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PREFACE
Metaphors
play an important role in business. They simplify a complex world,
help organize facts and intuitions, and allow you to express ideas
in a lively, thought-provoking way. Moreover, metaphors can be great
motivational tools because they are usually easy to understand and
hard to forget. Scott McNealy, the CEO of Sun Microsystems, admits
that he often finds himself "turning to metaphors and analogies,
borrowing images from sports and even war to drive home my business
strategy and motivate the troops." McNealy believes that "the
companies that succeed will be the ones that…employ great metaphors
and analogies to define their business and tell their stories."
This
book is built on two broad metaphors that we hope readers will find
compelling in thinking about the strategic challenges their businesses
face. Our primary metaphor comes from the sport of judo, which originated
in late nineteenth-century Japan. Judo requires quickness, agility,
and the ability to outmaneuver the competition. Most important,
in judo, unlike many martial arts, true strength comes from turning
your opponent’s weight and power to your advantage.
We
picked up on this idea while conducting interviews at Netscape in
the summer of 1997. When we asked Netscape’s head of engineering
how he could ever hope to compete successfully with Microsoft, given
the dominant position of Windows, he gave a very judo-like answer.
"You can either look at Microsoft’s operating system as an
asset," he said, "or you can think of Windows as a liability
that slows Microsoft down." The very fact that Microsoft was
so committed to Windows, he argued, created opportunities for Netscape
to use Microsoft’s strength to its advantage.
As
we reflected on this concept, the judo metaphor became increasingly
compelling as a means for thinking about how companies could overcome
larger rivals. The same skills used by judo masters, we came to
believe, could help businesses become more effective competitors.
We originally wrote about these ideas in Competing on Internet
Time: Lessons from Netscape and Its Battle with Microsoft. But
that project only whetted our interest in further exploring judo’s
potential for competitors both large and small.
Our
first step was to do our homework on judo. In addition to reading
up on the subject, we observed judo classes and competitions, interviewed
judo masters in the United States, and traveled to Japan to speak
with experts on both judo and sumo (our other principal metaphor).
But we must admit that neither of us was willing to take judo (or
sumo) classes. We only wanted to take the metaphor so far!
Next,
we explored the management literature and learned that judo has
long been used as a metaphor in business and academic circles. Many
business executives were in the habit of casually describing their
tactics as "judo" or "jujutsu." And the judo
metaphor had already surfaced among both economists and students
of strategy. Gary Hamel and C.K. Prahalad, for example, made reference
to the sport in their classic Harvard Business Review article
on strategic intent, writing "Competitive innovation is like
judo: upset your rivals by using their size against them."
Yet no one, to our knowledge, had tried to use judo as the basis
for a systematic way of thinking about strategy. Thus, our challenge
became to discover if judo-like techniques were really being used
by managers, and if judo delivered value as a metaphor for developing
and communicating strategy.
We
began by identifying examples of judo-like business behavior in
both the past and the present. Between the spring of 1999 and the
fall of 2000, we interviewed more than fifty executives, many of
them CEOs and company directors, some multiple times. (All unattributed
quotations in this book are drawn from these interviews, which are
listed in the Appendix.) In several cases, we also spoke with executives
at companies competing with firms in our sample. After spending
a couple of days at RealNetworks, for example, we interviewed the
CEO of Microsoft and key managers in Microsoft’s streaming media
business. Similarly, as part of our analysis of CNET, we met with
the CEOs of the company’s biggest rivals, IDG and ZDNet.
In
one important case, we were unable to rely primarily on interviews
for our analysis. What we describe as sumo strategy—making the most
of your strength and power—can be a very sensitive topic for the
very large companies that are most likely to profit from these techniques.
Consequently, we drew heavily on public information and government
documents, as well as selected interviews, in writing this section
of the book. Fortunately, the Department of Justice has created
an extensive online archive of documents filed as part of the case
against Microsoft that began in 1998. These materials were invaluable
in our research.
We
were pleased that numerous managers seemed to use judo strategy,
although like Molière’s Monsieur Jourdan, who didn’t realize
he was speaking prose, they generally did so without using the term.
Some of the companies we studied employed judo techniques with extremely
positive results. Other companies started out looking like success
stories but found it difficult to execute their strategies over
time. This made it possible for us to study why judo techniques
worked and why they sometimes failed. Our results largely confirmed
our hypothesis that judo strategy can help many companies succeed
against stronger players. But it also confirmed our suspicion that
judo strategy is not a universal remedy.
