Agents in Negotiations

Toward Testable Propositions

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The chapters in this volume provide a fascinating set of ideas that we expect can vitalize a critical, yet underdeveloped, part of the negotiation literature—the role of agents. Our goal in this chapter is to funnel the wealth of ideas in this volume into a set of testable propositions that can build on and further develop the scientific study of the role of agents in negotiation. We hope that this organization will increase the likelihood that these chapters provide a springboard for research in this critical set of negotiation issues. The first step in our chapter is to quickly review existing empirical work on the effects of agents in negotiation and attempt to place the current work into the literature. After that, our focus turns to a synthesis that presents the ideas in the previous chapters as testable propositions.

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Agents are expensive. They add extra dimensions to the cost of buying and selling real estate. This is especially true when the benefits of doing so are not fully realized. The cost of using an agent is not just monetary; it also involves time and effort. The decision to use an agent is often based on a combination of factors, including the agent’s reputation, experience, and fees. The benefits of using an agent are worth considering, especially when the transaction involves a large sum of money. The use of agent services can save clients time and money, and help them make informed decisions. The use of agent services is not without its drawbacks, however. The cost of hiring an agent, the time and effort required to work with an agent, and the potential for conflicts of interest are all factors to consider. The decision to use an agent should be based on a careful evaluation of the benefits and drawbacks. 

References:

Where do research ideas come from, and how should they be tested?

There are many answers and opinions to these questions. We argue...

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### Table 1: Conceptual Framework

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<th>Conceptual Framework</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Cognitive Processes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Behavioral Responses</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environmental Context</td>
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<td>Situational Conditions</td>
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<td>Personal Attributes</td>
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### Diagram

1. **Diagram 1**: Conceptual Model of Cognitive Load and Performance

2. **Diagram 2**: Flowchart of Experimental Design

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**Notice**: The document includes a page number 209, but the content starts from page 208.
REFERENCES


