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Jews Will Be Jews: A Scientific Racism for the 21st Century

Introduction

Kevin MacDonald, a member of the Department of Psychology at California State University-Long Beach, is a widely published researcher whose professional reputation through the mid-1990's was based largely on his work on issues of parenting and developmental psychology. He is also the author of a three-volume study of Jews, Judaism and antisemitism observed from the disciplinary perspective of evolutionary psychology.¹ Evolutionary psychologists study how human learning structures and behavior patterns have been conditioned by survival and reproduction pressures exerted upon our ancestors in prehistoric environments. For MacDonald, this disciplinary perspective provides a platform for the elaboration of his theory that Judaism ought properly to be understood not as a religion but as a group evolutionary strategy, designed to maximize the ability of Jews to compete against other ethnic groups for resources and reproductive success.

In *A People That Shall Dwell Alone* (1994), MacDonald argues that for roughly the last two thousand years Jews have been engaged in a sustained eugenics program, breeding for a Jewish population high in a set of genetically influenced psychological predispositions and other attributes, such as high "verbal I.Q.," that will enhance their ability to compete against non-Jewish groups. *Separation and Its Discontents* (1998) offers MacDonald's theory of antisemitism, in his view an essentially reactive phenomenon triggered by Jewish group competition. Unless prevented by exceptionally severe restrictions on their activities, Jews engage in their competitive strategy by attempting to establish "economic and cultural domination" over other groups. Major manifestations of antisemitism in Western history, including fourth-century "corporate Catholicism," the Inquisition, and National Socialism all emerged in response to extended periods of Jewish domination or exploitation of non-Jews. These movements typically take the shape of "mirror images" of Judaism, as non-Jews adopt the group-serving and racist assumptions Jews practice against them. The more they abandon the "universalistic, assimilatory tendencies" of western cultures in their natural state, the more closely do they resemble Judaism. In *Culture of Critique* (1998) MacDonald employs his theory as an explanatory model, assessing a variety of historical movements as efforts to facilitate or establish Jewish domination over non-Jewish populations. So the American school of anthropology founded by Franz Boas sought to render evolutionary explanations of human variation illegitimate, thus limiting the possibility that non-Jews would develop the perspective needed accurately to perceive and defend against the Jewish group evolutionary strategy. The Frankfurt School of socio-cultural critique led by Theodor Adorno sought to stigmatize antisemitism as a pathological condition, and

¹ Kevin MacDonald, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone: A People That Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism as a Group Evolutionary Strategy*, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994); Kevin MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents: Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism*, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998); Kevin MacDonald, *Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements*, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998). All three volumes have since been printed in paperback second editions with American vanity presses.

Freudian psychoanalysis sought to stigmatize Western culture itself as a pathological condition. In the same vein, MacDonald portrays world communism as a protracted exercise in ethnic warfare conducted by Jews against the peoples of Eastern Europe. In the United States, Jews use their positions of cultural dominance to prevent “gentile European Americans” from recognizing and defending their own ethnic group interests. By advancing both the ideology of radical individualism and the ideology of multiculturalism, by manipulating immigration policy to create an ethnically diverse American population, and by exploiting the right to free expression in order to promote a debased, hyper-sexualized, “essentially Jewish”² cultural climate, Jews force upon “European-Americans” a debilitating environment designed to frustrate their attempts to cohere and develop an effective counter-strategy.

MacDonald summarizes his view of Judaism by mapping its manifestations of what he calls “the five independent dimensions of human group evolutionary strategies” as follows:

(1) Judaism is a self-imposed, non-coerced evolutionary strategy, although at times anti-Semitic actions have had effects that dovetailed with Judaism as an evolutionary strategy; (2) Judaism is a fairly closed group strategy in which much effort has been devoted to resisting genetic assimilation with surrounding populations, and, moreover, this effort has been substantially successful; (3) Jews have typically engaged in resource and reproductive competition with gentile societies, often successfully; (4) there is a significant (but limited) degree of within-group altruism, traditionally enforced by powerful social controls and always enshrined in religious ideology; and (5) there is a significant degree of role specialization, specifically specialization for a role in society above the level of primary producer characterized by cultural and eugenic practices centered around intelligence, the personality trait of conscientiousness, high-investment parenting, and group allegiance.³

Jews are said to have been practicing this evolutionary strategy for roughly the last two thousand years. A principal effect of the strategy, corresponding to the second of MacDonald’s five dimensions, has been the Jews’ genetic segregation from other human groups.

[A]lthough there is some genetic admixture with surrounding populations as well as some natural selection toward frequencies of local populations, all Jewish populations have a significant degree of segregation from native populations and a significant degree of commonality with other Jewish groups derived from widely separated parts of the world.⁴

Now MacDonald initially implies that his theory does not view Jews as essentially different from the rest of humanity: “Judaism must be understood as exhibiting universal human tendencies for self-interest, ethnocentrism, and competition for resources and reproductive success.”⁵ It is not long, however, before he substantially qualifies the claim that Jewish behavior exhibits “universal human tendencies,” and this is where things begin to get interesting. For MacDonald, persistent Jewish genetic difference is not simply a measurable result of the Jewish group evolutionary strategy; Jewish genetic difference is itself a cause of the Jewish group evolutionary strategy.

² MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, 325.

³ MacDonald, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone*, 19.

⁴ MacDonald, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone*, 27.

⁵ MacDonald, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone*, 1.

I suggest that the ancient Israelites were genetically predisposed to be high on a cluster of psychological traits centering around group allegiance, cultural separatism, ethnocentrism, concern with endogamy, and a collectivist, authoritarian social structure. Evidence ... indicates that these tendencies are very strong among widely dispersed Jewish groups in traditional societies and that they appear to be more common among other Near Eastern peoples compared to prototypical Western societies. Further, it is suggested that Judaism itself resulted in a “feed-forward” selection process in which Jewish groups become increasingly composed of individuals who are genetically and phenotypically predisposed to these traits.⁶

So—Jews are just like everybody else, with the single notable exception that Jews are not like anybody else. Jewish brains are *different*. Their distinctive constellation of genetic predispositions drives Jews to engage in their competitive evolutionary strategy, making them a chronic threat to any other group in contact with them. This argument achieves a truly stunning rhetorical effect, simultaneously encouraging two conclusions that ought to be mutually exclusive: 1) that Jewish behavioral difference is strongly influenced by Jewish biological difference and is thus irremediable in practice if not in principle, and 2) that Jewish biological difference results from the Jews’ own choices and is thus a shared moral responsibility of the group as a whole.

Consider MacDonald’s odd description of the Jewish evolutionary strategy as “self-imposed.” Over the course of nearly two millennia of “feed-forward” breeding practices, Jews as a group have become increasingly marked by their distinctive genetic predispositions toward cultural separatism, ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, concern with endogamy, etc. In other words, with each generation Jewish genes play an ever stronger role in driving the Jewish evolutionary strategy. How, then, does it make sense to describe behavioral patterns so powerfully informed by one’s genetic inheritance as “self-imposed”? The answer, of course, is that it makes no sense at all; as a Jew, I can no more “impose” genetic predispositions on myself than I can help acting on them, *including the predisposition to enhance them in my own children*. As a logical claim the notion that an evolutionary strategy can be “self-imposed” is quite empty. It functions not as scientific argument but as a rhetorical device, a flourish so drained of meaning as to be indistinguishable from propaganda: Today’s designer Jews—just what their ancestors ordered.

A key point to keep in mind during our engagement with MacDonald’s thought is that his trilogy is actually the story of not one but two peoples. In the foreground, of course, are the Jews, busily forging ever more Jewish Jews with each passing generation. In the background, however, is another, no less distinctive ethnic group, one shaped by naturally occurring evolutionary processes rather than engineered by a centuries-long managed breeding program. Where Jews are mistrustful, ethnocentric collectivists, members of this group are naturally welcoming, tolerant individualists. Where Jews are drawn to authoritarian political and social structures, members of this group naturally form into hierarchically harmonious, mildly meritocratic, politically moderate societies. Where Jews are prone to trumpet their supposed ingrained moral superiority as a cover for the machinations of their evolutionary strategy, the biological predispositions of this

⁶ MacDonald, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone*, 8.

other group naturally lead its members to a worldview and to structures of social organization that are not only “profoundly ethical,” but are uniquely so.⁷ Where Jews are “relatively prone to self-deception,” and are thus inclined to repress unpleasant truths about themselves and their ingroup, members of this other group presumably have relatively greater resistance to such self-deceptions and thus enjoy a more accurate self-awareness. I am confident I will surprise no one when I reveal that this exceptional people is, of course, Kevin MacDonald’s own. He and his ethnic kin come by their proclivities toward individualism and its uniquely ethical cultural expression quite naturally, as an adaptive result of their ancestors’ extended sojourn battling the harsh conditions of Ice Age Europe some forty-thousand years ago.⁸ The fundamental incompatibility between Jews and the ethnic group he describes as “Europeans,” “gentile Europeans,” or, less frequently but more specifically, “Northwest Europeans,” is a key theme of MacDonald’s trilogy; by the end of the third volume, he is issuing urgent warnings of the imminent, cataclysmic collapse of Western civilization as the surest consequence of this incompatibility—unless, of course, drastic measures are taken immediately to reverse the pernicious effects of Jewish influence and the “maladaptive” environment it has fostered.

MacDonald’s work on Jews did not immediately strike many readers as problematic. In 1995, the year after he published *A People That Shall Dwell Alone*, California State University-Long Beach honored MacDonald with its Distinguished Faculty Scholarly and Creative Achievement Award.⁹ To the extent that charges of antisemitism or xenophobia emerged in early discussions of his theory, such charges tended to be directed at his reviewers rather than at MacDonald himself.¹⁰ It was largely after the publication of the final volumes of his trilogy in 1998 that his work began to be assessed as itself an expression of antisemitism. Initially he insisted, as he had in the preface to *A People That Shall Dwell Alone*,¹¹ that there was nothing in the least antisemitic about himself or his books; he was simply a disinterested scientist, forthrightly pursuing the thread of his research wherever it lead. Over time this became an increasingly difficult claim to promote. In January 2000, MacDonald appeared as the only witness to testify voluntarily on David Irving’s behalf during the latter’s disastrous libel suit against Deborah Lipstadt and Penguin Books. Since then, MacDonald has been an active contributor to *The Occidental Quarterly*, an emanation of the ‘intellectual wing’ (such as it is) of the

⁷ For MacDonald’s summary of the biological causes and sociological effects attendant upon the differences between Jewish collectivism and European individualism, see *A People That Shall Dwell Alone*, 228-245. For the claim that naturally occurring Western social structures are profoundly and uniquely ethical, see *The Culture of Critique*, 318.

⁸ MacDonald, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone*, 237. Appeals to climatological conditions as the basis for self-congratulating accounts of European exceptionalism have a long tradition, stretching back at least as far as the eighteenth-century philosopher and theologian Johann Gottfried Herder. MacDonald takes his Ice-Age variant on the tale from the speculations of the German eugenicist Fritz Lenz, whose career reached its apex when he signed on with the Nazis’ ideology and propaganda apparatus.

⁹ “Distinguished Faculty Scholarly and Creative Achievement Awards,” California State University-Long Beach, [cited 17 September 2005], Available from World Wide Web: (http://www.csulb.edu/divisions/aa/grad_undergrad/senate/awards/cnfa/dfsca/past/).

¹⁰ In particular, a 1994 review by John Hartung in *Ethology and Sociobiology* achieved a certain level of notoriety. The editors of *Patterns of Prejudice* were somewhat embarrassed by their decision to publish a mildly approving review of *A People That Shall Dwell Alone* by Richard Lynn, only to learn later of Lynn’s own reputation as a promulgator of racist doctrines.

¹¹ MacDonald, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone*, vii.

American white separatism movement, and in 2004 he was rewarded for his efforts with a prize of ten thousand dollars from fellow believers, underwritten in part by anonymous donors. In his address in acceptance of this award he urged upon his audience the need “to make extreme sacrifices for our ethnic group,” or else face the consequences of “an historical mistake of catastrophic proportions.”¹²

His increasingly open political engagement has become so profoundly incompatible with the posture of the disinterested researcher that MacDonald has now significantly revised his own back story. Rather than flatly deny charges of antisemitism, he evades them with the almost irrelevant riposte that he in fact admires the Jewish strategy and hopes to instill in ethnic Europeans a similar commitment to ethnic ‘self’ preservation. If in his more recent publications and pronouncements he has occasionally drifted from the clinical dispassion appropriate to the professional research psychologist, it is only owing to the alarming, inescapable conclusions to which his research has brought him. The extremity of his politics, already on display in the third volume of his trilogy, is warranted by the unimpeachable integrity of his scholarship.

The obvious question to ask, then, is: just how solid is the foundation of MacDonald’s theory? MacDonald himself points to the crux of the matter. “There is reason to believe,” he declares, “that there is a genetic basis for [the Jews’] powerful tendency toward collectivism,” that Jewish genetic difference numbers among “the extremely powerful centripetal forces that have resulted in an intense commitment to the group throughout Jewish history. It is this intense commitment, more than anything else, which is the *sine qua non* of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy.”¹³ Moreover, he guides us directly to the literature that provides the theoretical basis upon which he rests his “*sine qua non*.”

I believe that the area of psychological research most relevant to conceptualizing Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy is that of research on individualism/collectivism (see Triandis 1990, 1991 for reviews).¹⁴

His theory thus depends crucially on his demonstration that Jews have a strong tendency to develop highly collectivist groups, showing extraordinarily high degrees of bias toward the ingroup and extraordinarily high degrees of hostility toward outgroups, a tendency so pronounced MacDonald habitually describes it as Jewish “hyper-collectivism.” The bulk of my discussion will interrogate MacDonald’s scholarship, in its putatively pristine, pre-political state, on a single point: how does consultation of “the area of psychological research most relevant to conceptualizing Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy” reflect on his notion of Jewish “hyper-collectivism”?

¹² Kevin MacDonald, “Can the Jewish Model Help the West Survive?” [cited 17 September 2005]. Available from the World Wide Web: (<http://theoccidentalquarterly.com/jllp1/jllp-km.html>).

¹³ MacDonald, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone*, 257.

