suggesting a change could benefit the client (Seabright, Levinthal, & Fichman, 1992).

Restricting search to close ties also occurs in negotiations within consumer markets. DiMaggio and Louch, studying large item negotiations, such as those over houses and cars, found higher satisfaction for deals achieved through within-network ties. They conclude that “consumers use social networks in much the same way as firms use hierarchy” to protect against opportunistic agents (1998, p. 619). But restricting negotiations in markets to trusted others may generate costs, as well as benefits, for the involved parties. Tenbrunsel and her colleagues, in an experimental simulation of markets, found that power and friendship ties interact such that high-power players realize less profit, while low-power players realize more profit, when negotiating with friends than when negotiating with others (Tenbrunsel, Wade-Benzoni, Moag, & Bazerman, 1999).

In some cases, selection of close others as negotiation partners becomes an end in itself, and economic gains from a deal are traded for maintaining or enhancing the relationship. Commitment to one’s partner can lead to a conscious derogation of alternatives (Johnston & Rusult, 1989). But relationship effects on partner selection may also work in the opposite direction. There may be occasions in which negotiators will take steps to avoid bargaining with close friends or colleagues, because doing so could restrict profit-maximization or could be socially uncomfortable. Alternatively, parties may choose to maintain an arm’s length relationship, and not develop the relationship further, when interacting with someone with whom they may have to engage in potentially contentious negotiations in the future. These possibilities, as yet unexplored, deserve investigation in future research.

Relationships Influence Process Through Attritions and Emotions in Negotiations Relationships create emotions that in turn shape negotiations. Barry, Fulmer, and Goates (chapter 6) provide a comprehensive review of the roles emotions play in negotiations. In an earlier paper, Barry and Oliver (1996) argued that positive relationships lead parties to expect more from one another, setting the parties up for negative emotional responses if these expectations are not met. In negotiations involving positive relationships, aspirations reflect heightened importance attached to fair treatment and distribution, though the potential negative consequences of these heightened aspirations may be mitigated by perspective taking (Drolet, Larrick, & Morris, 1998).

People hold positive general images (or illusions, depending on your perspective) of those they are close to (Murray & Holmes, 1996). A generalized positive image of the other provides the canvas on which a negotiator can paint negative conflict behaviors as positive attributes (Miller & Rempel, 2004). What might be viewed as stubborn, obstructionist behavior in a stranger or an enemy, for example, may be seen as a strong commitment to values when there are close ties between the parties. These positive attributions provide a cushion of trust when things go poorly in negotiations, reducing the likelihood of reciprocity of negative behaviors (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994) and increasing the stability of the relationship (Murray & Holmes, 1996). Over four experiments, Dunn and Schweitzer (2005) found that negative emotions do not color trust judgments of close others, while they have measurable deleterious effects on judgments of strangers.

Relationships Influence Process Through Knowledge Structures Parties in close, positive relationships develop and share their own, unique way of interacting with one another and interpreting the social world around them (Berger, 2002). These shared systems of meanings or understandings facilitate agreement on how to make sense of the issues in and surrounding a negotiation between close parties (Fletcher & Fitness, 1996; Wegner, Erber, & Raymond, 1991). In a study revealing the extent of presumed knowledge sharing between friends, Keysar, Carter, and Swanson (2004) presented participants with an assortment of items, including a roll of Scotch tape and an audiotape. With a physical barrier separating the parties so they could not see one another, the focal participant was instructed to place the Scotch tape into a small paper bag and to put the bag back on the table with the other items. The barrier was then removed and either a friend or stranger instructed the focal participant to pick up one item at a time, as written on an index card, eventually getting to “the tape.” If the party giving instructions was a friend rather than a stranger, the participant was significantly more likely to initially reach for the Scotch tape in the bag than to tell the other party “the tape.” The participants naturally and without conscious thought assumed their friends shared the same knowledge that they held. If this same assumption occurs in negotiations between parties with close positive relationships, the parties will negotiate with a shared understanding of what to expect from one another, enhancing coordination and easing interaction (McCrim & Keros, 2003). On the other hand, close parties may fail to communicate differences in preferences, valuations, expectations or interests, and therefore fail to identify opportunities for mutual gain. Taken-for-granted assumptions of what the other knows and wants may limit the amount of exploration of novel approaches and alternatives, restricting outcomes to those fitting the preconceived notions of the parties.