We
don’t try to reveal any corporate secrets in this book. In accordance
with Harvard Business School rules, we promised the executives we
interviewed that they could review their quotes and veto the release
of any proprietary information. The vast majority did not request
any changes in the wording or our usage of their quotes, and in
only one case were we asked to remove confidential information.
A couple of companies inevitably cleaned up their CEOs’ prose, but
we feel comfortable that our research and message have remained
intact.
We
have organized the book in three distinct parts to allow readers
to focus on those elements of judo strategy that interest them most.
The first four chapters of the book systematically apply the judo
metaphor to business strategy. We take the core principles of judo—movement,
balance, and leverage—and explore specific techniques companies
can use to gain an advantage over the competition. Every technique
is supported with examples from real-life companies and managers,
often drawn from the old economy as well as the new.
The
second section of the book details how three companies have put
judo strategy into action. We looked for black belts: judo masters
who were the best practitioners of the art. Our choices were Jeff
Hawkins and Donna Dubinsky from Palm Computing and Handspring; Rob
Glaser from RealNetworks; and Halsey Minor and Shelby Bonnie from
CNET Networks. Palm was part of our research design from the very
first—since David Yoffie had learned about the business from Donna
Dubinsky while their daughters were attending preschool together
in 1995. RealNetworks was not part of our original plan, but after
a couple of meetings with Rob Glaser, we were impressed with his
command of judo-like techniques. Similarly, CNET was not on our
original list, but after our first meeting with Halsey Minor, we
realized that CNET used leverage at nearly every stage of its drive
to success.
Finally,
the last section of the book offers guidance to two groups of readers:
those who want to know how to fight back against judo strategists,
and those who want to learn more about putting judo strategy into
action.
We
have tried to make this discussion accessible and potentially valuable
for all managers—whether you’re part of the old economy or the new,
an established player or the new kid in town. If you too find value
in using metaphors to shape your thinking about strategy, we think
you will enjoy this book.
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EXCERPTS
FROM "CHAPTER 1: JUDO STRATEGY"
"[Judo]
depends for success upon the skill of using an opponent’s own weight
and strength against him, thus enabling a weak or light individual
to overcome a physically superior opponent."
--Columbia
Encyclopedia, 6th edition
A
Tale of Two Companies
In
the spring of 1994, a little-known company called Mosaic Communications
opened its doors in Mountain View, California. Six months later,
the tiny start-up had become Netscape Communications, the hottest
company in the white-hot high technology world. Netscape’s flagship
product, the Navigator Web browser, dominated its market from day
one. Co-founder Marc Andreessen became the first of the cybercelebrities,
showing up in People as well as Time. And in August
1995, a scant sixteen months after its founding, Netscape delivered
the Internet’s first moonshot IPO.
But
Netscape’s star fell nearly as quickly as it had soared. On December
7, 1995—Pearl Harbor Day, as history buffs immediately recalled—Microsoft
unleashed a declaration of war, making Netscape "ground zero,"
in the words of John Doerr, one of Netscape’s original backers and
a member of its board. Under relentless attack, Navigator’s market
share soon began an irreversible decline, while fears about Netscape’s
ability to compete with Microsoft drove its share price into the
ground. By the end of the decade, Microsoft was king of the browser
business, and Netscape survived only as a division of AOL. Moreover,
all across the new economy, being "Netscaped" had become
a four-letter word.
Two
years before Netscape was born, another company set up shop a few
miles up the road in Los Altos, California. After treading water
for a few years, Palm Computing shipped the Pilot, a handheld electronic
organizer, in April 1996. The giants of computing and consumer electronics,
including Apple, Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard, and Sharp, were already
fighting for the category, and any one of them could have crushed
Palm. So the company’s founders, Jeff Hawkins and Donna Dubinsky,
held their breath in the months following the Pilot’s release.
By
the end of 1996, however, it was clear that Palm had created a star.
Like Netscape’s Navigator, the Pilot dominated its market within
a year. But unlike Netscape, Palm went from strength to strength.
Despite Microsoft’s repeated efforts to take over the market, Palm’s
share remained close to 70 percent after four years, and first-day
trading valued the company at $53 billion when Palm went public
in March 2000. Palm was not only alive and kicking, to borrow from
the Apple lexicon, Palm was "insanely great."
An
Introduction to Judo Strategy
Why
did Palm succeed where Netscape failed? What distinguishes challengers
who build successful businesses from those who fall by the wayside,
despite an auspicious start? Which strategies hold the most promise
for companies facing powerful opponents, and which approaches are
most likely to lead to defeat? These are questions that all ambitious
businesses eventually face.