¹⁴ MacDonald, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone*, 258. MacDonald’s citations: Harry Triandis, “Cross-cultural Studies of Individualism and Collectivism,” *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 1989: Cross Cultural Perspectives* 1990: 41-133; Harry Triandis, “Cross-cultural Differences in Assertiveness/Competition vs. Group Loyalty/Cohesiveness,” in *Cooperation and Prosocial Behavior*, R.A. Hinde & J. Groebel, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

The Researchers on Individualism, Collectivism and the Jews

To my knowledge, MacDonald has participated in no first-hand psychological studies involving Jews, and is therefore entirely dependent on research published by others to support his theory. His laboratory, then, is the library; if his work is to approximate the rigor of scientific research, he ought to be seeking out opportunities to test his hypotheses, to subject his theory's claims to scrutiny by evaluating them against potential disproof. In other words, we would expect MacDonald to confront the network of suggestions, suppositions and speculations that informs his notion of genetically-driven Jewish "hyper-collectivism" with published research that challenges those claims, precisely in order to show that his theory withstands such challenges.

Within the social sciences literature there is a well-developed body of work studying general tendencies toward individualism or collectivism across various cultures. Harry Triandis, Professor Emeritus of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, is a senior figure in this field. MacDonald is not shy about enlisting Triandis's support for his theory. He devotes several pages in *A People That Shall Dwell Alone* to a survey of Jewish behavior over the course of many centuries in different regions of the world, offering examples that range from the bare survival of isolated Jewish communities under unfavorable conditions to episodes of intense Jewish religious fanaticism. He then concludes:

In summary, the data indicate that Judaism can be characterized as a collectivist (or even "hyper-collectivist") culture in Triandis's (1990, 1991) terms. In accounting for this tendency, I suggest that the ancient Israelites were genetically predisposed to be high on a cluster of traits centered around group allegiance, separatism, ethnocentrism, and collectivism.¹⁵

Let me start with this quibble: the expression "hyper-collectivist" is not, in fact, one of "Triandis's terms." As far as I can tell, it is MacDonald's own coinage, and although he applies it to Jews many times in the course of his trilogy, he never bothers explicitly to define it, much less to explain how it fits with the body of research from which it is purportedly derived. At a minimum one would expect him to offer up an example of your average, everyday, run-of-the-mill collectivist culture, along with a demonstration of the differences from such 'ordinary collectivism' that amount to Jewish "hyper-collectivism." In the absence of either a clear definition of the term or a useful counter-model, the expression operates as a comparison without a comparator, which is to say it is yet another example of empty rhetoric masquerading as scientific discourse.

MacDonald seems to think it quite impressive to invoke Triandis's authority in support of his theory. Triandis is, after all, a leading scholar in what MacDonald asserts is "the area of psychological research most relevant to conceptualizing Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy,"¹⁶ and, indeed, he draws attention to his agreement with Triandis on Jewish collectivism several times.

¹⁵ MacDonald, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone*, 236. In this discussion, as in MacDonald's texts, the term "hyper-collectivism," and its variants are always insulated in scare quotes. I do this to indicate my skepticism that the term has any real meaning apart from its value as a scientific-sounding term of abuse. I must leave explanation of MacDonald's typographical practice to the reader's imagination.

¹⁶ MacDonald, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone*, 228.

Collectivist cultures (and Triandis [1990, 57] explicitly includes Judaism in this category) place a much greater emphasis on the goals and needs of the ingroup than on individual rights and interests.¹⁷

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As indicated above, Triandis regards Jews as a collectivist culture[sic], and I would agree.¹⁹

In summary, the data indicate that Judaism can be characterized as a collectivist (or even “hyper-collectivist”) culture in Triandis’s (1990, 1991) terms. In accounting for this tendency, I suggest that the ancient Israelites were genetically predisposed to be high on a cluster of traits centered around group allegiance, separatism, ethnocentrism, and collectivism.²⁰

It is of interest that there is some agreement that the Near Eastern peoples have a more ingrained sense of ethnocentrism than has been characteristic of the vast majority of Western societies [MacDonald’s endnote number 16]. The contrast between Eastern and Western cultures is central to Triandis’ (1990, 43-44) work on cross cultural variation on individualism and collectivism. Triandis includes both Arabs and Jews as exemplars of collectivist cultures in contrast to Western individualist cultures.²¹

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There is little doubt that Jews tend toward the extreme end of the collectivism dimension, and Triandis (1990, 57) regards Judaism as a collectivist culture.²³

Triandis explicitly describes Judaism as an example of a collectivist culture, while Western cultures tend toward individualism.²⁴

Another quibble: if it is disingenuous of MacDonald to imply that the notion of “hyper-collectivism” is somehow endorsed by Triandis, it is considerably more problematic for him to imply, as we see him doing in the fifth excerpt above, that Triandis would accept genetic difference (that is, an “ingrained sense of ethnocentrism”) as an explanation for variation along the individualism/collectivism spectrum among cultures. In the very document MacDonald repeatedly cites, Triandis exclusively emphasizes environmental factors to explain such cultural differences;²⁵ if he is going to invoke Triandis’s name in such close proximity to claims for inherent difference, I would argue that intellectual honesty requires MacDonald explicitly to acknowledge as much. The reader enterprising

¹⁷ MacDonald, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone*, 141.

¹⁸ MacDonald, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone*, 228.

¹⁹ MacDonald, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone*, 229.

²⁰ MacDonald, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone*, 236.

²¹ MacDonald, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone*, 238.

²² MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, 167.

²³ MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents*, 18.

²⁴ Kevin MacDonald, Address to the Human Behavior and Evolution Society Symposium, Amherst, Mass., 2000; [cited 25 September 2005], available from the World Wide Web: (<http://www.csulb.edu/~kmacd/newtimes-Amherst.html>).

²⁵ Harry Triandis, “Cross-cultural Studies of Individualism and Collectivism,” 71-72.

enough to consult MacDonald's endnote will find that the only author he cites to illustrate his claim that there is "some agreement" about the "more ingrained sense of ethnocentrism" among Near Eastern peoples is the nineteenth-century French racial theorist Comte Arthur de Gobineau; MacDonald's dodgy implication of support from Triandis to the side, the only "agreement" anywhere within view is that of MacDonald with de Gobineau.²⁶

Finding him investing such significance in having Triandis's support and giving such weight to a single passage in Triandis's work (i.e., "Triandis [1990, 57]"), we would expect on tracing MacDonald's citation to discover Triandis engaged in a substantive discussion of the evidence for Jewish collectivism. The paper MacDonald cites is a survey of the literature, a summary of a great many discussions of individualism and collectivism in disparate cultures. Here, in its entirety, is the passage MacDonald repeatedly invokes as evidence for his claim that "Triandis regards Jews as a collectivist culture."

Collectivist patterns can be seen in many other studies such as of the Chinese (Yang, 1986), Japanese (Lebra, 1976), and so on. Patterns of collectivism can be seen in a wide literature, such as Guthrie (1961) and Church (1987) on the Philippines; Kaiser (1984) on the USSR; Doumanis (1983), Katakis (1984), Georgas (1986, 1989), and Triandis and Vassiliou (1972) on Greece; Northrop (1949) on the Navaho; Strodbeck (1958) on Italians **and Jews**; Tallman, Marotz-Baden, and Pindas (1983), and Swartz (1975), and Diaz-Guerrero (1979) on Latin Americans; Sinha (1982) on Indians; Holzberg (1981) on Africans; and Geertz (1963) on Bali, while individualism has been discussed by Bellah et al. (1985), Kerlinger (1984), and Triandis et al. (1985) for the United States.²⁷ [emphasis added]

That, quite literally, is all there is. MacDonald's repeated claims of support from Triandis for the notion that "Jews are a collectivist (or even 'hyper-collectivist') culture" are based entirely on this tick-in-a-list citation of a single study conducted some thirty-six years earlier and, frankly, this is as deep into any actual psychological research on individualism and collectivism involving Jews as MacDonald goes. So the plot thickens: what is the relevance of *this* source, Strodbeck 1958, to the notion of Jewish "hyper-collectivism" and the theory of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy?

Fred Strodbeck's 1958 study, entitled "Family Interaction, Values, and Achievement,"²⁸ addresses the contrasting experiences of the descendants of two turn-of-the-century immigrant communities in the United States. One of these, the Jews from eastern Europe, achieved significant material success within the span of two or three generations. By contrast, according to Strodbeck, immigrants from southern Italy were initially less prosperous. Now for MacDonald, Jewish success in the U.S. results from the Jews' exploitation of a classically liberal political and economic structure that is poorly equipped to defend against their group-based competition; it is evidence of the fundamental incompatibility of Western culture with Judaism. Strodbeck makes quite a

²⁶ MacDonald, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone*, 260.

²⁷ Triandis, "Cross-cultural Studies of Individualism and Collectivism," 56-57. I have not assembled a bibliography of the other studies Triandis lists here.

²⁸ Fred L. Strodbeck, "Family Interaction, Values, and Achievement," in *Talent and Society*, David C. McClelland, Alfred L. Baldwin, Urie Bronfenbrenner, and Fred L. Strodbeck, eds. (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1958).

different case, one that helps to put MacDonald's implicitly comparative notion of Jewish "hyper-collectivism" into an explicitly comparative context. While Strodtbeck's broad descriptions of the traditional Jewish culture of eastern Europe are largely congruent with (if considerably less hostile than) MacDonald's (they rely on some of the same sources), Strodtbeck's side-by-side comparison of Jewish culture with the traditional culture of southern Italy marks off boundaries of similarity and difference that are utterly irreconcilable with those MacDonald draws. According to Strodtbeck, Jewish immigrants and their children outperformed their Italian counterparts in large part because the "old Jewish culture" and the "Protestant work-ethic" that defined American culture resembled each other more closely than either of them resembled the family-focused "old culture" of southern Italy. This similarity operates even at the level of ingroup altruism, those behaviors which MacDonald adduces as evidence of Jewish ethnocentrism but which Strodtbeck finds to have an analog in Americans' "recognition of the interdependencies of modern society," a notion descended from the Calvinist doctrine "that 'each man is his brother's keeper.'"²⁹

In short, Strodtbeck's thesis is quite opposed to MacDonald's. Yet Triandis's citation of Strodtbeck is the only evidence MacDonald ever offers that Triandis places Jews in the 'collectivist category.' Strodtbeck does not appear in MacDonald's bibliographies, so I have no way of knowing whether MacDonald traced the citation to its source. If he did, then I would argue that even at second-hand it is deeply dishonest of MacDonald to cite Strodtbeck as evidence for his own agreement with Triandis on Jewish collectivism. If, on the other hand, MacDonald repeatedly cites Triandis's reference to Strodtbeck without actually knowing what he was citing, the implications for the quality of his scholarship ought to be obvious.

Although we would have no way of learning this from MacDonald, Triandis's 1990 survey also takes note of two other studies on the relative strength of collectivism and individualism in Jewish cultures. The first of these studies finds that divorce rates are climbing with successive generations of American Jews. Observing that the authors of a study on romantic relationships speculate that the predominant individualism of American culture contributes "in good part" to the high rate of divorce in the U.S., Triandis continues,

Support for Dion and Dion's speculation [on high divorce rates in the U.S.] can be found in a study by Brodbar and Jay [sic] (1986). They examined the relationship of allocentrism (measured by synagogue attendance, having many Jewish friends, belonging to Jewish organizations, contributing to Jewish charities) to divorce rates among 4,505 Jewish households in New York City. They found that the more collectivist the sample, the lower was the divorce rate.³⁰

The study Triandis describes also found that divorce rates among American Jews show a notable increase over time, drawing nearer the American average with successive

²⁹ Strodtbeck, "Family Interaction, Values and Achievement," 157.

³⁰ Triandis, "Cross-cultural Studies of Individualism and Collectivism," 85. Triandis is in error here; the author of the study is Jay Y. Brodbar-Nemzer, not two separate authors named "Brodbar" and "Jay." For reasons beyond the scope of this discussion, MacDonald is quite interested in the references to romantic love that set the context for Triandis's summary of the Brodbar-Nemzer study; I mention this here only to emphasize that it is extremely unlikely that MacDonald missed the reference, which appears on the same page.

generations. This suggests not only that lower divorce rates correlate with higher levels of collectivism (or, here, “allocentrism”), but that a rather rapid shift of balance among American Jews toward the individualist side of the collectivism spectrum has been in progress.³¹ Now if we are to believe MacDonald, the “feed-forward” eugenics program conducted by Jews for the last two millennia must by definition have produced in the current generation the most Jewish Jews who have ever lived. Yet according to this study, cited with approval by Triandis, in a scant one or two generations the prevailing individualism of American culture has been able to make significant inroads against the eugenically-enhanced tendencies of Jewish “hyper-collectivism.”

Jay Brodbar-Nemzer’s work on divorce rates is thus consistent with Triandis’s emphasis on environmental factors as the chief determinants of an orientation toward individualism or collectivism; Jews, entering into the extremely individualistic American culture, widely adopt its values as their own over the course of just a few generations. They assimilate. To the extent that MacDonald does acknowledge what he calls a “tendency for individualistic Western cultures to break down Jewish group cohesiveness,” it is to call attention to the reactive mechanisms of the Jewish group evolutionary strategy that emerge in order to meet such challenges. Ultimately, for MacDonald, Jews do not assimilate. That their adoption of individualism works to “break down Jewish group cohesiveness” only confirms the “fundamental and irresolvable friction between Judaism and prototypical Western political and social structure.”³² Elsewhere, MacDonald offers quite a different assessment of how Jewish group cohesion fares in Western cultures: “Jewish particularism is ... expected and found to thrive precisely in Western societies that (apart from Jews themselves) are highly assimilative and individualistic.”³³ So in Western cultures Jewish particularism thrives, except that in Western cultures Jewish group cohesiveness tends to erode. MacDonald betrays no awareness of any contradiction between these assertions. He is, however, careful to keep any acknowledgment that Jews readily adopt Western individualist values well removed from his discussions of the quite different behaviors to be expected on the basis of their genetic predispositions, particularly those cohesive, competitive behaviors that pose the greatest threat to the interests of unsuspecting Western individualists.