Relationships Influence Process Through Procedural Rules and Norms When the relationship is left unspecified, there is wide variation in how people expect others to behave in a negotiation. O’Connor and Adams (1999) asked a group of undergraduates to “list the typical things that occur when two people negotiate” (p. 137). Thirty-five actions were listed by their respondents, only two of which were named by more than a very small minority—“attempt to compromise” and “reach agreement.” The majority of the actions were listed by only one respondent, indicating a broad and varied range of “typical” negotiation behavior. But within socially embedded negotiations, acceptable behavior is often narrowly prescribed. Social norms or rules develop naturally through repetition, and specify that certain behaviors should occur, while others are off limits (Argyle & Henderson, 1985).
People within relationships act in ways that are consistent with situating role structures (Rusbult & Arriaga, 1997, p. 221). Situated role structures reflect broadly held norms for the relationship type, as well as situated norms for the specific relationship. Relationship categories, such as friend or spouse, are already psychologically represented as prototypes when parties begin a new relationship. Entering into a given type of relationship, for example, becoming friends, implies agreement with the norms accompanying such a relationship. As the tie matures, the parties begin to mold behavior to their unique relationship, adjusting and changing from the original prototype (Reis & Knee, 1996). Through this ongoing process of naming, assimilating, and habituating, mutually understood behavioral norms evolve. These norms result in regularity of one’s own behavior and expectations for the other’s. Mutually held norms for interaction, in turn, promote trust and further enhance the relationship (Olson & Olson, 2000).

Within negotiations, norms and rules for certain relationships result in predictable processes and outcomes. Halpern (1997) asserts that friends have a script for transactions, including being generous and not asking for large portions of the available surplus. Others have also shown consistently generous behavior, such as accommodation (Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, & Slovik, 1991) and willingness to sacrifice (Van Lange & Rusbult, 1995), in mixed-motive interactions between friends.

Relationships Influence Process Through Coordinated Action and Information Sharing A positive relationship between the parties in a negotiation affects not just the specific norms that are in play, but the very presence of coordinated action. McGinn and Keros (2003), comparing negotiation processes between strangers and friends, found that strangers often failed to coordinate on a shared logic of exchange, but such asymmetry was rare between friends. The relational, procedural, and informational acts within a negotiation between friends are coordinated in ways that enhance information sharing and accurate interpretation of information (McGinn & Keros, 2003; Walther, 1995). Through field interviews of bankers, Uzzi (1999) revealed that transactions among socially embedded actors entailed detailed information exchange and joint problem solving, features not present in transactions among actors without network ties.

The benefits of information sharing among related parties in negotiation settings are manifold. Greenhalgh and Chapman (1998) showed experimentally that information sharing rose with the closeness of the relationship between the parties, while coercive behavior fell correspondingly, leading to higher joint gain in close dyads. In an examination of a company’s archival human resources data, Seidel, Polzer, and Stewart (2000) found that increases from initial offers in starting salary negotiations were positively associated with having a friend already working in the organization. African Americans, who were less likely to have within-firm ties, negotiated smaller increases than whites, but the salary differences across racial groups were no longer significant when controlling for social ties. The authors speculate that those without ties to others in the organization had less information about the acceptability of asking for additional compensation and therefore failed to ask for significant increases.