Stories
like those of Netscape and Palm, where a tiny upstart confronts
one of the largest companies in the world, throw the challenge of
competing with stronger opponents into stark relief. However, even
large corporations may find themselves in similar situations if
they expand beyond their base. The strongest, battle-hardened competitor
can be at a severe disadvantage when trying to enter into a market
where a powerful incumbent holds sway.
So
what strategy is most likely to succeed when strength or size is
not on your side? Whether you're large or small, the answer is not
to oppose strength with strength, as Netscape ultimately chose to
do. Instead, study the competition carefully, avoid head-to-head
battles, as Palm did, and use your opponents' strength to your advantage.
This is the lesson at the heart of judo strategy.
…
The
Origins of Judo Strategy
The
roots of judo strategy lie in "judo economics," a term
coined by economists Judith Gelman and Steven Salop to describe
a simple strategy for entering a market dominated by a large opponent.
Like most journal articles, their paper is strewn with assumptions,
diagrams, and math. But behind the equations lies a simple idea:
If you mount a full-scale attack on a stronger incumbent, your opponent
will fight back—say, by slashing prices—and almost certainly win.
However, you can avoid this outcome by pledging to be satisfied
with a small slice of the market. In this case, self-interest will
lead the incumbent to accommodate entry, rather than launch a price
war that would spoil the market as a whole. Gelman and Salop called
this entry strategy "judo economics" because it shows
how a small company can use a larger opponent’s size to its own
advantage. By reducing the threat that it poses, the attacker induces
the incumbent to tolerate its presence, rather than fight back.
JUDO
ECONOMICS—A SIMPLE EXAMPLE
The
basic model makes a few important assumptions: the incumbent faces
a single challenger, the challenger has no cost advantage, and the
incumbent must charge all customers the same price (i.e., price
discrimination is impossible). Based on these assumptions, the logic
works like this: Assume that the incumbent supplies ten customers
with widgets for $50. If you offer to supply the entire market at
$40, the incumbent will be forced to match your price or lose all
of its sales. By contrast, if you only have enough capacity to sell
to one customer, the incumbent will find it more profitable to accommodate
your entry by sticking to his original price and selling to the
remaining nine.
The
idea behind judo economics—turning your opponent’s size into a disadvantage—has
a lot of intuitive appeal. But judo economics has important limitations
as well. First, it is very difficult to implement. It’s one thing
to say that you won’t threaten bigger competitors. It’s quite another
to convince them that you mean what you say. Moreover, judo economics
looks far less promising once the assumptions behind the original
model are relaxed. If, for example, the incumbent faces not just
one entrant, but a long line of potential challengers, he’s much
more likely to fight anyone who steps into the ring. In this way,
he can establish a reputation for toughness and deter other players
from taking him on. But the greatest weakness of judo economics
is that it sets its sights too low. Judo economics may allow you
to survive, but only at the cost of staying small. For most managers
and companies, this is not enough. You don’t want to skulk around
the sidelines; you want to get out there and win.
Winning,
of course, can take different forms, depending on the competitive
dynamics of your business. If you’re in a winner-take-all industry,
winning means ending up on top. If your sector can support several
strong players, it means becoming one of the Big Three. In tougher
environments, winning may take a more limited form: building a profitable
business in a market where the vast majority of challengers fail.
In this last case, judo economics may be of some help, but should
your ambitions range higher, it has little to say.
Judo
strategy picks up where judo economics leaves off by providing a
set of tools that allow you to do more than just survive--they show
you how to thrive and grow. The goal of judo strategy is not just
to gain a toehold in a market. It is to establish a growing and
ultimately profitable position. Management sage Peter Drucker describes
a concept he calls "entrepreneurial judo" in similar terms.
"Entrepreneurial judo aims first at securing a beachhead, and
one which the established leaders either do not defend at all or
defend only halfheartedly," he writes. "Once that beachhead
has been secured, that is, once the newcomers have an adequate market
and an adequate revenue stream, they then move on to the rest of
the ‘beach’ and finally to the whole ‘island.’"
Drucker
identifies the critical problem: How can you move beyond your beachhead
once competitors have been alerted to your attack? Judo strategy
provides the mind-set and the techniques that make it possible to
defeat larger and stronger opponents. Moving beyond judo economics,
judo strategy goes back to the original source for inspiration--back
to principles that judo masters have been teaching for more than
a hundred years.
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