The Brodbar-Nemzer study of increasing divorce rates as they correlate with increasing individualism is the first of two studies involving Jews noted by Triandis that go unnoticed by MacDonald. The second is even more striking, if only because it addresses straight-on the issue at the core of MacDonald’s thesis: the profound, irreconcilable psychological differences that purportedly obtain between Jews and Europeans. Surely, a study offering data that goes directly to this very question must be of immediate, compelling interest to MacDonald’s work. Then again, Triandis’s summary of this research suggests a certain off-putting incongruity with the theory of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy:

³¹ Jay Y. Brodbar-Nemzer, “Divorce and Group Commitment: The Case of the Jews,” *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 48: 329-340.

³² MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, 314; see also MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents*, 263-276.

³³ MacDonald, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone*, 245.

The method Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) used to measure values can be used to tap specific aspects of collectivism and individualism. They presented a list of values to Israeli and German subjects and asked them to rate their importance. Smallest space analysis revealed a structure of these values that was reasonably similar in the two cultures.³⁴

Far from finding evidence of irreconcilable differences in value systems between groups of Germans and Israelis, Solomon Schwartz and Wolfgang Bilsky offer conclusions that conform to those of Triandis's other citations of studies involving Jews: that the differences between Jews and "gentile Europeans," or "Northern Europeans" if you prefer, while noticeable, are not dramatic or extreme. Assessing the value systems of Israelis and Germans, the authors diagram their findings for each group as a mapping of what they call its seven "motivation domains."³⁵ Three of these domains, Self-direction, Achievement, and Enjoyment, correspond to individualist interests; three others, Security, Prosocial and Restrictive Conformity, correspond to collectivist interests; the last domain, Maturity, reflects mixed individualist and collectivist interests. The mapping of these domains for a group resembles a pie chart; adjacent domains in this arrangement are interpreted as compatible within the culture, and domains separated by two intervening domains are said to be incompatible. Now in this 1987 study, the authors announce their intention to conduct further research using data from a wider variety of cultural groups, but, as Triandis's summary has led us to anticipate, their initial assessment is already problematic for MacDonald's theory: "Whereas the Israeli and German samples were quite similar, it is conceivable that more culturally distant groups will reveal a different organization of value domains."³⁶ One can imagine how difficult it would be to bridge the gap between a finding that Israeli values and German values were "quite similar" and the argument that Jewish culture and European culture are, as MacDonald repeatedly insists, 'fundamentally incompatible.' MacDonald's decision not to report on this study, then, is perfectly understandable.

A quick consultation of the standard citation index led me to two additional relevant studies conducted by Schwartz and Bilsky, both published in mainstream research psychology journals. These studies both appeared in 1990, too late to be included in Triandis's 1990 literature survey, but still early enough to have been available to MacDonald during his research. Like the three studies of actual Jews actually cited by Triandis, however, neither of these two additional papers appears in MacDonald's first edition bibliographies. In one, the authors continue along the path of their earlier work on value domains, expanding the range of their samples to include groups from five additional societies: the United States, Australia, Finland, Spain and Hong Kong.³⁷ Diagrams for these additional samples revealed broadly similar arrangements of compatible motivational domains for all six of the national groups the authors describe as "Western." In fact, there were two pairs of identically arranged sets of compatible/incompatible motivational domains: Germany and Australia had identical arrangements, as did the United States and Israel. The outlier was the Hong Kong sample,

³⁴ Triandis, "Cross-cultural Studies of Individualism and Collectivism," 68.

³⁵ Solomon Schwartz and Wolfgang Bilsky, "Toward a Universal Psychological Structure of Human Values," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 53, 3 (1987): 550-562.

³⁶ Schwartz and Bilsky, "Toward a Universal Psychological Structure of Human Values," 561.

³⁷ Solomon Schwartz and Wolfgang Bilsky, "Toward a Theory of the Universal Content and Structure of Values: Extensions and Cross-Cultural Replications," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 58, 5 (1990): 878-891

which showed a distinctively different arrangement of compatible domains by comparison with those of the other national groups, marking off a clear cultural distinction.

The second of these two later studies assessed the comparative levels of outgroup mistrust between Israelis and Germans by measuring the tendency to entertain a distorted perception of the outgroup's value system or to exaggerate the differences between the ingroup's and the outgroup's value systems.³⁸ This issue goes to the heart of MacDonald's distinction between collectivist and individualist cultures, which he insists differ greatly in rates of such ethnocentrism. Having determined in their earlier paper that the actual value systems of Germans and Israelis were broadly similar, the authors found further similarities here: both groups were inclined to exaggerate the differences between them, indicating the existence of some intergroup hostility, or at least a potential for intergroup conflict. But what caught my attention was how the two groups compared for a couple of the key features of MacDonald's notion of Jewish "hyper-collectivism." For one thing, the German respondents exaggerated their differences with Israelis more than Israelis did their differences with Germans, suggesting the Germans' relatively stronger proclivity to engage in the (supposed) collectivist pastime of ethnic conflict—at least, with Israelis.³⁹ The Germans also had a less accurate perception of their *own* value system than did the Israelis,⁴⁰ a finding that undermines MacDonald on one of the most noteworthy and least appealing features of the Jewish "hyper-collectivist" personality, the tendency to engage in self-deception. As "hyper-collectivists," Jews, according to MacDonald, "would be relatively prone to self-deception by ignoring or rationalizing negative information about themselves and their ingroup."⁴¹ Yet according to Schwartz, Bilsky and Struch, Israeli Jews, those products—if we are to believe MacDonald—of a two-thousand-year-long exercise in "feed-forward" eugenics, show greater self-awareness and noticeably weaker proclivity to engage in self-deception than do the naturally occurring European individualists with whom they are here compared.

Schwartz and Bilsky's comparative studies go a considerable way toward filling the vacuum inherent in MacDonald's notion of Jewish "hyper-collectivism." Now, let us suppose there exists a study which included a list of, say, forty different countries, conveniently ordered by position along the individualism/collectivism spectrum. Let us further suppose that the volume providing this useful tabulation is one of the most widely cited works among the many thousands of studies referenced in the *Social Sciences Citation Index*. Let us also suppose that this volume is cited both in the Schwartz and Bilsky studies *and* by Harry Triandis in the 1990 literature survey that has launched us on this little exercise. We might be tempted further to suppose that such a work, with its clear relevance to the claims of the theory of Judaism as an evolutionary strategy and its *sine-qua-non* notion of Jewish "hyper-collectivism," would be cited by Kevin MacDonald as well, but that would be a supposition too far.

³⁸ Solomon Schwartz, Wolfgang Bilsky and Naomi Struch, "Values and Intergroup Social Motives: A Study of Israeli and German Students," *Social Psychology Quarterly* 53,3 (1990): 185-198.

³⁹ Schwartz, Bilsky and Struch, "Values and Intergroup Social Motives", 190-191.

⁴⁰ Schwartz, Bilsky and Struch, "Values and Intergroup Social Motives", 191.

⁴¹ MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents*, 248.

In his very influential study *Culture's Consequences*, Geert Hofstede offers a chart of individualism index values for forty nations. The chart expresses the intensity of individualism in a culture along a one-hundred-point scale, with one hundred indicating maximum individualism and zero indicating maximum collectivism. Israel scores a fifty-four, placing Israeli culture just to the individualist side of the mean.⁴² Clearly, Hofstede makes just as poor a fit with the needs of the theory of Judaism as a competitive group evolutionary strategy as does the other research on Jews and collectivism Triandis discusses. One has to wonder: what sort of pseudo-technical expressions would MacDonald have needed to coin to account for the fact that half of the cultures under consideration by Hofstede have a stronger collectivist orientation than that of "hyper-collectivist" Israeli Jews? "Super-hyper-collectivist"? "Really-really-*really*-hyper-collectivist"? It is probably unsurprising, then, that in spite of his high visibility within the field and his straightforward and unambiguous assessments of rates of individualism and collectivism in more than three dozen world cultures, Geert Hofstede's name appears nowhere in any of the first edition bibliographies of Kevin MacDonald's Judaism trilogy.

On Self-Deception as a Feature of Jewish "Hyper-Collectivism":

MacDonald places significant emphasis on the notion of "self-deception" as a critical component of the Jewish group evolutionary strategy. Indeed, the practice of self-deception is so vital a feature of "hyper-collectivist" Judaism that it merits a chapter unto itself in *Separation and Its Discontents*. A harrowing chapter it is, too, brimming over with examples of Jews averting their eyes from the messy reality of their group-serving behavior and its unpleasant consequences. MacDonald locates the theoretical basis for his claims for Jews' self-deceiving proclivities in the premises that inform Jewish "hyper-collectivism."

There is reason to suppose that members of cohesive groups would be more likely than others to engage in self-deception that ignores negative traits of themselves or their in-group. In Chapter 1 [of *Separation and Its Discontents*], I argued that Jews are generally quite high on attraction to cohesive groups and have a high need for a group identity. Research on social identity processes indicates that people are highly prone to attributing very positive traits to their own groups, and Altemeyer (1994) notes that people who are highly attracted to cohesive groups are relatively likely to not want to hear unpleasant information about themselves. The suggestion is that Jews, and especially those who strongly identify as Jews, would be relatively prone to self-deception by ignoring or rationalizing negative information about themselves and their ingroup.⁴³

I should call attention, by the way, to the rhetorical trajectory of this passage, launched with a supposition, its sites set on a suggestion, with only a languid feint in the direction of an empirical claim to link the two. In between supposing and suggesting, MacDonald cites himself as having shown that "Jews are generally quite high" when it comes to attraction to cohesive groups; tracing his self-citation turns up another one of his

⁴² In the 2001 second edition of *Culture's Consequences*, Hofstede expands the chart to include fifty-three entries, tilting the balance more heavily toward the collectivist end of the spectrum and thus pushing Israel further into individualist territory within the set. In this more recent edition Hofstede also asserts a blunt correlation between religion and cultural orientation that flatly contradicts MacDonald's theory, declaring, "Human beings' images of God or the gods reflect the values of human society. All traditionally individualist societies developed in countries with monotheistic religions, especially Christianity and Judaism ..."

⁴³ MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents*, 248.

extended non-comparative comparisons (“generally quite high” compared to whom?), itself a hash of proposals, suggestions, and suppositions.⁴⁴ The only gesture toward empirical data on hand here is the citation from “Altemeyer (1994).” As I will show below, the cited passage actually says nothing explicit about Jews at all, although its appearance in this context implies a great deal about Kevin MacDonald’s intellectual integrity.

So according to MacDonald a tendency toward self-deception correlates with a tendency toward collectivism. Ergo “hyper-collectivist” Jews would be expected to be self-deceivers *par excellence*. MacDonald’s subsequent discussion of this phenomenon certainly emphasizes the distance Jews will go to avoid acknowledging the realities that contribute to antisemitism, including “the role of Jews in the political and cultural processes in traditional and contemporary societies,” and the extent to which Jews who perceive themselves as assimilated into Western culture are in reality hardly assimilated at all. What MacDonald pointedly does not do, however, is demonstrate that episodes of Jewish self-deception distinguish Jews as a group significantly from other human groups. As is typical of his style, he posits a marker of Jewish difference and proceeds to ‘prove’ it in a methodological vacuum. Here, he ‘suggests’ that Jews “would be relatively prone to self-deception” without ever getting around to the obvious question: relative to whom?

I have already mentioned that tracing citations appearing in Triandis’s 1990 survey leads to one study of Jews that at least tangentially addresses this question. When Schwartz, Struch and Bilsky asked groups of Israeli Jews and groups of Germans to assess the values held by members of their own group and by members of the other group, they found that while neither group assessed ingroup values completely accurately, the Israelis were noticeably less inaccurate in their assessment of Israeli values than the Germans were in assessing German values. But we do not need to traverse even these two degrees of separation beyond MacDonald’s first-edition bibliographies to find studies directly addressing the issue of comparative tendencies toward self-deception among individualists and collectivists. In these bibliographies there appears a volume offering information that flatly contradicts his supposition that collectivists will be more inclined to self-deception than individualists. Unsurprisingly, this inconvenient data, again, is reported by Harry Triandis, in a book cited by MacDonald in both of his 1998 volumes. The passage below appears in Triandis’s 1995 study *Individualism and Collectivism*.

Collectivists frequently have realistic self-perceptions about their abilities, and individualists frequently have flattering self-perceptions. For example, Markus and Kitayama (1991b) reported that when various populations (e.g. college students) were asked questions such as “what percent of this population (e.g. college students) is higher than you are on X?” when X was an ability, American men showed a self-enhancement bias. That is, their judgments did not average 50 percent, as they should have, but only 36 percent. In short, they admitted that on the average only about a third of the relevant population was higher than they were on this socially desirable trait. American women showed less bias. Their answers averaged 47 percent. Japanese men showed even less bias. Their answers averaged 49 percent. Japanese women showed a modesty bias: their

⁴⁴ I am not the first to point out MacDonald’s tendency to make provisional claims which he then treats as proven facts.

answers averaged 58 percent. In other words, Japanese women college students, on the average, indicated that they were below average in ability.⁴⁵

The more collectivist the sample, the less likely its members were to engage in flattering self-deception. This finding leads the discussion in one of two directions: either Jewish “hyper-collectivism” would be expected to result in more than usually accurate levels of self-perception among Jews as a group (or, as in the case of Japanese women, a bias toward ‘deflationary’ self-deception), or relatively high rates of ‘inflationary’ self-deception among Jews would prompt us to wonder whether Jews ought to be deleted from MacDonald’s ‘collectivist category.’ Neither of these options is palatable to the theory of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy, so it is hardly surprising that in MacDonald’s scholarship Triandis’s discussion of self-deception among individualists and collectivists, like his actual discussions of actual Jews, goes right by the boards, leaving MacDonald free to float his suppositions unencumbered by the inconvenience of contradictory data.

Of course, in the passage quoted above MacDonald does offer one citation that appears to support his claim that collectivists are more prone to self-deception, observing that “Altemeyer (1994) notes that people who are highly attracted to cohesive groups are relatively likely not to want to hear unpleasant information about themselves.”⁴⁶ MacDonald’s appeal to Altemeyer leads us to yet another dimension of the relationship between published research and his central notion of Jewish “hyper-collectivism.”