Research has shown that coordination and information sharing is enhanced not only by positive relations between the parties, but also by friendly actions within the negotiation, regardless of prior ties. People are cooperative in response to cooperative acts (Fehr & Gächter, 2000). Even a modicum of social information about the other party increases self-disclosure and enhances rapport (Moore et al., 1999), which sorts into motion the cycle of positive reciprocity. The additional benefits of a prior positive relationship occur through increases in the likelihood of the initial cooperative act and the ensuing prosocial reciprocity.

RELATIONSHIPS INFLUENCE OUTCOMES

As relationships influence the process of negotiations, they inevitably affect outcomes. In addition to the process-mediated effects discussed above, the relationship between the parties also influences agreements through objectives for, utilities for, and interpretations of the outcomes themselves. The value placed on long-term relatedness goals often guides behavior more directly than the desire for maximizing one’s own economic payoffs (Tyler, 1989). Both Rabin (1993) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) provide theoretical arguments suggesting how a prior relationship results in each party placing a positive value on the outcomes of the other. Friendship may also create a positive utility for genial interaction over instrumental outcomes. Friends are willing to sacrifice economic payoffs to reduce the conflict and negative externalities of negotiations (Barry & Oliver, 1996; Halpern, 1994; Polzer, Neale, & Glenn, 1993).

Regardless of the objective payoffs, positive relationships influence parties’ interpretations of those payoffs (Rusbult & Arriaga, 1997). The utility assigned to an outcome is mediated by the attributions the parties make about the process and the agreement, and what these say about the relationship (Tyler, 1999). Long-term, stable relationships elicit “stable, pattern-contingent transformational tendencies” (Rusbult & Arriaga, 1997, p. 241), in the Kelley (1979) sense of transformed payoff matrices. In other words, related parties transform the outcome of a negotiation to reflect not only economic payoffs, but also relational returns, as discussed below. Social scientists, particularly organizational scholars, may want to argue that the objective payoff should be considered primary, but this is akin to arguing that money matters more than happiness, more than relatedness. How many who make this assumption in experimental investigations would take on this preference ordering in their own negotiations?

NEGOTIATIONS INFLUENCE RELATIONSHIPS

The economic payoff to the parties is generally treated as the pertinent outcome variable in negotiation research. But three other dimensions of outcomes increase
in importance as one moves away from experimental research and toward actual negotiations involving parties with past and future ties. The process itself becomes an important product of negotiations, because ethical, efficient processes have long-term relational and reputational benefits and unethical, inefficient processes have parallel costs, independent of the parties' immediate economic payoffs. Similarly, the ease and success in implementing the agreement is a critical outcome variable in negotiations between parties who plan to continue their relationship and negotiate again in the future. Finally, the continuity of, satisfaction with, and intimacy within the relationship itself is fundamental to what most would consider success in negotiations. Salancie (1998) goes so far as citing the establishment and/or maintenance of relationships as the key purpose of business negotiations: "The essence of the deal between the parties is their relationship, not the contract" (p. 5).

The idea that relationships are a key outcome variable is explicit in the Group Values model of conflict resolution (Tyler, 1989). Negotiations can be seen as externalizing the substance and strength of the relationship itself (Burleson, Metts, & Kirch, 2000). The way in which conflict is handled is a defining element of interpersonal relationships, affecting the development, maintenance, and erosion of the ties between the parties (Canary & Messman, 2000; Gottman, 1994). Fair treatment in conflict situations matters most when the respondent values the relationship with the authority. In these situations, treatment matters because the relationship with the other is defined by the interaction (Tyler, 1999). The negotiation sends a status message—the way we interact is a message to me about how much you value me and our relationship (Tyler, 1999).

Under some conditions, negotiations may harm relationships. Greenhalgh and Chapman (1998) found that coercive tactics were negatively associated with relationship continuity. Other research has revealed how disruption of trust in a negotiation may trigger closer scrutiny of the underlying relationship. Bottom and his colleagues, in a series of dilemma exercises, show that relationships are fragile and easily disrupted by competitive moves (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murriithan, 1996). Luckily, they also find that small deeds can reinstate trust when there is a prior relationship between the parties.