On Authoritarianism as a Feature of Jewish “Hyper-collectivism”

The University of Manitoba psychologist Bob Altemeyer is known for his research on authoritarianism, and for his development of the “Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale” as a tool for assessing it. Altemeyer offers a clear definition of the phenomenon he studies.

By “right-wing authoritarianism” I mean the covariation of three attitudinal clusters:

1. Authoritarian submission—a high degree of submission to the authorities who are perceived to be established and legitimate in the society in which one lives;
2. Authoritarian aggression—a general aggressiveness, directed against various persons, which is perceived to be sanctioned by authorities; and
3. Conventionalism—a high degree of adherence to the social conventions which are perceived to be endorsed by society and its established authorities.⁴⁷

MacDonald makes frequent reference to Altemeyer, not least to draw on Altemeyer’s extensive critique of *The Authoritarian Personality*, the study of authoritarianism produced under the leadership of Theodor Adorno in 1950 which sought to establish a strong correlation between authoritarianism and tendencies toward ethnocentrism, prejudice, and antisemitism. Altemeyer’s critique is clearly congenial to MacDonald, for

⁴⁵ Harry C. Triandis, *Individualism and Collectivism*, (Boulder: Westview, 1995): 69. Triandis’s citation: H.R Markus and S. Kitayama, “Culture and Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion and Motivation,” *Psychological Review* 98: 224-253.

⁴⁶ MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents*, 248.

⁴⁷ Bob Altemeyer, *Right Wing Authoritarianism* (Manitoba: The University of Manitoba Press, 1981), 240.

whom *The Authoritarian Personality* and the body of work that followed from it (much of it conducted at the University of California, Berkeley) represent a sustained attempt by Jewish intellectuals to undermine the stability of non-Jewish culture by stigmatizing its core values. Quoting MacDonald:

The agenda is to develop an ideology of anti-Semitism that rallies ingroup loyalties to Judaism and attempts to alter gentile culture in a manner that benefits Judaism by portraying gentile group loyalties (including nationalism, Christian religious affiliation, close family relationships, high-investment parenting, and concern with social and material success) as indicators of psychiatric disorder.⁴⁸

Adorno et. al. were thus deeply concerned, according to MacDonald, to discourage non-Jews from adopting behavior patterns similar to those characteristic of Jews, a concern driven by the need to prevent non-Jews from competing effectively against the Jewish group evolutionary strategy. It is interesting, then, that MacDonald, who attributes to Jews strong tendencies toward “authoritarian social structures” and includes Jewish authoritarianism among the factors that contribute to the success of the Jewish group evolutionary strategy, seems eager here to de-stigmatize not just antisemitism, but (“gentile”) authoritarianism itself. Here he offers his own psychological assessment of the individuals found in *The Authoritarian Personality* to have, well, authoritarian personalities (and note the kid-gloves delicacy with which he prepares his readers for his assessment):

It may appear disturbing to accept the alternative picture developed here. I am essentially saying that the families of the high scorers [i.e., individuals found to have authoritarian tendencies] were adaptive. They combined warmth and affection with a sense of responsibility and discipline, and the children appear to have been ambitious and interested in upholding the values of family and country. ... High scorers are thus socially connected and feel a responsibility to ingroup (family) norms. In Triandis’s (1990, 55) terms, these individuals are “allocentric” people living in an individualist society; that is, they are people who are socially integrated and receive high levels of social support. They identify strongly with ingroup (family) norms.⁴⁹

Altemeyer, by contrast, is considerably less sanguine about the social and cultural impact of authoritarianism, as one might infer from the title of his second monograph on the subject, *Enemies of Freedom*. Recognized as much for his blunt prose style as for his research, Altemeyer is characteristically plainspoken about the goal of his work.

The central concern of my research has been the apprehension that there may be a vast potential for the acceptance of right-wing totalitarian rule in countries such as Canada and the United States. This acceptance is essentially an attitude, a state of mind, a willingness to see democratic institutions destroyed, which in some people may even be a desire. Right-wing authoritarianism has thus been defined as an orientation, rather than a set of acts, but it is still dangerous. The mood of a populace can create a climate of public opinion that promotes totalitarian movements. It can intimidate politicians, journalists, and religious leaders who might otherwise oppose repression. It can encourage a bold, illegal grab for power, as it did in Italy in 1922. It can elect a Hitler to office, as it did in Germany in 1933. It can encourage military leaders to overthrow duly elected governments, as it has so many times since.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, 191.

⁴⁹ MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, 187.

⁵⁰ Bob Altemeyer, *Enemies of Freedom* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988): 3.

Indeed, in his chapter entitled “Protecting Ourselves from Authoritarianism,” Altemeyer seems to have anticipated MacDonald’s recent call, noted above, for people of his own ethnicity to be prepared “to make extreme sacrifices for our ethnic group.” As I will discuss in greater detail below, Altemeyer could almost be addressing MacDonald directly when he reflects upon the internal authoritarian threat now facing western societies:

The larger danger, inherently, comes from within, where extremists on the left and extremists on the right will use the freedoms guaranteed to all to take liberty from everyone but themselves. The research reported in this book is concerned with the threat from the right, which I consider the greater in our present circumstances. It deals with the large segment of the population who do not require special situations to act in authoritarian ways but do so every day. I see them as a threat to my freedom, to yours, and to our children’s.⁵¹

So there is little common ground between MacDonald’s warm embrace of authoritarian values and Altemeyer’s urgent warnings against them. In the end, of course, these are really matters of data interpretation; MacDonald can certainly make use of Altemeyer’s statistical findings concerning authoritarian personalities without finding them the cause for alarm Altemeyer himself does. The problem, however, is that MacDonald’s transparent desire to render tendencies toward authoritarianism among members of his own ethnicity palatable requires him to do some fancy rhetorical dancing around Altemeyer’s terms as well as his data. Ultimately, this will lead us to the real issue of interest here: yet another example of MacDonald suppressing information that does not conform to his theory.

MacDonald’s clear aim in his critique of *The Authoritarian Personality* is to dissolve the bond asserted there between ethnocentrism and authoritarianism. Authoritarians may well harbor ethnic prejudices, but prejudice itself is not a constitutive feature of authoritarianism; rather, authoritarians, being socially well-integrated, pick up attitudes prevalent in their communities. “The defining feature in this view is simply their adoption of the social conventions and norms of the group, some of which may involve negative attitudes toward outgroups.”⁵² Altemeyer is useful here insofar as

Altemeyer (1981, 238-239) also reports finding much lower correlations between authoritarianism and ethnic prejudice in his studies than were found by Adorno et al. Moreover, Altemeyer notes that the data are consistent with the proposal that authoritarian individuals are ethnocentric only to the extent that other ethnic groups are conventional targets of discrimination by groups with which the authoritarian individual identifies.⁵³

This wrangling of Altemeyer into MacDonald’s attempt to make the coincidence of authoritarianism and ethnocentrism strictly accidental—call it the “ethnocentrism-in-the-water” hypothesis—actually does some violence to Altemeyer’s argument. On the page MacDonald cites, Altemeyer makes stronger claims for the relationship between ethnocentrism and authoritarianism than MacDonald attributes to him. It is not simply that there exist “conventional targets of discrimination” that results in authoritarian prejudice, but that such conventional targets act as lightning rods for authoritarian

⁵¹ Altemeyer, *Enemies of Freedom*, 269-270.

⁵² MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, 189.

⁵³ MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, 189.

aggression. The main point of Altemeyer's objection to the premises of *The Authoritarian Personality* is less that he finds ethnocentrism to be purely orthogonal to authoritarianism than that the Frankfurt School model so overstates the overlap between the two as to make ethnocentrism a defining component of authoritarianism and vice-versa.

[B]ecause of their tendencies to aggress against sanctioned targets, authoritarians are likely to be prejudiced against various minority groups who are conventional targets of discrimination. Many ethnocentrism items were tested in the development of the RWA [Right-Wing Authoritarianism] scale, and a number of them proved weakly correlated with the cluster of submission, aggression and conventionalism items which ultimately formed the test. But the relationships were not at all strong enough to make ethnocentrism a fourth element in the cluster. The data thus indicated that a weak but positive correlation existed between authoritarianism and prejudice among students, a finding which was later confounded by the failure to obtain higher correlations with aggression against a Jewish victim in the mock laboratory learning experiment.⁵⁴

Altemeyer's tests, involving his University of Manitoba students and their parents, did find a reasonably consistent correlation between authoritarianism and ethnic prejudice, although not one strong enough to confirm the claims of the Berkeley researchers. The strongest correlations that turned up in his testing emphasized "aggressive impulses" and had to do with issues of "crime and punishment" rather than ethnic difference, suggesting to Altemeyer "the explanation of prejudice in high RWA subjects as another form of authoritarian aggression. Just as authoritarians were especially likely to aggress against the 'common criminals' whom they saw as disgusting and repulsive, Jews, blacks, Asians and native peoples have historically been treated as 'lower forms of life,' deserving of discrimination, in North American society." While his findings do not support the Berkeley researchers' argument that ethnocentrism is a reliable indicator of authoritarianism, they do suggest "that authoritarianism may be an important covariate of prejudice in such populations."⁵⁵ MacDonald is simply wrong to impute to Altemeyer the notion that authoritarians take up ethnocentrism merely because it is a locally prevailing social norm. For MacDonald, authoritarian ethnocentrism (among people of his own ethnicity) is a purely contingent phenomenon; in one culture, the authoritarian's conventionalism may lead him to develop contempt and repugnance for ethnic outgroups, while in another he might as easily develop a taste for peanut butter and banana sandwiches or a passion for professional wiffle ball. For Altemeyer, ethnocentric social norms appeal to the authoritarian not just because of his tendency uncritically to adopt prevailing conventions but because they also provide a focus and a rationalization for his "aggressive impulses."

In fact, Altemeyer repeatedly makes clear that ethnocentrism is not a hit-or-miss, environmentally-contingent accessory to authoritarianism, but is an expected expression of authoritarian aggression.

The "various people" who are the targets of authoritarian aggressiveness could be anyone, but unconventional people (including "social deviants" such as homosexuals) and people who are conventional targets of aggression (such as certain minority groups) are attacked more readily than others. Thus right-wing authoritarianism is expected to be correlated, in general, with ethnic and

⁵⁴ Altemeyer, *Right-Wing Authoritarianism*, 238.

⁵⁵ Altemeyer, *Right-Wing Authoritarianism*, 239.

racial prejudice, because such prejudice is a conventional outlet of aggressive impulses. The authoritarian believes that certain authorities approve of this prejudice, and he may believe that groups such as blacks threaten the established social order. Hence, the aggressiveness in prejudice can be authoritarian. But by no means is all prejudice thought to be linked to right-wing authoritarianism, much less be caused by it, as the Berkeley investigators theorized.⁵⁶

MacDonald's discussion of authoritarianism among White North Americans makes no mention of Altemeyer's assessment of authoritarian aggression as one of its defining attitudinal clusters. Instead, he emphasizes the authoritarians' experience of having been raised in environments characterized by "warmth and affection" and a sense of "responsibility and discipline," adaptively resulting in authoritarian individuals who are "socially integrated." In this view, no hint of authoritarian aggression lurks on the front porch, so there is no inherent likelihood of ethnocentrism turning up in the parlor. If MacDonald's milk-and-cookies notion of "gentile" authoritarianism bears little resemblance to Altemeyer's data or the theory he derives from it, it has the virtue of compatibility with MacDonald's own claims that "gentile European Americans" such as himself enjoy, thanks to their Ice Age ancestry, a relatively high resistance to ethnocentrism.

Similarly, MacDonald's appeal to Altemeyer in support of the supposed Jewish proclivity to self-deception, noted above, blurs the context in order to avoid acknowledging information that undermines his thesis. In the study MacDonald cites, "Reducing Prejudice in Right-Wing Authoritarians," Altemeyer puts the relationship between ethnocentrism and authoritarianism in the most unambiguous terms imaginable. "You do not have to be authoritarian to be prejudiced," he states,

[b]ut authoritarians do tend to be bigots. Indeed, RWA scale scores among White North Americans have correlated with prejudice against so many different minorities (Black, Hispanics, Jews, aboriginal peoples, Sikhs, Japanese, Chinese, Pakistanis, Filipinos, Africans, Arabs, feminists, homosexuals, and—where I come from—Francophones) that one could say right-wing authoritarians are "equal opportunity bigots."⁵⁷

If, as MacDonald insists, authoritarians pick up prejudice simply because it is a "social norm," Altemeyer's findings prompt the conclusion that there must be a great deal more ethnocentrism floating about in the normal culture of White North Americans than MacDonald's notion of excessively tolerant, Ice-Age tempered individualism can accommodate. But to return to his "evidence" that Jewish "hyper-collectivists" will be "relatively prone" to self-deception: pursuing the argument that heightened proclivity to self-deception is a feature of collectivist (and certainly of "hyper-collectivist") cultures, MacDonald notes of those whom Altemeyer found to be relatively less willing to hear bad news about themselves only that they were "people who are highly attracted to cohesive groups," that is, collectivists. Amazingly, he simply omits the features that make the subjects under discussion relevant to Altemeyer's prejudice reduction project: they were "White North Americans" and high-scoring Right Wing Authoritarians who consequently "tend to be bigots." Nor was attraction to cohesive groups the only impetus

⁵⁶ Altemeyer, *Enemies of Freedom*, 153.

⁵⁷ Bob Altemeyer, "Reducing Prejudice in Right-Wing Authoritarians," in *The Psychology of Prejudice: The Ontario Symposium Vol. 7*, Mark P. Zanna and James M. Olson, eds. (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1994): 136.

Altemeyer identified as a driver of authoritarian self-deception. He notes, “[e]xperiments have also indicated that many Highs stiff arm ego-threatening material,” a finding which jars rather discordantly with MacDonald’s portrait of those well-adjusted White North American authoritarians.⁵⁸

But the real distortion MacDonald commits against Altemeyer is his failure to acknowledge Altemeyer’s findings for different religious groups as measured against the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale. If reflecting on the authoritarianism of White North Americans like himself in *Separation and Its Discontents* stirs MacDonald to warming reveries of hearth and home, turning his attention to *Jewish* authoritarianism in *Culture of Critique* sharpens his focus on all of the unappetizing features of right-wing authoritarianism that Altemeyer emphasizes.

Altemeyer (1988, 2) defines “right-wing authoritarianism” as involving three central attributes: submission to legitimate authority; aggression toward individuals that is sanctioned by the authorities; adherence to social conventions.

Clearly, individuals high on these traits would be ideal members of cohesive human group evolutionary strategies. Indeed, such attributes would define the ideal Jew in traditional societies: submissive to the *kehilla* authorities, strongly adherent to within-group social conventions such as the observance of Jewish religious law, and characterized by negative attitudes toward gentile society and culture seen as manifestations of an outgroup. Consistent with this formulation, high scorers on the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWA) tend to be highly religious; they tend to be the most orthodox members of their denomination; they believe in group cohesiveness, group loyalty, and identify strongly with ingroups (Altemeyer 1994, 134; 1996, 84). Without question, traditional Jewish society and contemporary Jewish Orthodox and fundamentalist groups are highly authoritarian by any measure. Indeed, Rubenstein (1996) found that Orthodox Jews were higher on RWA than “traditional Jews,” and both of these groups were higher than secular Jews.⁵⁹

This extended passage on religious orientation and authoritarianism accurately reports on Altemeyer’s findings that orthodoxy correlates with high rates of authoritarianism among all religions. But MacDonald’s argument, with its smooth segues from his discussion of the conventional and submissive yet aggressive “ideal Jew” to Altemeyer’s research on religion and authoritarianism, and from there to Rubenstein’s 1996 assessment of authoritarianism among Jews *compared only to other Jews*, neatly fudges one massively inconvenient detail: according to Altemeyer, Jews as a group consistently score *lower* on the RWA scale than do members of any other religious group.

Over the years, there have been consistent differences in the RWA Scale scores of students affiliated with different religions. Those with no affiliation (who are mostly agnostics and atheists, about 75% of whom in 1979 stated that they were raised in no religion whatsoever) scored significantly lower than all the others, while Jews also tended to score low. ... Catholics and Protestants in turn scored higher than these groups. ...

The results described above seem to indicate that authoritarianism and religious variables mutually determine one another. In the first place, it seems clear that different religions produce different levels of authoritarianism in their membership. People raised in no religious system tend to be less authoritarian than those raised in Judaism or Christianity, Jews tend to be less authoritarian than

⁵⁸ Altemeyer, “Reducing Prejudice in Right-Wing Authoritarians,” 137.

⁵⁹ MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, 190.

Christians, and there are at least some reliable differences within Protestantism among Manitoba students.⁶⁰

Even worse, from MacDonald's perspective, was the richer data on religious affiliation, orthodoxy and authoritarianism presented by Altemeyer in *Enemies of Freedom*, a volume MacDonald also cites. Even within the set of High RWA "true believers" characteristic of all religions (but underrepresented among Jews by comparison with other religions), clear differences among the groups emerge.

[A]re "very accepting" subjects equally authoritarian in all religions? Or do different denominations (as argued earlier) produce different levels of authoritarianism even among the strongly committed? If we examine just those subjects who answered the (0-5) "still accept" question with either a "4" or a "5" (that is, they indicated they "nearly completely" or "completely" accepted the religious beliefs taught them in childhood), who do you think were the most authoritarian of all these "true believers"? Fundamentalists (185.1) and Mennonites (185.3) among the students, Mennonites (202.1) and Fundamentalists (208.5) among the parents. The (rarer) United Church members, Anglicans, and Jews who were *just* as accepting of *their* religions scored about 25 points lower. True-believing Catholics and Lutherans lay somewhere in between.⁶¹

So not only are Jews among the *least* authoritarian of religious groups, according to Altemeyer highly religious Jews are among the *least* authoritarian of the highly religious. Yet in an awe-inspiring display of sheer gall (dare I say, 'chutzpah?'), MacDonald takes information Altemeyer has collected from studies of subjects explicitly identified as "White North Americans" and applies it willy-nilly to the Jews whom Altemeyer, working from actual data rather than his own 'suppositions,' largely exempts from the discussion. The point is worth emphasizing: these highly ethnocentric, highly authoritarian, highly self-deceptive "people who are highly attracted to cohesive groups," as MacDonald so guardedly puts it, whom MacDonald adduces as evidence for the self-deceptive tendencies of Jewish "hyper-collectivism," were in fact members of MacDonald's own ethnic group. I can think of no other way to describe this conduct than as an act of deliberate fraud. None of this actual data on authoritarianism among Jews is good news for the theory of Judaism as an evolutionary strategy, with its emphasis on the inherently authoritarian "ideal Jew," and, as should by now be quite unsurprising, none of it makes its way back to Kevin MacDonald's readers.

Harry Triandis, "Horizontal Collectivism," and Jewish "Hyper-collectivism"

I began this discussion by pointing out that it is at best problematic for MacDonald to be hanging his oft-repeated claim that Harry Triandis includes Jews in the 'collectivist category' on Triandis's citation of the study of Italian and Jewish immigrants to the United States by Fred Strodbeck. I then went on to show that Triandis points the way to several other studies that discuss Jews in the context of individualism/collectivism constructs, each of which undermines MacDonald's claims about Jewish "hyper-collectivism," and none of which appears in his bibliographies. Now I wish to point out

⁶⁰ Altemeyer, *Right Wing Authoritarianism*, 240. Note that this data is, literally, just, a page flip away from the passages MacDonald cites in support of his fabrication that Altemeyer promotes the "ethnocentrism-in-the-water" hypothesis.

⁶¹ Altemeyer, *Enemies of Freedom*, 216-217.

one other omission MacDonald commits against Triandis's work. The source in question is, as we have seen, known to MacDonald, appearing in the bibliographies of the 1998 editions of both *Separation and Its Discontents* and *Culture of Critique*: Triandis's 1995 volume *Individualism and Collectivism*. Here Triandis does indeed place a large set of Jews—the Jewish population of Israel—in a collectivist category. Yet for all his eagerness to claim support from Triandis for his notion of Jewish “hyper-collectivism,” MacDonald makes no reference to Triandis's explicit and unambiguous assertion that Israel constitutes a type of collectivist culture. MacDonald's omission is far from inexplicable; as was the case with the other omissions I have documented in this discussion, examination of Triandis's specific claim about Israeli collectivism reveals its fundamental incompatibility, to coin a phrase, with MacDonald's theory.

In *Individualism and Collectivism* Triandis provides an important modification to his theoretical understanding of these phenomena. Rather than assessing the relationship between individualism and collectivism as primarily polar, with cultural orientations plotted along a line stretching between two extremes, he introduces a second vector that converts his model into something very much like a Cartesian graph, allowing distinctions to be drawn not just between individualism and collectivism, but between different sorts of individualisms and collectivisms.

There are four kinds of self: independent or interdependent (Markus and Kitayama, 1991b) and same or different. The combinations of these four types can be categorized as horizontal individualism (independent/same) and horizontal collectivism (interdependent/same), vertical individualism (independent/different) and vertical collectivism (interdependent/different). In collectivist cultures, horizontal includes a sense of social cohesion and of oneness with members of the ingroup. Vertical includes a sense of serving the ingroup and sacrificing for the benefit of the ingroup and doing one's duty. In both individualist and collectivist cultures, the vertical dimension accepts inequality, and rank has its privileges. This is reflective of the “different self.” In contrast, the horizontal dimension emphasized that people should be similar on most attributes, especially status. This reflects the “same self,” which does not want to stand out.⁶²

This emphasis on the vertical and horizontal dimensions of individualism and collectivism places many of the characteristics which, according to MacDonald, ought to be typical of Jewish “hyper-collectivism,” into a more complex pattern of interrelationships than is allowed by the binary oppositions (collectivists are like *that* but individualists are like *this*) he invokes. A polar conception of individualism/collectivism is critically important to MacDonald's notion of the threat Jews pose to the interests of “gentile Europeans” such as himself. As he sees it, owing to their tolerant, assimilatory, individualist biases, ethnic Europeans are ill-equipped accurately to perceive the strategizing behavior of collectivist groups such as the Jews, and he appeals repeatedly—indeed, exclusively—to Triandis to make this argument.

People in individualist culture ... show little emotional attachment to ingroups. Personal goals are paramount, and socialization emphasizes the importance of self-reliance, independence, individual responsibility, and “finding yourself” (Triandis 1991, 82). Individualists have more positive attitudes toward strangers and outgroup members and are more likely to behave in a pro-social, altruistic manner toward strangers. People in individualist cultures are less aware of ingroup/outgroup boundaries and thus do not have highly negative attitudes toward outgroup

⁶² Triandis, *Individualism and Collectivism*, 44. Triandis's citation:

members (1991, 80). They often disagree with ingroup policy, show little emotional attachment or loyalty to ingroups, and do not have a sense of common fate with other ingroup members. Opposition to outgroups occurs in individualist societies, but the opposition is more “rational” in the sense that there is less of a tendency to suppose that all of the outgroup members are culpable. Individualists for mild attachments to many groups, while collectivists have an intense attachment to a few ingroups (1990, 61).

The expectation is that individualists living in the presence of collectivist subcultures will tend to be less predisposed to outgroup hostility and more likely to view any offensive behavior by outgroup members as resulting from transgression by individuals, rather than being stereotypically true of all outgroup members. On the other hand, collectivists living in an individualist society would be more likely to view ingroup/outgroup distinctions as extremely salient and to develop stereotypically negative views about outgroups.⁶³

“Hyper-collectivist” Jews are thus able to prosecute their competitive strategy against ethnic Europeans because the Europeans, naïve individualists that they are, never see it coming. This passage from *A People That Shall Dwell Alone* (1994) lays the theoretical foundation for all of the claims about Jewish-European incompatibility that inform the arguments MacDonald develops in the 1998 volumes *Separation and Its Discontents* and *Culture of Critique*. (Note again, by the way, the provisional language—in this case readers are encouraged to entertain an “expectation” that individualists “will tend to be less predisposed to outgroup hostility.”) In the meantime, in *Individualism and Collectivism* Triandis brought the notion of verticality to bear on this issue, offering an assessment of the relationship between individualism and intergroup conflict that bears little resemblance at all to MacDonald’s expectations of his excessively trusting, welcoming, and altruistic individualists.

The relationship between individualism-collectivism and prejudice and discrimination is extremely complex. There are two contradictory tendencies that increase prejudice and discrimination. The collectivists are more likely to identify with their cultural group and thus be more ethnocentric, and the vertical individualists were more likely to put down groups that were different from their own, in an effort to be “distinguished” and to win the “competition in the market place.” The horizontal individualists are probably the least likely to be prejudiced and to discriminate. ...

[V]ertical individualists are especially likely to want to be “distinguished” and thus we are likely to see more prejudice and discrimination among them (e.g. Americans and Britons) than among horizontal individualists (e.g., Dutch, Scandinavians), though undoubtedly other factors, such as cultural homogeneity, are also at work in this case. ...

The link between individualism and prejudice was shown in studies by Sears (1988) in which “symbolic racism” was linked to individualism. Symbolic racism is measured by attitude items that criticize current policies that they claim “unfairly favor African Americans.” The data showed that those who favored individualism, hard work, thrift, punctuality, sexual repression, and delays in gratification were especially likely to express this type of attitude. However, attitudes toward equality were also important. Klugel and Smith (1988)[sic] found that those who favored equal opportunity for all were less prejudiced. These findings suggest that vertical individualists may be more prejudiced than horizontal individualists.⁶⁴

⁶³ MacDonald, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone*, 228-229.

⁶⁴ Triandis, *Individualism and Collectivism*, 125-126. Triandis’s citations: David O. Sears, “Symbolic Racism,” in *Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy*, Phyllis A. Katz and Dalmas A. Tayler, eds. (New York: Plenum, 1988); James R. Kluegel and Eliot R. Smith, *Beliefs about Inequality: Americans’ View Is What Ought to Be* (New York: 1986).

By 1995, then, Triandis was arguing that there is in fact a lively tendency for some kinds of individualists to be quite aware of what MacDonald calls “ingroup/outgroup boundaries” and to entertain “highly negative attitudes toward outgroup members.” Were there reason to suppose that Triandis was at all aware of the theory of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy and its claims about Jewish “hyper-collectivism” and European individualism, we might be tempted to believe that his straightforward assertion that “unqualified collectivism and individualism are probably unrelated to prejudice” is meant as a direct repudiation of MacDonald’s claims.⁶⁵ In addition to being compatible with ethnocentric attitudes, vertical individualism, with its emphasis on social stratification, also appears at least by implication to be smoothly compatible with features of the authoritarian mindset, as suggested by David Sears’s finding of a correlation between “symbolic racism” and attitudes favoring “individualism, hard work, thrift, punctuality, sexual repression and delays in gratification.” This is consistent with Bob Altemeyer’s work on authoritarianism and prejudice, whose applicability to people of MacDonald’s own ethnicity we have seen MacDonald go to considerable lengths to obscure. Indeed, Triandis agrees with and cites representatives of the Frankfurt School to show that some individualist cultures will be likely to show higher rates of “negative attitudes” toward outgroups than some collectivist cultures. “A society with a great deal of social mobility is likely to have many individuals who are unsure about their status, and such anxiety is related to prejudice (Bettelheim and Janowitz, 1950). This condition is especially likely among vertical individualists. From these considerations it seems likely that prejudice and discrimination will be high among vertical collectivists, followed by vertical individualists, followed by horizontal collectivists, and will be low among horizontal individualists.”⁶⁶

So claims such as MacDonald’s that individualists are by definition unlikely to entertain “highly negative attitudes toward outgroup members” were explicitly rejected by Triandis in 1995. MacDonald must certainly have known this by the time he published his 1998 volumes; Triandis’s *Individualism and Collectivism* is cited in both *Separation and Its Discontents* and *Culture of Critique*. Yet in both volumes MacDonald reproduces, nearly verbatim, his assertions about individualists’ resistance to “highly negative attitudes toward outgroup members,” complete with citations to Triandis.⁶⁷ I would argue that to cite Triandis in support of claims he is known specifically and explicitly to have rejected amounts to something very much like scholarly malfeasance.