NEGOIATION OUTCOMES (INCLUDING RELATIONSHIPS) SHAPE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT

Mutual agreement on a set of payoffs is the end of the story in experimental research, but only one stage in an ongoing cycle of negotiations in organizations, markets, and other social systems. While social psychological research is essentially silent on the dynamic, cyclical nature of negotiations and the social contexts in which they take place, the ongoing evolution of social structure is foundational for anthropologists. More than 20 years ago, in a comparative study across tribes in Africa, Scott (1976) revealed how parties negotiate conflict in ways that reify the existing social structure. When disputes take place between closely tied parties (related, or in the same tribe), the chosen settlements reinforce social integration; when disputes take place between distant parties, settlements emphasize social distance and heighten animosities.

While negotiation outcomes often further solidify the social and economic structure in place prior to the interaction—"them that has, gets"—negotiations have the potential to alter the social and economic order. Buchalter (2003) offers a compelling illustration of this in a study of an elite neighborhood in Philadelphia. The borders of the neighborhood were being "challenged" and had to be negotiated. This negotiation, guided by relational and spatial ties, played out in the day-to-day interactions in the neighborhoods. As a new social agreement was formed, the modified border took on objectivity beyond the social construction. This, in turn, affected the social and economic context, from interpersonal relationships to real estate values.

CHALLENGES AND NEW FRONTIERS FOR STUDYING RELATIONSHIPS IN NEGOTIATIONS

In the years between 1995 and 2005, social psychological research has moved toward studying natural relationships in negotiations, if not toward studying naturally occurring negotiations. And sociologists have increasingly turned to negotiations in organizations and markets as arenas for investigation. The new learning that these forays have garnered, reviewed above, is substantial. But the challenges introduced by considering a negotiated order perspective in negotiation research are also substantial.

To study the multiple and dynamic aspects of relationships and negotiations in a negotiated order requires treating relationships or interactions, rather than the individual negotiators or the negotiation outcomes, as the unit of analysis. This raises the issue of nonindependent data—because of the mutual influence and knowledge processes in negotiation, party A's preferences, behavior, outcomes, and so forth cannot be considered independently of party B's. In economics, interdependence of behavior is responded to by game theory, but even here, underlying interests and preferences are assumed to be unaltered by the interaction. In sociology, network analytic methods have been developed to handle the statistical anomalies arising from interdependence. Social psychologists studying negotiations must also tackle this critical theoretical and empirical issue.

Taking a negotiated order lens to questions at the intersection of negotiations and relationships introduces issues of temporality that are difficult to reconcile with traditional experimental approaches. Long-term relationships are steeped in history that drives processes, understandings, and norms for distribution (Fichman & Levinthal, 1991). The emotions involved in both negotiations and relationships, and the ways in which these emotions affect attributions, vary in form and intensity over the course of a prolonged negotiation. The presence of a relationship, which exists over time across multiple negotiations, allows parties to adjust negotiated outcomes over time if one or both of the parties wish to do so (Sacks, Reichart, & Proffitt, 1999). Actual relationships make possible temporal tradeoffs not observable
in one-shot interactions or cross-sectional studies. If changing emotions alter interpretations, parties add or eliminate issues during the negotiation, and payoffs are adjusted as negotiated agreements are implemented over time, measuring outcomes at the end of a negotiation session, based on stated preferences at the beginning of a negotiation, may lead to erroneous conclusions regarding the positive or negative effects of relationships on negotiated outcomes. Sacks and associates suggest longitudinal studies that explore actual negotiator relationships before and after negotiations.