Interestingly, MacDonald actually agrees with Triandis that extreme individualism tends to produce ethnic conflict. For MacDonald, however, the problem arises from the readiness of individualistic elites to sell out lower-status members of their own ethnic groups in order to form mutually advantageous alliances with strategizing Jews, leading to a collectivist, anti-Jewish backlash among the lower-status non-Jews. This is a key theme of *Separation and Its Discontents*. The issue here is that these extremely individualistic elites are insufficiently respectful of ingroup/outgroup boundaries;

⁶⁵ Triandis, *Individualism and Collectivism*, 127.

⁶⁶ Triandis, *Individualism and Collectivism*, 127. Triandis’s citation: Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, *Dynamics of Prejudice: A Psychological and Sociological Study of Veterans* (New York: Harper, 1950).

⁶⁷ MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents*, 90; *Culture of Critique*, 167, 239.

MacDonald describes the reactive antisemitism of the lower-status non-Jews as a shift toward collectivism, rather than as a natural emanation of their own individualist attitudes. This formulation allows him to retain his insistence that genetically-derived European individualism is markedly resistant to prejudice and discrimination, untroubled by Triandis's utter rejection of any such notion.

As we have seen, Triandis presents an ad-hoc reckoning that tendencies toward ethnocentrism will be strongest among vertical collectivists, followed by vertical individualists, horizontal collectivists, and horizontal individualists, in that order. Given MacDonald's insistence that Jewish "hyper-collectivism" entails extremely high Jewish ethnocentrism, Triandis's assessment of Israel as a type of collectivist culture is quite interesting. For Triandis, Israeli culture belongs to the "horizontal collectivist" category, i.e., it is a culture likely to have lower levels of ethnocentrism than such vertical individualist cultures as the United States. Interesting, as well, is the context in which he offers this assessment. By comparison with "vertical individualist" Americans, Israelis, it seems, are quite resistant to the *echt* submissive-authoritarian behavior of 'doing as you're told.'

Participation techniques used by managers are especially effective in horizontal collectivism, such as the kibbutz, and are probably least effective in vertical collectivism. Erez and Earley have done extensive research on participation and have included kibbutz samples. Three conditions were used: (1) goals are assigned, (2) goals are decided by a representative of the group, or (3) goals are decided through participation of all members of the group. Performance was quite different in U.S., Israeli urban, and Israeli kibbutz samples (Erez and Earley, 1987). Performance was more or less the same under these three conditions in the United States, a vertical individualism culture, where the assignment of goals can be accepted even though participation is desirable and has some positive effect on productivity. In Israel, a horizontal collectivist culture, performance was very different in the three conditions. In both Israeli urban and Israeli kibbutz samples it was low in the assigned goals condition and high in the participative goals condition.⁶⁸

This account underscores, again, how rich the social science literature on individualism and collectivism is in examples of Jews behaving in ways radically unlike the ways Kevin MacDonald insists they behave. Here, again, MacDonald resolutely refuses to acknowledge information of which he can hardly have been unaware. Having insisted that "in Triandis' terms" Jews ought to be understood as ethnocentric, authoritarian "hyper-collectivists," MacDonald could hardly have been confronted with a more embarrassing passage than one in which Triandis associates Israeli Jews with a cultural orientation less disposed to ethnocentrism than that of American individualism, and, worse still, in which Triandis explicitly shows that Israeli Jews are far less inclined to knuckle under to authoritarian directives than are those same American individualists.

Another Pass at "Hyper-collectivist" Jewish Ethnocentrism

Consultation of the research which Kevin MacDonald himself describes as "most relevant to conceptualizing Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy" thus reveals that he radically and consistently misstates its findings with respect to Jews. In spite of his

⁶⁸ Triandis, *Individualism and Collectivism*, 131. Triandis's citation: Miriam Erez and P. Christopher Earley, "Comparative Analysis of Goal Setting Strategies," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 72: 658-665.

breezy assertion that “[t]here is little doubt that Jews tend toward the extreme end of the collectivism dimension,”⁶⁹ an assertion informed less by cited data than by an accumulation of anecdotes buttressed by MacDonald’s own suggestions and suppositions, the actual research that considers Jews in the context of the ‘collectivism dimension’ places Jews nowhere near the “hyper-collectivist” extreme. Instead, these studies reliably place Jewish groups near the mean for this dimension among all human groups; so close to the mean, in fact, that there is some disagreement among researchers as to whether to describe Jewish culture as collectivistic or individualistic.

Indeed, the literature he himself calls “most relevant to conceptualizing Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy” consistently finds Jews less strongly marked for distinguishing characteristics of MacDonald’s Jewish “hyper-collectivism,” such as the tendencies toward authoritarianism and self-deception, than are other religious or ethnic groups, particularly MacDonald’s own. There can be little doubt that MacDonald is familiar with these findings; they are either reported directly in publications he is known to have consulted, such as those by Harry Triandis and Bob Altemeyer, or they are removed from these studies by a distance of one or, at most, two traced citations. Nor does the literature in this field of research support MacDonald’s insistence that Jewish culture is profoundly, fundamentally incompatible with Western culture. To the extent that researchers address the question of cultural similarity or compatibility at all, they take the position stated most clearly by Triandis himself (in a volume MacDonald does not cite). Juxtaposing Israel with the United States, Triandis compares them by assessing cultural differences across five broadly considered “facets.”

Minimal cultural distance will exist when the language, family structure, religion, GNP/cap, and values can be identified. The largest distance will occur when all five facets are different. In the case of the United States and Israel, the language belongs to different families (but most Israelis learn English); family structure is quite similar; religion is somewhat different, but monotheism results in common traditions; the GNP/cap is different, but not very different; values are different, but compared with the world relatively similar. All in all, in worldwide perspective, the two cultures are a lot more similar than different.⁷⁰

MacDonald is remarkably consistent in his response to the studies that support such conclusions: he pretends they do not exist. He mentions not one of the studies involving Jews cited by Triandis—including the one he indirectly (and speciously) latches upon as evidence that Triandis includes Jews in the ‘collectivist category.’ Not once does MacDonald acknowledge the deeply embarrassing reports by Bob Altemeyer that Jews are consistently among the *least* authoritarian of any of the religious groups he studies, or that this distinction holds true even when highly religious Jews are compared against other highly religious people.

It is not as though MacDonald does not actively seek research data concerning Jews that will support his notion of Jewish “hyper-collectivism.” He is happy to report, for instance, on a study that finds “that Jews had the highest bias toward their own ethnic group among groups classified as White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs), Asians,

⁶⁹ MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents*, 18.

⁷⁰ Harry Triandis, *Culture and Social Behavior* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), 33. It is interesting that this particular work by Triandis appears in none of MacDonald’s first-edition bibliographies.

Italians, Other Europeans, and Blacks, with the only significant difference between Jews and WASPs.”⁷¹ Predictably enough, however, MacDonald does not bother to give his readers all the relevant information reported in this study. The authors, Irwin Silverman and Danielle Case, gave subjects questionnaires describing a series of hypothetical situations in which their responses would place them at increasing levels of risk if they were to prefer a member of their own group over a member of another group. For instance:

- You are about to make a household appliance purchase of about one thousand dollars, and you have a choice of two brands. One is manufactured by a company owned by ALPHAS [i.e., the subject’s own ethnic group], and the other by BETAS. Which would you buy if:
- They are equivalent in quality, service, price and every other relevant aspect?
 - They are equivalent in every relevant aspect except that the ALPHA’s product is about \$30 higher in price?
 - They are equivalent in every relevant aspect except that the ALPHA’s product is about \$150 higher in price.⁷²

The authors did indeed find, as MacDonald reports, a higher ingroup bias among Jews than the other groups. They also qualified this by noting, “it should be considered that these differences may, to some extent, represent tolerance for costs and/or risks rather than ethnocentrism.” MacDonald leaves the qualification out, of course, although it is hard to fault him much for this. He can, however, be severely faulted for ignoring the context and conclusions of this study, which directly contradict a) his oft-repeated claim that members of his own group, as Ice-Age hardened individualists, are generally more resistant to ethnocentrism than other groups, and b) his broader argument that ethnic conflict is a genetically-driven phenomenon with world-changing implications. He does not mention, for instance, that under the no-risk scenarios, more than ninety percent of the responses showed ingroup bias, suggesting a universal tendency toward casual, low-cost ethnocentrism from which members of his own ethnicity are by no means exempt. Moreover, with increasing risk (i.e., moving through options b and c in each scenario), all of the groups—including Jews—showed a marked preference for self-interest over ethnic group interest. An interesting outlier case involved charitable giving: asked if they were inclined to give to an inefficiently managed ingroup charity than to a well-run outgroup charity, respondents proved to be more willing to accept this cost than was typical of the other highest-cost (option c) outcomes. Given the traditionally high emphasis on ingroup charity in Jewish cultures, it would be interesting to know if Jews were more heavily over-represented in their tolerance for sloppily-run Jewish charities than they were in the other high-risk scenarios. In other words, does this statistically significant difference between Jewish ethnocentrism and “WASP” ethnocentrism still obtain if we throw out the outlier question? Unfortunately, the authors do not show a break down of the responses to individual questions along ethnic lines, so a definitive answer to this question is not possible based on the available data.

The real point of the study, however, is not to establish differences in rates of ethnocentrism across ethnic groups, but to test the tenacity of ethnocentrism when it is

⁷¹ MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents*, 17.

⁷² Irwin Silverman and Danielle Case, “Ethnocentrism vs. Pragmatism in the Conduct of Human Affairs,” in *Indoctrinability Ideology and Warfare: Evolutionary Perspectives* (New York: Berghahn, 1998), 394.

challenged by competing interests. The critical point is the finding that for all of the groups participating in the study, including Jews, self-interest trumps ethnocentrism.

To the extent that the ALPHA/BETA survey elicited projects of subjects' probable behaviors, the conclusion of this study is that ethnocentrism is a generally weak motive, readily relinquished when confronted with utilitarian considerations. Thus, it seems fallacious to regard ethnic nepotism as the root cause of human intergroup conflict. The thesis underlying the present study—that intergroup contests are primarily driven by pragmatics, and that ethnocentric rationales by protagonists are, in fact, rationalizations—appears more feasible.⁷³

Here, again, we have an example of MacDonald extracting a bit of useful-seeming data from research that in fact soundly thrashes the core contentions of his theory. In context, the stronger tendency of Jews than “WASPs” to favor the ingroup (with none of the other groups showing a statistically meaningful difference with either Jews *or* “WASPs”) was far less significant than the profound lack of sustained ingroup bias among all of the groups when issues of immediate self-interest are also in play. This finding is of worse than no use to MacDonald, and, predictably, he ignores it entirely. Indeed, like Triandis and Altemeyer, it almost seems as if Silverman and Case are addressing MacDonald directly when they state that “ethnocentric rationales”—such as the one that drives his theory of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy—“are, in fact, rationalizations.”

On Self-Deception as a Feature of the Theory of Judaism as a Group Evolutionary Strategy

MacDonald's account of the psychological research involving Jews and collectivism, then, is flatly false, and there can be little doubt that he knows his account to be false. For every instance in which the behavior of Jews is actually measured against some indicator for “hyper-collectivism” in published research of which he is clearly aware, the results show Jews behaving in ways utterly unlike the ways MacDonald ‘supposes’ them to behave. His scientific demonstration of Jewish difference is a fiction. But Kevin MacDonald is not some wild-eyed, vaguely unhygienic obsessive, stewing in his mother's basement with its walnut paneling and orange shag carpeting, cranking out venomous tracts against the world Jewish conspiracy. He is a tenured academic professional, one who presumably understands his responsibility to construct a scientific theory that accounts for relevant evidence rather than evading it. It is utterly inconceivable, for instance, that MacDonald cannot have understood the implications of his omission of Bob Altemeyer's unambiguous, repeated reports that Jews are very low on authoritarianism while at the same time promoting his own unsubstantiated supposition that Jews, as “hyper-collectivists,” will be highly authoritarian. In case after case MacDonald deliberately chooses to avoid reporting information that he knows to be damaging to his theory. What can he possibly hope to achieve by devoting so much time and effort to what can only be characterized as an extended exercise in academic fraud?

A potential answer to this question snaps into focus when we consider that MacDonald's assessment of members of his own ethnic group rests on as distorted a reading of the research literature as does his assessment of Jews. Let us assume, for the

⁷³ Silverman and Case, “Ethnocentrism vs. Pragmatism,” 400.

sake of discussion, that MacDonald omits the inconvenient findings from the literature he ‘cites,’ not because he doubts the validity of such findings, but because he *accepts* their validity. (I am clearly speculating here.) It then becomes extremely salient indeed to recall that in Triandis 1995, in Schwartz, Bilsky & Struch 1990, and in Altemeyer 1994 appear findings by various measures indicating an association between self-deception and ethnocentrism on the part of “gentile European” or North American individualists, and particularly (in Triandis and Altemeyer) those with authoritarian proclivities.

Consider this passage from Triandis:

Gelfand, Triandis, and Chan (in preparation) asked Illinois students to make similarity judgments among sentences that represented individualism (e.g., do my own thing), collectivism (e.g., do what my group wants me to do), and authoritarianism (e.g., obedience to authority). The researchers submitted these judgments to multidimensional scaling and found that these subjects saw individualism and authoritarianism as opposites; collectivism was orthogonal (unrelated) to that dimension. Thus, in the natural cognitions of American undergraduates at least, individualism and collectivism are orthogonal and the opposite of individualism is authoritarianism.⁷⁴

Triandis is far from certain that individualism and authoritarianism are as profoundly opposed as his Illinois undergraduates believe them to be, although he does not suggest that this posited opposition might represent a self-deceptive disconnect in the minds of these American individualists. Yet we have also seen that he reports on studies showing that individualists are indeed more susceptible than collectivists to ego-inflating self-deceptions,⁷⁵ that American individualists are far more willing to submit to imposed instructions than Israeli “horizontal collectivists,”⁷⁶ and that ethnocentrism among individualists is found among those who also favor characteristics that map well against the authoritarian mindset, such as “hard work, thrift, punctuality, sexual repression and delays in gratification.”⁷⁷ For ethnocentric individualists, moreover, the prejudicial impulse is located precisely in issues of self-image: “[V]ertical individualists are more likely to put down groups that are different from their own, in an effort to be ‘distinguished’ and to win the ‘competition in the market place.’”⁷⁸ These findings suggest not only that authoritarianism is, along with ethnocentrism, quite compatible with vertical individualism, but that vertical individualists may also be especially prone to deceive themselves as to how authoritarian they really are.

Altemeyer, whose emphasis is on Right Wing Authoritarianism rather than on individualism-collectivism constructs, states clearly that tendencies toward self-deception are strong among authoritarians: “Most Highs do not realize they are unusually submissive, conventional, and aggressive.”⁷⁹ Not only are they likely to be unaware of their own authoritarianism, they are also prone to be self-deceived about how ethnocentric they are, and they are more likely to want to keep it that way.

⁷⁴ Triandis, *Individualism and Collectivism*, 51.

⁷⁵ Triandis, *Individualism and Collectivism*, 69-70.

⁷⁶ Triandis, *Individualism and Collectivism*, 131.

⁷⁷ Triandis, *Individualism and Collectivism*, 126.

⁷⁸ Triandis, *Individualism and Collectivism*, 125.

⁷⁹ Altemeyer, “Reducing Prejudice in Right-Wing Authoritarians,” 147.

Direct evidence of some authoritarians' *I Don't Want To Know* attitude came in 1992 when I administered a booklet of surveys under "secret number" conditions. Students again answered anonymously, except they wrote down a personally relevant number that they would recognize when I (supposedly) brought individual feedback sheets to their class. After answering an ethnocentrism scale, the students were asked "If it turns out you are highly prejudiced compared with others, do you want to be told?" Seventy-six percent of the Low RWAs said "yes," compared with 55% of the High RWAs ($p < .001$).⁸⁰

Given Altemeyer's finding that Jews consistently score on the low end of the RWA scale, this offers further indirect evidence that Jews, *pace* MacDonald, are also less prone to self-deception on these issues. As we have seen, Altemeyer informs us (as MacDonald does not) that the subjects of his study on authoritarianism and bigotry are "White North Americans." Interestingly, he found that improving the self-awareness of these bigoted authoritarians may have had some palliative effect on their bigotry.

I suspect personal value confrontation (and perhaps personal religious confrontation) would be particularly troubling to Highs, because they conceive of themselves as "good people." When they could (or, had to) see a way in which they were falling short of their self-image, many may have resolved to change. They seemingly responded beautifully, nondefensively, constructively when an inconsistency in their thinking was pointed out. *Freedom* and *equality* are probably highly compartmentalized concepts in authoritarians' thinking, both endorsed with little thought, as cultural values. But when the connection was made between equality and other people's freedom, a more comprehensive, better integrated understanding of equality in society emerged.⁸¹

So it would appear that tendencies among vertical individualists toward self-deception, authoritarianism and ethnocentrism are tightly interrelated. The need Triandis identifies in some vertical individualists to believe in their own personal superiority contributes to their ethnocentrism, but since this ethnocentrism is in conflict with their competing need, as Altemeyer puts it, to "conceive of themselves as 'good people' as judged by prevailing social norms, they must engage in a fair amount of self-deception to keep the "ego-threatening" disjuncture at bay. A similar process appears to be operating with respect to vertical individualism and authoritarianism: Triandis reports that vertical individualists in the United States are quite prepared to accept direction from authority, but, as we have seen, he also reports on his own study showing that vertical individualists perceive individualism to be opposed to authoritarianism. In juxtaposition, these studies suggest that vertical individualists are more authoritarian than they are prepared to admit, a suggestion that is fully consistent with Altemeyer's observation that many authoritarians do not perceive themselves as such.

Now, with these findings from Triandis and Altemeyer in mind, consider the idyllic vision MacDonald promotes as the naturally occurring social structure best suited to members of his own ethnic group. It is most clearly stated in his discussion of the romantic medievalism of the nineteenth-century German intellectual tradition, but it runs as a leitmotif throughout his Judaism writings.

This tradition idealized the Middle Ages as a period of *Volksgemeinschaft*, a sense of social cohesion, organic unity, cooperation, and hierarchical harmony among all social classes. This tradition can be traced to Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803; see Herder 1774, 189ff), and it

⁸⁰ Altemeyer, "Reducing Prejudice in Right-Wing Authoritarians," 138.

⁸¹ Altemeyer, "Reducing Prejudice in Right-Wing Authoritarians," 147.

attracted the majority of German intellectuals during the period spanning the 19th century to the rise of National Socialism (Mosse 1970, 8). ...

This idea of “hierarchic harmony” and group cohesion apparent among these intellectuals therefore did not originate as an aspect of group conflict between Germans and Jews but predated the escalation of this conflict in the late 19th century. In *Culture of Critique* I suggest that the ideals of hierarchic harmony and muted individualism are primitive features of prototypical Western social organization.⁸²

Further:

My view, which I elaborate in *Culture of Critique*, is that Western societies have a tendency to seek an equilibrium state of hierarchic harmony among the social classes in which there are powerful controls on extreme individualism among the elite classes. This tendency toward hierarchic harmony—a paradigmatic feature of the Christian Middle Ages—combined with assimilationism and individualism has been a powerful force in breaking down barriers within society. The difficulty for a group strategy like Judaism is that, if assimilation fails, the Western tendencies toward universalism and individualism are abandoned. From this perspective, it is no accident that the National Socialist theorist Alfred Rosenberg regarded the Western concepts of universalism and individualism as anathema: Both concepts were incompatible with National Socialism as a closed ethnic group strategy. It is in this sense that the individualist, universalist trends of Western culture are indeed incompatible with Judaism.⁸³

This vision of a hierarchically harmonious, mutedly individualistic, mildly meritocratic Western society in happy equilibrium clearly depends on liberal helpings of authoritarianism, in the form of “powerful social controls” to prevent elites from placing their own interests above those of the group. The stability of such a society also, it turns out, requires ethnic homogeneity.

The society whose acceptance is here attributed to [Charles] Murray [author of *The Bell Curve*] envisions a moderately individualistic society, a society that is meritocratic and hierarchical but also cohesive and culturally and ethnically homogeneous. It is a society with harmony among the social classes and with social controls on extreme individualism among the elite.

There has been a powerful Western tendency to develop such societies, beginning at least in the Middle Ages, but also present, I believe, in the classical Roman civilization of the Republic. The ideal of hierarchic harmony is central to the social program of the Catholic Church beginning during the late Roman Empire and reaching its pinnacle during the High Middle Ages (MacDonald 1995c; [*Separation and Its Discontents*] Ch 5). This ideal is apparent also in a powerful strand of German intellectual history beginning with Herder in the eighteenth century.⁸⁴

The multicultural society of the United States at the turn of the twenty-first century is obviously a far cry from this utopian paradise. Indeed, MacDonald diagnoses the ills now confronting his hierarchically harmonious universe with admirable directness.

⁸² MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents*, 139. MacDonald’s citations: Johann Gottfried Herder, *Yet Another Philosophy for the Enlightenment of Mankind*, trans. F.M. Bernard. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); George Mosse, *Germans and Jews: The Right, the Left, and the Search for a “Third Force” in Pre-Nazi Germany* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1970). It is worth noting that MacDonald appears to be familiar with Herder’s work only in Bernard’s extremely abbreviated English translation.

⁸³ MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents*, 165.

⁸⁴ MacDonald, *Culture of Critique*, 314-15. MacDonald’s citation: Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, *The Bell Curve* (New York: Free Press, 1994); Kevin MacDonald, “Focusing on the Group: Further Issues Related to Western monogamy,” *Politics and Life Sciences* 14: 38-46.

Such a world is threatened from above by the domination of an individualistic elite without commitment to responsible lower-status individuals who may have lesser intellectual ability, talent, or financial resources. It is threatened from within by the development of a society constituted by a set of ethnically divided, chronically competing, highly impermeable groups as represented historically by Judaism and currently envisioned as the model for society by the proponents of multiculturalism. And it is threatened from below by an increasing underclass of people with the attributes described by Herrnstein and Murray [in *The Bell Curve*]: intellectually incompetent and insufficiently conscientious to hold most kinds of jobs; irresponsible and incompetent as parents; prone to requiring public assistance; prone to criminal behavior, psychiatric disorders, and substance abuse; and prone to rapid demographic increase. Such people are incapable of contributing economically, socially, or culturally to a late-twentieth-century society or, indeed, to any human civilization characterized by a substantial degree of reciprocity, volunteerism and democracy.⁸⁵

Tucked away in a chapter endnote is the less-than-stunning revelation that MacDonald's fulminations against the "underclass" are directed against African Americans, who present American civilization with its "most dangerous and most ineradicable threat."⁸⁶ (Another example of MacDonald's tendency to make pregnant relativizing claims: that the African American threat is the "most ineradicable" strongly implies that there must be another, 'less ineradicable' threat awaiting attention.) Ethnic diversity, multiculturalism, unbridled individualism—all of these number among the omni-directional threats facing a society striving to establish and maintain "prototypical Western hierarchical harmony." If Triandis and Altemeyer are right that tendencies toward authoritarianism and ethnocentrism within cultures denoted by Triandis as "vertical individualist" are quite robust, for MacDonald these tendencies are not nearly robust enough. If, however, Altemeyer is also right that members of societies ideologically committed to principles of individual liberty require a healthy dose of self-deception to nurture and sustain their own authoritarian and ethnocentric tendencies, MacDonald faces a dicey methodological challenge. His nearly perfect response to that challenge: the theory of Judaism as a competitive group evolutionary strategy.

Reading MacDonald against Triandis and Altemeyer, it is difficult to escape the impression that he is engaged in a sustained exercise to foster grand-scale self-deception in members of his own ethnic group. Where the sociological literature shows that ethnocentrism comes as easily to people of his own background as to anybody else, MacDonald offers a flattering tale of genetic exceptionalism to persuade them differently.

Groups that are geographically isolated from direct competition with other human groups for an evolutionarily significant period may not have developed the propensity toward extreme collectivism and ethnocentrism.

I speculate that such isolated groups with low population density would have been common in northern areas characterized by extremely harsh ecological conditions, as occurred during the Ice Age. Under ecologically adverse circumstances, adaptations are directed more at coping with the adverse physical environment than at competing with other groups (Southwood (1977, 1981), and in such an environment, there would be less pressure for selection of highly collectivist groups. Evolutionary conceptualizations of ethnocentrism emphasize the utility of ethnocentrism in group

⁸⁵ MacDonald, *Culture of Critique*, 315. The flat assertion that "such people are incapable of contributing economically, socially, or culturally to a late-twentieth-century society or, indeed, to any human civilization" is quite pungent read against the biographical detail that Kevin MacDonald is a failed jazz pianist.

⁸⁶ MacDonald, *Culture of Critique*, 322 n6.

competition. Ethnocentrism would thus be of no importance at all in combating the physical environment, and such an environment would not support large groups.⁸⁷

MacDonald's speculative "evolutionary conceptualizations" effectively insulate him against the need to consult any actual studies of ethnocentrism among these Ice-Age tempered individualists. Such studies are rendered irrelevant *a priori*; if the individualistic resistance to ethnocentrism of MacDonald's ethnic kin is genetically informed, any evidence of behavior that drifts from this standard must by definition be a deviation, a "departure from Western tendencies toward universalism and muted individualism."⁸⁸ As the result of external, environmental pressures, then, such departures would have no bearing at all on Westerners' true, inherent, essential nature. The explosions of authoritarian, ethnocentric collectivism documented in *Separation and Its Discontents* were simply reactions against predatory Jewish competition, in no way reflective of any underlying natural tendencies. Indeed, once such authoritarian outbursts have been allowed to fulfill their adaptive function, MacDonald 'suggests,' they just fade away.

[G]iven the Western tendency toward "muted individualism" and hierarchic harmony, there is the suggestion that in the absence of a hated and feared outgroup such as the Jews, there would be a tendency toward decomposition of collectivist, authoritarian social structures in the West. From this perspective, the apparently primitive Western tendency toward a significant degree of individualism, possibly deriving from a unique ancestral environment (see *PTSDA*, Ch. 8), results in an inertial tendency toward assimilatory, reproductively egalitarian, and moderately individualistic societies.⁸⁹

Charmingly, this reassuring passage occurs at the end of MacDonald's discussion of German National Socialism, and, oblique as it is, it constitutes the only reference in the entire chapter to the most direct policies undertaken by the National Socialists to effect "the absence of a hated and feared outgroup such as the Jews." MacDonald's examination of anti-Jewish policy under the Nazis ends with the promulgation of the Nuremberg Laws. That Jews in Hitler's Germany were subjected by these laws to restrictions against intermarriage, professional restrictions, and to such petty-minded indignities as exclusion from public parks and "prohibitions against owning pets"⁹⁰ captures Kevin MacDonald's attention; more evolutionarily conclusive programs executed by the Nazis to combat the Jewish threat, however, are apparently beneath his notice.

MacDonald and his kin, then, are remarkably resistant to the blandishments of self-deception, ethnocentrism, and authoritarianism. Thanks to their distinctive genes they are also, it turns out, uniquely ethical beings.

Although many intellectuals continue to attempt to alter fundamental Western tendencies toward assimilation, muted individualism, and hierarchic harmony, there is a real possibility that these Western ideals are not only more achievable but also profoundly ethical. Uniquely among all the

⁸⁷ MacDonald, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone*, 237. MacDonald's citations: T.R.E. Southwood, "Habitat, the Temple for Ecological Strategies?" *Journal of Animal Ecology* 46: 447-66; T.R.E. Southwood, "Bionomic Strategies and Population Parameters," in *Theoretical Ecology: Principles and Applications*, Robert M. May, ed. (Sunderland, Mass.: Sinauer, 1981).

⁸⁸ MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents*, 133.

⁸⁹ MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents*, 165.

⁹⁰ MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents*, 135.

stratified cultures of the world, prototypical Western societies have provided the combination of a genuine sense of belonging, a large measure of access to reproductive opportunities, and the political participation of all social classes combined with the possibilities of meritocratic upward social mobility.⁹¹

Indeed, it is precisely their uniquely ethical predispositions that make Westerners so vulnerable to Jewish predation. Jews, being Jews, cannot help but exploit the European individualists' inherent good nature to advance their own competitive group interests.