Even the fundamental constructs of integration and distribution present a conundrum when the negotiation is viewed from the perspective of the larger social order in which parties may have positive, long-term relationships. Because parties with positive, enduring relationships tend to engage in truthful exchange and positive reciprocity, “efficiency questions and questions of distribution are inseparable” (Fehr & Gächter, 2000, p. 171). Field studies by Uzzi (1997, 1999), DiMaggio and Louch (1998), and Mizuuchi and Stearns (2001) have shown that embedded ties facilitate the honest information exchange and problem solving that leads to high joint gains, equitably distributed (allowing for temporal tradeoffs). Even after the deal is made, relationships continue to create value and affect its distribution simultaneously. Shapiro, Sheppard, and Chers inski (1992) assert that trust in business relationships enhances the efficiency of the deal and dealmaking, results in greater flexibility in the implementation of deals, and reduces the need for ongoing monitoring. The accompanying costs and benefits, and how these are distributed, depend on the basis of trust between the parties (Shapiro et al., 1992). Separating the efficiency of deals between embedded parties from the payoff each party achieves simply breaks one factor into two variables.

Another important concern that is brought to the fore when examining negotiation research through a negotiated order lens is the long-standing distinction between disputes and transactions (Gulliver, 1979). Once relationships are in the picture, the likelihood that any negotiation is a pure transaction falls precipitously. Brett and her colleagues (e.g., Brett, Goldberg, & Ury, 1990; Karambaya & Brett, 1989) attend to this distinction, but the bulk of social psychological research on negotiations focuses almost exclusively on transactions, ignoring disputes in general as well as the potential for disputes to erupt during transactions. In pure transactions, the critical outcomes are the parties’ economic payoffs. In disputes, the critical outcomes include relationship continuity, intimacy, self-identity, self-worth, and reputation. Experimental and field methods relying on quantitative measures can easily accommodate payoffs in pure transactions, but the variables of interest in disputes pose challenges to these methods. Kurtzberg and Medvec (1999) cite a number of indirect ways of quantitatively measuring noneconomic effects of negotiations between related parties (e.g., how far apart the parties stand afterwards). Combinations of qualitative and quantitative measures, like those used by Jehn (1997) in her studies of group conflict, may open up opportunities for studying negotiated disputes as well as transactions. In an older study, Morrill (1991) used a combination of ethnographic, social network, and perceptual data to study conflict management among corporate executives, providing a promising methodological example for studying negotiated disputes among related parties.

In the field of close relationship research, theoretical and methodological challenges such as those discussed above are being tackled head-on (see Kashy & Levesque, 2000, for review of quantitative issues in close relationship research; Allen & Walker, 2000, for review of qualitative issues in close relationship research). For example, Kashy and Levesque apply a social relations model (SRM) to an analysis of friendship networks. The SRM allows dyadic variables to be separated into four distinct components: actor effects, partner effects, relationship effects, and group effects. These components have direct applications in negotiation research: The actor effect would measure one party’s consistency in behavior and/or payoffs across multiple negotiation partners; the partner effect would measure the extent to which an actor elicits the same responses from others across negotiations; the relationship effect would measure the degree to which a behavior or outcome is unique to the dyadic negotiation; and the group effect would measure the mean of a variable across all negotiations within a particular group or organization. Turning to qualitative approaches in close relationship research, Allen and Walker describe ways of quantifying qualitative data, for example, taking the transcripts of narratives or interactions and coding them numerically for quality, valence, or frequency, and using these variables in statistical analyses. Recent research on relationships in negotiation has begun to move in this direction, but more work in this vein may allow deeper understanding of relationship issues.

There are many avenues that promise exciting adventures in future explorations of relationships and negotiations. The roads taken are likely to expose more of the underlying processes that precede, make up, and follow bargaining between related parties. Investigations into the critical normative, economic, and historical features of the social and organizational contexts in which negotiations take place are also likely to take a front seat, for these contextual features drive relationships, and negotiations are inexorably altered along the way. What we should be aiming for is not just a deeper understanding of each branch of the highway—relationships, negotiation processes, payoffs, perceptions, and so forth—but a comprehensive map of the negotiated order in the social systems around us.

NOTES

2. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that relationships might in some circumstances cause negotiators to search outside of their personal relationships for negotiation partners.

REFERENCES