The implication is that Western societies are subject to invasion by non-Western cultures able to manipulate Western tendencies toward reciprocity, egalitarianism, and close affectional relationships in a manner that results in maladaptive behavior for the European-derived peoples who remain at the core of all Western societies. Because others' interests and perspectives are viewed as legitimate, Western societies have uniquely developed a highly principled moral and religious discourse, as in the arguments against slavery characteristic of the nineteenth-century abolitionists and in the contemporary discourse on animal rights. Such discourse is directed toward universal moral principles—that is, principles that would be viewed as fair for any rational, disinterested observer. ... It is this intellectual tradition that has been effectively manipulated by Jewish intellectual activists ...⁹²

This paean to his ethnic group's unique claim to "a highly principled moral and religious discourse" is certainly well removed from the data reported by Triandis and Altemeyer. (I should also note how MacDonald grounds his claim to his genetically-derived moral superiority on a rhetorical gesture that, comically enough, equates outrage over black slavery with the campaign for animal rights, a piquant moment in light of the vehement contempt we have seen him express for the African-American "underclass." Honestly, sometimes it seems as if he just cannot help himself.) If it is Altemeyer's goal to reduce self-deception among right wing authoritarians in order to reduce levels of prejudice, Kevin MacDonald must be seen as the anti-Altemeyer, whose evident goal is to encourage self-deception among members of his own ethnic group, targeted at that measurable percentage of them who, as the literature shows, already sport well-developed tendencies toward authoritarianism and ethnocentrism.

Political Objectives

Earlier in this discussion I referred to MacDonald's recent address, given on the occasion of his receipt of the "Jack London Literary Prize" for his tireless efforts on behalf of beleaguered occidentals such as himself. In this address he calls on his ethnic kin (all of whom, he observes, are as closely related to one another, genetically speaking, as grandparents are to their own grandchildren), to be prepared for sacrifice.

[I]t is very rational to make extreme sacrifices for our ethnic group. And I would like to underline that. Because of the large number of ethnic brethren numbering in the hundreds of millions, we are actually far better off from an evolutionary point of view if we have a positive influence on the future of our ethnic group than when we successfully rear our own children. Extreme self-sacrifice is entirely warranted and rational if it has a positive effect on our ethnic survival. I think we should all keep this in mind when planning our future life course.⁹³

⁹¹ MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, 318.

⁹² MacDonald, *Culture of Critique*, 328.

⁹³ MacDonald, "Can the Jewish Model Help the West Survive?"

On the whole, he is coyly unspecific about the precise nature of the “extreme sacrifices” he demands of his “ethnic brethren.” He does express the desire to see wealthy “brethren” emulate the behavior of those wealthy Jews who donate to explicitly Jewish charitable causes, but it is hard to believe that this is the furthest extent of the required sacrifice he repeatedly describes as “extreme.” Further hints as to the specific kinds of political action he believes will avert “the Darwinian dead end of extinction” for his “ethnic brethren,” however, can be gleaned from observations on offer in his theoretical and ostensibly apolitical scholarship.

Summarizing an argument made by the political scientist Rogers M. Smith,⁹⁴ MacDonald places into consideration “three competing models of American political identity: the ‘liberal’ individualist legacy of the Enlightenment based on ‘natural rights’; the ‘republican ideal of a cohesive, socially homogeneous society (which I have identified as the prototypical Western social organization of hierarchic harmony); the ‘ethnocultural’ strand emphasizing the importance of Anglo-Saxon ethnicity in the development and preservation of American cultural forms.” For MacDonald, only the two latter models offer any reasonable expectation of social stability.

From the present perspective no fundamental conflict exists between the latter two sources of American identity; social homogeneity and hierarchic harmony may well be best and most easily achieved with an ethnically homogeneous society of people derived from the European cultural area.⁹⁵

Smith himself, of course, is clear that “the latter two sources of American identity” have, at best, a checkered history, and do not of themselves offer a viable model for the future development of a communal philosophy of American citizenship.

Despite republicanism’s attraction for contemporary theorists, any honest assessment of it as an American communal tradition must recognize that in legal and political debate it has usually and quite naturally served to assist the repressive side of American ethnocentrism. The resulting longstanding history of invidious discriminations demonstrates that in the United States attention must be always be paid to the threats these ideals pose to liberal values.⁹⁶

Such awareness of a “longstanding history of invidious discriminations” is precisely what MacDonald seeks to erase from the consciousness of his readers. The last thing he wants them to reflect upon, or even acknowledge the existence of, is “the repressive side of American ethnocentrism.” In keeping with the practice we have already observed in his treatment of the work of Triandis, Altemeyer, and Silverman and Case, he simply ignores this repeatedly stressed aspect of Smith’s discussion. By Smith’s explicit reckoning, then, MacDonald’s can hardly be considered an “honest assessment” of republicanism as “an American communal tradition.”

Be that as it may, Smith’s three strands of American citizenship provide MacDonald with a point of departure for his own ruminations on the vulnerabilities of the current

⁹⁴ Misidentified in MacDonald’s text as “Roger Smith.”

⁹⁵ MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, 323-24.

⁹⁶ Rogers M. Smith, “The ‘American Creed’ and American Identity: The Limits of Liberal Citizenship in the United States,” *The Western Political Quarterly* 41 (1988): 225-251; 247.

political organization of the United States. “As discussed at several points in this volume [i.e., *The Culture of Critique*], the radical individualism embodied in the Enlightenment ideal of individual rights is especially problematic as a source of long-term stability in a Western society because of the danger of invasion and domination by group strategies such as Judaism and the possibility of the defection of gentile elites from the ideals represented in the other two models of social organization [i.e., republicanism and ‘ethnoculturalism’].”⁹⁷ So, near the top of the list of “extreme sacrifices” he is urging upon his “ethnic brethren” would be giving up on the especially problematic “Enlightenment ideal of individual rights.” Indeed, he has at least one quite specific individual right in mind: “Traditional American freedoms such as the First Amendment freedom of speech (deriving from the Enlightenment liberal strand of American identity) have clearly facilitated specifically Jewish interests in the construction of culture, interests that conflict with the possibility of constructing a cohesive society built around high-investment parenting.”⁹⁸ If he and his “ethnic brethren” are to defend themselves against the predatory threat of Jewish “invasion and domination,” the first thing to go will have to be the Bill of Rights, starting right at the top.

Thanks to the Jewish proponents of multiculturalism, however, the horse is already well out of the barn; abolishing hopelessly maladaptive “traditional American freedoms” is no more than the requisite first step toward restoring to MacDonald’s “ethnic brethren” that undisputed hegemony over (or isolation from) other groups which is apparently their only guarantee against “the Darwinian dead end of extinction.” Given the persistent reality of ethnic diversity in the United States, any effective policy designed to establish a political organization conformant with “prototypical Western social structure” will have to adopt specific policies to address the specific threats posed by specific ethnic groups. In this regard, it is interesting that MacDonald invites his readers to muse with him on measures that “would be required,” to “minimize group conflict” with Jews under conditions of ethnic diversity.

Because ethnic groups have differing talents and abilities and differing parenting styles, variable criteria for qualifying and retaining jobs would be required depending on ethnic group membership. Moreover, achieving parity between Jews and other ethnic groups would entail a high level of discrimination against individual Jews for admission to universities or access to employment opportunities and even entail a large taxation on Jews to counter the Jewish advantage in the possession of wealth, since at present Jews are vastly overrepresented among the wealthy and the successful in the United States. This would especially be the case if Jews were distinguished as a separate ethnic group from gentile European Americans.⁹⁹

To be sure, this exercise is nothing but a harmless thought experiment, meant to underscore what MacDonald contends is the inconsistency of Jewish intellectuals who advocate cultural pluralism, on the one hand, and the expectation that different groups can coexist in “complete political equality and economic opportunity”¹⁰⁰ on the other. Purely by happy accident, these musings on the policies that “would be required” to establish “ethnic parity” between Jews and “gentile European Americans” are also fully

⁹⁷ MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, 324.

⁹⁸ MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, 325-26.

⁹⁹ MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, 307-8.

¹⁰⁰ MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, 306.

compatible with a program designed to move American culture from the maladaptive multicultural situation in which it is currently mired to a hierarchically harmonious, ethnically homogeneous, healthily adaptive social structure. It takes no imagination at all to envision the elaborate bureaucratic architecture that would be required to administer such policies. After decades of rampant intermarriage, of course, the genetic distinction between Jews and “gentile European Americans” is less than ideally precise; only the most rigorous examination of each individual’s ancestry will prevent “gentile European Americans” from committing the maladaptive mistake of allowing some number of crypto-Jews to evade the powerful social controls designed to contain their group evolutionary strategy (see also Spain, fifteenth century). The assembly of such highly detailed ancestry records will necessarily be extremely invasive, but success in the effort to combat the Jewish strategy depends vitally on the collection of such information. Chalk up one more “extreme sacrifice.”

As must be obvious, no policy to protect the dominance of MacDonald’s “ethnic brethren” can hope to be effective without the enactment of measures that by any reckoning would have to be described as extremely authoritarian and extremely ethnocentric. Yet, as Altemeyer shows, the advocacy and imposition of such policies runs headlong into the need of those White North Americans who are highly authoritarian to “conceive of themselves as ‘good people,’” a need strongly informed by self-deceptive convictions that they are neither authoritarian nor ethnocentric. The formulas of Kevin MacDonald’s theory of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy perfectly resolve this cognitive dissonance, promising his “ethnic brethren” that no matter what policy measures they adopt, thanks to their noble genetic heritage bequeathed to them by their Ice-Age ancestors, their true and essential, non-authoritarian, non-ethnocentric nature remains constant, and will surely reassert itself when the adaptive moment is right. The unappealing reality of their own tendencies to ethnocentrism and authoritarianism he encourages them to displace onto his chimerical Jewish monsters, the “hyper-collectivists” who appear nowhere in the sociological literature he pretends to consult, but instead are grotesqueries of his own imagining.

Conclusion

In this discussion I have identified several studies that undermine or contradict key claims of the theory of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy, and I have shown that Kevin MacDonald resorts to highly inventive citation strategies in order to avoid acknowledging these contradictions. Now let me be clear: MacDonald is under no obligation to accept without challenge or critique the information contained in any of these studies. He would certainly be within his rights to dispute their data-gathering methodologies, their interpretations or their conclusions. For instance Geert Hofstede’s work, as widely admired as it is, also has a number of vocal detractors—although I note that Harry Triandis, who cites Hofstede almost as frequently as MacDonald cites Triandis, is not among them. Bob Altemeyer has also been subjected to scornful critiques, particular on the part of colleagues who seem eager to rescue political conservatism from his skeptical analysis. Alternatively, MacDonald could address the apparent disconnect between the reported data (i.e., that Jews are very low on authoritarianism) and his own

claims (i.e., that Jews are “supposed” to be highly authoritarian) and show that such data actually fits with his theory; given its morass of internal contradictions, this might actually have been the path of lesser resistance. But in his published scholarship MacDonald does not take any such approach to these studies, choosing instead either falsely to report them, or to proceed as though they did not exist at all. I submit that this is sufficient evidence to conclude that MacDonald’s books have little to do with coming to a clear understanding of actual Jews or actual Jewish cultures. Rather, they have a great deal to do with promoting a pre-determined notion of Jewish difference that fits smoothly into the self-serving, resentment-driven cosmology of white-separatist racialism. There is in short every good reason to agree with MacDonald’s assertion “that the area of psychological research most relevant to conceptualizing Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy is that of research on individualism/collectivism.” The relevant conclusion to draw from this most relevant body of research is simply that Kevin MacDonald had good reasons indeed not to consult it.

I imagine some readers will be tempted to assume that I am seeking to replace MacDonald’s model of genetic difference pitting “hyper-collectivist” Jews against uniquely ethical European individualists with another genetic model, though one less overtly offensive to my own ingroup. In fact, I have no idea whether any of the behavioral or attitudinal differences documented by Bob Altemeyer or by Harry Triandis and the researchers he cites have anything at all to do with genetic difference. Certainly, none of these researchers makes any such claim, and I do not pretend to expertise that would authorize me to have, let alone express, an opinion on the question. My conclusion here is much more limited in scope, and addresses the specific issues raised by the work of a single individual: comparison of Kevin MacDonald’s writings on Jews to the research on which his theory is purportedly based makes quite clear that he is constructing a fable, inventing blatantly false constructions of Jewish behavioral difference which he then ascribes to Jewish genetic difference. This fable serves as the basis for a political agenda targeted at the destruction of the fundamental values of the American social and political system, with an interest in restricting the rights of Jews in particular, but with clear designs on the rights of all American citizens. Given the consistent thrust of the serial falsifications MacDonald commits against the research he cites, I think it fully reasonable to conclude that this venal political agenda is the force that drives his theory, and not, as he and his defenders would have it, the other way around.

MacDonald once publicly declared that he did not believe himself to be antisemitic because he felt no personal ill-will toward Jews as such. Perhaps he does not—only MacDonald himself can know the truth of this. It is, however, quite impossible to miss his conviction that it would be a good thing, or at least an “adaptive” one, if other members of his own ethnic group were indeed to adopt a broad-based ill will against Jews and other ethnicities, to develop an awareness of them “as competing, negatively evaluated outgroups.”¹⁰¹ An old saw of armchair historical debate poses the question: did Hitler really hate the Jews himself, or did he just use hatred of Jews to promote his own agenda? The implicit premise is that the cynical manipulation of other people’s passions

¹⁰¹ MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, 330.

is somehow either less or more morally culpable than to be moved by hateful passions of one's own. To my mind, the question is uselessly circular; in the end, there is no useful distinction to be made between someone who is himself antisemitic as opposed to someone who believes it would be good for many other people to be antisemitic. Whatever his personal feelings about Jews, MacDonald has dedicated himself to the mission of cultivating widespread hostility toward Jews based on fraudulent claims of Jewish difference and European exceptionalism, an exercise that is by definition indistinguishable from any other form of antisemitism.